Rogers v. Board of Road Com'rs for Kent County
30 N.W.2d 358 (1947) (1947)
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Rule of Law:
A governmental entity's failure to remove a structure from private land after its license to be there has expired constitutes a continuing trespass, for which the defense of governmental immunity is not available.
Facts:
- The Board of County Road Commissioners had an agreement with Theodore Rogers to place a snow fence on his farm property during the winter seasons.
- The agreement specified that the board would remove the entire fence, including all anchor posts, at the end of each season.
- This agreement was renewed for the winter of 1944-1945.
- In the spring of 1945, the board's employees removed the snow fence but failed to remove a steel anchor post, which was left protruding 6 to 8 inches from the ground.
- The anchor post was concealed by tall grass in Rogers' meadow.
- On July 23, 1945, while mowing the meadow, Theodore Rogers' mowing machine struck the hidden post.
- The impact forcibly threw Rogers from the machine, causing severe injuries which resulted in his death on October 25, 1945.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff, widow of Theodore Rogers, filed a lawsuit against the Board of County Road Commissioners in a Michigan circuit court (trial court) to recover damages for her husband's death.
- The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit, asserting the defense of governmental immunity.
- The trial court granted the defendant's motion and dismissed the plaintiff's case.
- The plaintiff appealed the judgment of dismissal to the Supreme Court of Michigan.
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Issue:
Does a county's governmental immunity protect it from liability for injuries caused by a continuing trespass on private land?
Opinions:
Majority - Reid, J.
No. A county's governmental immunity does not shield it from liability for a continuing trespass. The failure to remove the anchor stake after the expiration of the license to have it on the decedent's land constituted a continuing trespass. Citing the Restatement of Torts, the court reasoned that a trespass can be committed by the continued presence of a chattel on another's land after the consent for its presence has been terminated. The court also found that a state statute waiving the State's own immunity from tort liability was in effect at the time of the accident, which undermined the county's claim to derivative immunity.
Concurring - Boyles, J.
No. Governmental immunity is not a defense that a county may interpose against liability for a continuing trespass. This concurrence agrees with the result but on narrower grounds. It relies solely on the common law principle established in cases like Ashley v. City of Port Huron, which holds that governmental entities are liable for direct injuries caused by trespass. The concurrence explicitly rejects the majority's reasoning that the Court of Claims Act waived county immunity, arguing that such an application would be unconstitutional as it would fall outside the scope of the Act's title.
Concurring - Bushnell, J.
No. The waiver of governmental immunity extends to claims against counties. This concurrence also agrees with the result but argues that since counties derive their immunity from the state, the state's statutory waiver of its own immunity under the 1943 Court of Claims Act necessarily ended the derivative immunity of its political subdivisions. It reasons that the legislature did not intend to preserve greater immunity for a county than for the state itself, making the county answerable for the torts of its employees.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the trespass exception to the doctrine of governmental immunity in Michigan. It establishes that when a government entity's actions constitute a continuing physical invasion of private property, it cannot shield itself from liability by claiming it was performing a governmental function. The split reasoning in the concurring opinions on rehearing highlights a key debate: whether this exception is based on common law principles distinguishing trespass from negligence, or on a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity. The prevailing view, adopted by a majority of justices on rehearing, grounded the decision in the common law, ensuring the trespass exception's durability beyond the life of the specific statute.
