Rogers v. State
224 S.W.3d 564, 94 Ark. App. 47 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
Under Arkansas law, an intoxicated person is not in "actual physical control" of a motor vehicle for the purpose of a DWI conviction if the keys are not in the ignition, even if the engine is running via a remote-start system and the person is in the driver's seat.
Facts:
- After drinking alcohol, Charles Rogers was driven back to his Cadillac Escalade by a friend.
- On a very cold night, Rogers used a remote-start device to start his vehicle's engine to warm it up before getting inside.
- Rogers then entered the vehicle and sat in the driver's seat, intending to sleep until he was sober enough to drive.
- The vehicle's remote-start system kept the steering wheel and gear shift locked, making it impossible to drive the vehicle without first inserting the key into the ignition.
- Police officers discovered Rogers asleep or passed out in the driver's seat of the running vehicle.
- The vehicle's engine, headlights, and taillights were on.
- The vehicle's keys were found on the floorboard or in the passenger area, not in the ignition.
Procedural Posture:
- Charles Rogers was charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI).
- The case was tried in the Washington County Circuit Court in a bench trial.
- At trial, Rogers moved for a directed verdict, arguing insufficient evidence of 'actual physical control,' but the motion was denied.
- The trial court found Rogers guilty of DWI.
- Rogers, as the appellant, appealed his conviction to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.
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Issue:
Does an intoxicated person exercise "actual physical control" over a vehicle for purposes of the Arkansas DWI statute if the engine is running via a remote-start device, but the keys are not in the ignition and the vehicle cannot be put in motion without the keys being placed in the ignition?
Opinions:
Majority - Robbins, J.
No. An intoxicated individual is not in 'actual physical control' of a vehicle when the keys are not in the ignition. Precedent from the Arkansas Supreme Court in Dowell v. State established a bright-line rule that actual physical control begins only when the keys are in the ignition. Although the engine was running via remote-start, the state presented no evidence that the keys were in the ignition, and undisputed testimony showed the vehicle was not moveable without the key being placed in the ignition. Criminal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused, and this court is powerless to expand the definition of 'actual physical control' by implication to account for new technology; that is a legislative function.
Dissenting - Bird, J.
Yes. The evidence was sufficient to show Rogers was in actual physical control of the vehicle. The majority's reliance on the Dowell 'key in the ignition' rule is outdated and fails to consider modern technology like remote-start systems. The purpose of the DWI statute is to prevent intoxicated persons from becoming a menace to the public. Rogers started the engine, was in the driver's seat of a running vehicle, and could operate accessories. He exercised directing influence over the vehicle, and the location of the keys is incidental when the engine is already running. He had the ability to manage the vehicle and was a potential menace, which is what the statute aims to prevent.
Dissenting - Griffen, J.
Yes. Rogers's conduct represented precisely the type of public menace the DWI statute is designed to prevent. An intoxicated person sitting behind the wheel of a running vehicle with his foot near the brake poses a significant threat, regardless of how the engine was started. Auto-start technology provides an alternative method to exercise actual physical control, not an exemption from DWI laws. The steps required to make the vehicle drivable—inserting the key—are minimal and do not negate the control he already exercised by starting the engine and occupying the driver's seat. Affirming the conviction would not be creating a crime by implication but rather applying the statute's purpose to modern facts.
Analysis:
This decision strictly adheres to an established bright-line rule, demonstrating judicial reluctance to adapt common law precedent to technological advancements like remote-start vehicles. The court prioritizes the strict construction of criminal statutes over a more flexible, purpose-driven interpretation, effectively creating a 'remote-start loophole' in Arkansas's DWI law. The case highlights the tension between stare decisis and evolving technology, suggesting that the legislature, not the judiciary, must act to close such loopholes if it wishes for the law to keep pace with innovation. This ruling limits the scope of 'actual physical control' and forces prosecutors to prove the key was in the ignition, regardless of other factors showing control.
