Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co. et al.
358 U.S. 354 (1959)
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Rule of Law:
Claims rooted in general maritime law do not "arise under" the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States for the purposes of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Federal jurisdiction over such claims is based either on admiralty jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1333) or diversity jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1332).
Facts:
- Francisco Romero, a Spanish citizen, was a crew member on the S.S. Guadalupe.
- The S.S. Guadalupe was a Spanish-registered vessel, sailing under the Spanish flag, and owned by Compañía Trasatlántica, a Spanish corporation.
- Romero's employment contract was made in Spain and was governed by Spanish law.
- The vessel sailed from Spain and docked at the port of New York in Hoboken, New Jersey.
- On May 12, 1954, while the ship was in Hoboken, Romero was seriously injured when he was struck by a cable on deck.
- At the time of the injury, two American companies, International Terminal Operating Co. and Quin Lumber Co., were performing stevedoring and carpentry work on the vessel.
Procedural Posture:
- Francisco Romero filed a suit for damages on the law side of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.
- Romero sued four corporate defendants, asserting claims under the Jones Act and general maritime law.
- Following a pre-trial hearing, the District Court (trial court) dismissed the entire complaint, primarily for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
- Romero, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court) affirmed the District Court's dismissal.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Romero's petition for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which grants federal district courts original jurisdiction over civil actions "arising under" the laws of the United States, encompass claims brought under general maritime law?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Frankfurter
No. Claims rooted in general maritime law do not "arise under" the laws of the United States for the purpose of establishing federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Article III of the Constitution establishes 'Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction' as a separate and distinct head of federal judicial power from 'Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States...'. The Judiciary Act of 1875, the precursor to § 1331, adopted the 'arising under' language and was intended to open federal courts to new federally created rights, not to absorb the long-established and distinct admiralty jurisdiction. For seventy-five years after the Act's passage, courts and commentators uniformly assumed that maritime claims could be heard on the law side of federal court only through diversity jurisdiction. To interpret § 1331 to include general maritime claims now would disrupt the traditional federal-state balance by making all saving-clause cases removable from state court and creating complex jurisdictional and procedural problems. However, because the District Court has jurisdiction over the Jones Act claim, it may exercise 'pendent jurisdiction' over the related general maritime claims against the same defendant.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Black
Yes. Federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 lies for claims under general maritime law. Congressional language that is understandable in ordinary English should not be given a technical or esoteric reading. Furthermore, the Jones Act applies to 'any seaman,' and its scope should not be reduced by judicial notions of international policy, especially when the injury occurred within United States waters. The complaint stated a good cause of action under general maritime law because the tort occurred in the navigable waters of the United States, and jurisdiction should be based on § 1331.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Mr. Justice Brennan
Yes. Federal question jurisdiction under § 1331 extends to claims for maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness. A seaman's right of recovery for these claims is a federally created right, rooted in federal maritime law, which is part of the 'laws of the United States.' A suit 'arises under the law that creates the cause of action,' and here, federal law creates the cause of action. It is a 'gross anomaly' to hold that such a federally rooted action can be brought on the law side of a federal court only if diversity jurisdiction exists. The majority's reliance on 75 years of judicial silence is unpersuasive, as the federal nature of these rights is a more modern legal understanding, making it natural that the jurisdictional question was not previously litigated.
Analysis:
This case is significant for clarifying the jurisdictional boundaries between admiralty and federal question jurisdiction, preventing their merger. It established that general maritime law claims are not, by themselves, sufficient to invoke 'arising under' jurisdiction, thereby preserving the distinct nature of admiralty procedure, such as the absence of a jury. The Court's introduction of 'pendent jurisdiction' in this context provided a crucial procedural mechanism for plaintiffs to join Jones Act claims (with a right to a jury) and general maritime claims in a single civil action, which has become standard practice. The decision also reaffirmed the primacy of the Lauritzen choice-of-law factors in maritime torts involving foreign elements, demonstrating that the place of injury is not determinative.
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