Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison
905 So. 2d 1213, 2005 WL 1039146 (2005)
Rule of Law:
Civil courts generally have subject matter jurisdiction over tort claims, such as negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud, brought against religious institutions for alleged sexual abuse by clergy, as such claims involve the application of neutral, generally applicable laws and do not necessarily require excessive entanglement in ecclesiastical matters under the First Amendment. However, discovery must still respect recognized privileges and protect victim privacy.
Facts:
- In 1969, Dr. Francis and Dorothy Morrison and their three sons (Kenneth, Thomas, and Francis, Jr.) moved to Jackson, Mississippi, and became active parishioners at St. Peter the Apostle Catholic Church.
- The Morrison sons served as altar boys and participated in youth activities, developing a close friendship with Father George Broussard, a priest in the parish, who frequently visited their home and lakehouse.
- Shortly after the family began attending the church, Father Broussard began sexually molesting the three Morrison children at various locations, including their home, lakehouse, and the church.
- In 1973, Dr. Morrison learned from another parishioner about Broussard's possible sexual molestation of another child at St. Peter's.
- Dr. Morrison confronted his two oldest sons, Thomas and Francis, Jr., who confirmed they had also been sexually molested by Broussard.
- Dr. Morrison then confronted officials in the Jackson Diocese, including Vicar General Bernard Law, with the allegations of sexual molestation by Broussard.
- Diocese officials assured Dr. Morrison that Broussard was receiving treatment for his 'illness,' and Dr. Morrison 'left the matter in the church's hands to determine the best course of action.'
- The Diocese did not inform other St. Peter's parishioners of the allegations and allowed Broussard to remain at the church for over a year with unrestricted access to children, during which time he continued to abuse the Morrison boys, albeit less frequently.
- Broussard was subsequently moved to a parish in Waveland, Mississippi, where he allegedly continued to abuse children, before leaving the priesthood approximately a year later.
Procedural Posture:
- Dorothy Morrison and her three children (Kenneth, Thomas, and Francis, Jr.) filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, against the Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson and Bishop William R. Houck.
- Their complaint alleged civil conspiracy; breach of fiduciary duty; intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress; fraud and fraudulent concealment; negligent hiring, assignment and retention; negligent misrepresentation; and negligent supervision; Dorothy Morrison also asserted a claim for loss of consortium.
- During discovery, the Morrisons served interrogatories and requests for documents regarding other claims of sexual molestation by priests.
- The Diocese filed objections to these discovery requests, citing various privileges, and simultaneously filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing a violation of the First Amendment.
- The circuit judge ordered the Diocese to produce all requested documents and interrogatory responses to the court for an in-camera inspection.
- The trial court subsequently denied the Diocese's motion to dismiss and ordered all documents and interrogatory responses to be produced to the Morrisons.
- The Diocese then filed petitions seeking interlocutory appeals of both the denial of the motion to dismiss and the discovery order, which the Supreme Court of Mississippi granted and consolidated.
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Issue:
Does the First Amendment, including the Establishment Clause, Free Exercise Clause, and the Doctrine of Church Autonomy, preclude civil courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over claims of negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against a religious institution concerning alleged sexual abuse of children by its clergy, and do these principles or other recognized privileges bar related discovery?
Opinions:
Majority - Dickinson, Justice
No, the First Amendment does not prevent civil courts from asserting subject matter jurisdiction over the Morrisons' claims against the Diocese, nor does it broadly bar discovery; rather, these claims are subject to generally applicable secular laws. The Court reasoned that the Establishment Clause's prohibition against 'excessive entanglement' is not triggered by common law tort claims (negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress) that have a secular purpose and do not primarily promote or inhibit religion, because sexual molestation is a reprehensible secular conduct, not a religious activity. The Free Exercise Clause also does not provide immunity, as Mississippi's tort laws are neutral and generally applicable regulations of conduct, not targeting religious beliefs or practices. While the Doctrine of Church Autonomy protects internal ecclesiastical matters like ministerial selection and governance, it does not offer blanket immunity from civil responsibility for secular disputes or torts like fraud or the failure to protect children from known dangers. The court affirmed that a fiduciary duty may exist based on factual circumstances beyond mere priestly status, and claims of fraud and negligence (including negligent hiring, retention, and supervision) are not jurisdictionally barred, requiring a factual determination of whether the Diocese had specific knowledge, power, and authority to prevent harm. Regarding discovery, the trial court erred in ordering blanket production; while certain documents are discoverable, attorney-client, work product, and psychotherapist-patient privileges (despite limited waivers to the Diocese) must be respected, and the court declined to recognize a self-critical analysis privilege or a First Amendment/Canon Law discovery privilege, remanding for a detailed privilege log and protection of victims' identities.
Dissenting - Smith, Chief Justice
Yes, the First Amendment, specifically the Doctrine of Church Autonomy, precludes civil courts from asserting jurisdiction over the Morrisons' claims because they fundamentally constitute 'clergy malpractice' and involve intrinsically religious matters. The dissent argued that the claims directly challenge how a Catholic bishop selects, assigns, supervises, and disciplines his priests, as well as his communications about them, which are duties rooted in ordination vows, sacramental theology, and canon law. Adjudicating these claims would require a civil court to define a 'reasonable bishop's' duties or a clergyperson's professional obligations, leading to excessive entanglement in ecclesiastical matters, faith, doctrine, and internal church governance, which civil courts are incompetent to do according to Watson v. Jones and Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese. The dissent maintained that the relationship between a bishop and priest is spiritual, not a secular employer-employee relationship, and civil courts lack the power to oversee how a church speaks or remains silent on ecclesiastical subjects. Therefore, the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and all claims and related discovery should be dismissed.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the extent to which religious institutions can be held civilly liable for the misconduct of their clergy, particularly in cases of child sexual abuse. It underscores that while the First Amendment protects internal church governance and doctrinal matters, it does not grant blanket immunity from generally applicable civil laws designed to protect public safety and prevent harm. The ruling shifts the legal focus from the internal religious nature of clergy-church relationships to the secular duties of care owed to third parties, especially children, when institutions have knowledge and control. This precedent likely facilitates civil litigation against religious organizations in similar abuse cases, requiring them to demonstrate adherence to secular standards of conduct regarding the prevention of foreseeable harm, and it imposes stricter procedural requirements for asserting discovery privileges.
