Rogers v. Watson
1991 Vt. LEXIS 102, 594 A.2d 409, 156 Vt. 483 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
A restrictive covenant's burden will run with the land if intent is implied from a common development scheme, and a court will defer to an agency's objective interpretation of its own regulation unless that interpretation is plainly erroneous.
Facts:
- In 1963, Gerald and Kay Watson purchased a lot in a 200-acre parcel from Olaf and Edwina Bard; this initial deed contained no restrictions.
- The Bards subsequently sold other parcels from the development, and each deed, except one to their son, contained a covenant prohibiting mobile homes without the grantor's written approval.
- In 1977, Edwina Bard sold a lot adjacent to the Watsons' to Charles and Hazel Wilkinson, and this deed included the restrictive covenant against mobile homes.
- In 1981, the Watsons purchased a portion of the Wilkinsons' lot; the deed transferring this land to the Watsons did not mention the restrictive covenant.
- As a condition of the 1981 purchase, the Watsons agreed with the Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) to defer a permit by promising not to build any structure requiring plumbing and sewage facilities without first obtaining a permit.
- In 1985, to house their ill son-in-law and his family, the Watsons placed a mobile home on the lot acquired from the Wilkinsons.
- The Watsons poured a foundation, installed a septic system, and connected heat and electricity, but did not connect the mobile home to water or sewage facilities.
- The family used the mobile home as their residence but went to the Watsons' main house for all needs requiring water or sewage.
Procedural Posture:
- Adjoining landowners and Edwina Bard sued Gerald and Kay Watson in a Vermont trial court, seeking an injunction to remove a mobile home.
- The plaintiffs also sued the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources (ANR), asking the court to compel the ANR to enforce its subdivision regulations.
- The ANR filed a cross-claim against the Watsons to enforce the regulations directly.
- The trial court found for the plaintiffs and the ANR, granting an injunction requiring removal of the mobile home and imposing a fine.
- The Watsons, as appellants, appealed the trial court's judgment to the Supreme Court of Vermont.
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Issue:
Does a restrictive covenant against mobile homes run with the land to a subsequent purchaser when intent is implied from a common development scheme, and does an agency regulation requiring a permit for structures whose 'useful occupancy' requires plumbing apply to a mobile home where plumbing is installed but not connected?
Opinions:
Majority - Dooley, J.
Yes. A restrictive covenant against mobile homes runs with the land where intent is implied from a common development scheme, and an agency regulation applies based on the objective nature of a structure, not its subjective use. The court held that the burden of the covenant ran with the land because the restriction against mobile homes is intimately connected with the land and the Bards' inclusion of the covenant in nearly all other deeds demonstrated an intent to create a common development scheme. Enforcement was proper because the grantor's executor, who was explicitly named as an enforcer in the covenant, was a plaintiff. Regarding the ANR regulation, the court deferred to the Agency's interpretation, finding it was not plainly erroneous. The regulation establishes an objective standard: whether a mobile home of its type can be usefully occupied without plumbing, not whether the Watsons were actually using it without plumbing. This objective interpretation prevents impracticable enforcement burdens and narrowly construes an exemption to the general permit requirement.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies two important legal principles. In property law, it affirms that the intent for a covenant's burden to run with the land can be implied from a common development scheme, even if implemented imperfectly, strengthening the ability to enforce community-wide restrictions. In administrative law, the ruling strongly reinforces judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations, establishing that such interpretations will be upheld unless 'plainly erroneous.' This prioritizes objective, predictable standards for regulations over subjective, case-by-case analyses of an individual's specific use of a property or structure.
