Rogers v. United States
340 U.S. 367, 95 L. Ed. 2d 344, 1951 U.S. LEXIS 2154 (1951)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A witness who voluntarily discloses incriminating facts waives the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as to the details of those facts. Once a witness has chosen to testify about a criminal connection, they cannot refuse to answer follow-up questions on the grounds that the details might further incriminate them.
Facts:
- A federal grand jury in Colorado was investigating the Communist Party.
- In September 1948, Jane Rogers was subpoenaed and testified before the grand jury.
- Rogers admitted that she had served as the Treasurer of the Communist Party of Denver.
- She testified that by virtue of her office, she had been in possession of the party's membership lists and dues records.
- Rogers stated that she had turned the records over to another person in January 1948.
- When the grand jury asked her to identify the person to whom she gave the records, she refused to answer.
Procedural Posture:
- When Jane Rogers first refused to identify the recipient of the books before the grand jury, her stated reason was to protect the other person, not to avoid self-incrimination.
- The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado held her in contempt and ordered her into custody.
- The next day, after consulting counsel, Rogers again refused to answer the question, this time asserting her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
- The district court ruled that her refusal was not privileged and sentenced her to four months' imprisonment for contempt of court.
- Rogers (as appellant) appealed her conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's conviction.
- The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review the case.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a witness who voluntarily testifies about their own incriminating activities, such as holding office in the Communist Party, waive their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as to the details of those activities, thereby allowing a court to compel them to answer further related questions?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
Yes, a witness who voluntarily testifies to incriminating facts waives the privilege against self-incrimination regarding the details of those facts. The Fifth Amendment privilege is a personal one that is deemed waived unless it is invoked. Rogers initially refused to answer not on self-incrimination grounds, but on the untenable basis of protecting another person. More importantly, she voluntarily admitted to incriminating facts by describing her membership and office in the Communist Party. Once a witness discloses criminal connections, they are not permitted to stop and must make a full disclosure. To allow a witness to select a stopping point would permit a 'distortion of facts.' After her admission, revealing the name of her successor presented no 'real danger' of further crimination, but only a 'mere imaginary possibility,' as she had already incriminated herself regarding Smith Act violations by admitting her role.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Black
No, a witness does not waive the privilege merely by answering a preliminary question, and any waiver of a constitutional right must be intentional and not lightly inferred. The majority's holding improperly whittles away the Fifth Amendment's protection by creating a broad waiver doctrine. There is no evidence Rogers intended to waive her privilege; she asserted it as soon as she became aware of it. This ruling creates an untenable dilemma for witnesses: they risk contempt for claiming the privilege too early, but risk losing it if they answer a single question. Furthermore, Rogers' initial statements did not amount to an admission of guilt, and being forced to identify her successor would provide additional incriminating information by revealing a potential co-conspirator and key witness against her in a future prosecution.
Analysis:
This decision establishes the 'waiver by testimony' doctrine, significantly impacting Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. It clarifies that the privilege is not a selective tool; once a witness opens the door by admitting to an incriminating fact, they cannot shut it when asked for related details. The case creates a high-stakes 'all or nothing' situation for witnesses, forcing them and their counsel to decide at the outset whether to invoke the privilege completely or risk being compelled to provide a full account. This precedent narrows the practical application of the privilege in testimonial settings, requiring witnesses to be exceptionally cautious about answering any question that could form part of an incriminating narrative.
