Rong Yao Zhou v. Jennifer Mall Restaurant, Inc.
1987 D.C. App. LEXIS 502, 1987 WL 22696, 534 A.2d 1268 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
A commercial vendor of alcohol's unexcused violation of a statute prohibiting the sale of alcohol to an intoxicated person constitutes negligence per se, giving rise to a common law cause of action for third parties who are subsequently injured as a proximate result of the statutory violation.
Facts:
- Employees of the Brittany Restaurant, owned by Jennifer Mall Restaurant, Inc. in Washington, D.C., served alcohol to a patron, Peter Joray.
- The employees continued to serve Joray after he had become intoxicated and after his intoxication had become apparent.
- After leaving the restaurant in his impaired condition, Joray drove his car.
- On the evening of May 28, 1982, Joray's car struck and seriously injured Rong Yao Zhou and Xiu Juan Wu, residents of the District of Columbia.
- The collision occurred on Connecticut Avenue in Chevy Chase, Maryland, near the border with the District of Columbia.
Procedural Posture:
- Rong Yao Zhou and Xiu Juan Wu filed a lawsuit against Jennifer Mall Restaurant, Inc. in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the trial court of first instance.
- The defendant, Jennifer Mall Restaurant, filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
- The Superior Court judge granted the defendant's motion, dismissing the case.
- The plaintiffs, Rong Yao Zhou and Xiu Juan Wu, appealed the dismissal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the highest court for the District.
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Issue:
Does a tavern keeper who violates D.C. Code § 25-121(b) by serving an already intoxicated patron owe a duty of care to third parties who are subsequently injured by the patron's intoxicated acts, thereby giving rise to a cause of action for negligence?
Opinions:
Majority - Newman, J.
Yes. A tavern keeper's violation of a statute designed for public safety supplies the standard of care in a common law negligence action, and a plaintiff who alleges such a violation and proximate cause states a valid cause of action. The court determined that District of Columbia law applies under a governmental interests analysis, as the negligent conduct occurred in D.C., the defendant is a D.C. corporation, and the plaintiffs are D.C. residents; the location of the injury in Maryland was merely fortuitous. The court rejected the need to find an 'implied cause of action' within the statute itself, instead holding that the judicial branch can adopt a legislative enactment as the standard of care in a common law negligence claim. The court concluded that D.C. Code § 25-121(b), which prohibits serving intoxicated persons, has a clear public safety purpose designed to prevent the harms associated with intoxication, such as drunk driving accidents. Therefore, an unexcused violation of this statute is negligence per se, and the patron's subsequent drunk driving is a foreseeable consequence, not an intervening cause that breaks the chain of causation.
Dissenting - Nebeker, J.
No. The court should abstain from judicially creating this cause of action. The dissent argues that this holding creates an arbitrary distinction, providing a remedy for those injured by patrons served after becoming drunk, but not for those injured by patrons served until they become drunk. More fundamentally, the dissent contends that creating this form of liability is a significant policy decision that should be left to the legislature, or the 'political process.' The dissent fears this ruling places the court on a slippery slope toward expanding liability to social hosts, a step that should only be taken after legislative debate and consideration.
Analysis:
This case is significant for establishing common law dram shop liability in the District of Columbia for the first time. The court's decision did not create a new statutory right but instead integrated a pre-existing criminal statute into the common law tort framework of negligence per se. This holding clarified that commercial vendors of alcohol have a duty to the public, the breach of which can lead to civil liability for foreseeable harms like drunk driving accidents. It aligned the District of Columbia with the modern trend of holding alcohol vendors accountable and set a precedent for how violations of other public safety statutes might be treated in tort litigation.
