Rogers v. Bellei
28 L. Ed. 2d 499, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 61, 401 U.S. 815 (1971)
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Rule of Law:
Congress has the power to impose conditions subsequent on the citizenship of individuals born outside the United States to one citizen parent and one alien parent, as such citizenship is granted by statute and is not protected by the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Facts:
- Aldo Mario Bellei was born in Italy on December 22, 1939, to an Italian father and a native-born United States citizen mother.
- Bellei's mother met the statutory requirements for her physical presence in the U.S. prior to his birth, while his father always remained an Italian citizen and never acquired U.S. citizenship.
- Bellei acquired both Italian citizenship by birth in Italy and United States citizenship at birth under the then-effective Rev. Stat. § 1993, as amended by the Act of May 24, 1934, which included a residence condition.
- Bellei resided in Italy from birth until recently and now resides in England, working as an electronics engineer for a NATO defense program organization.
- Bellei visited the United States five times between 1948 and 1965, entering on his U.S. passport on some occasions, but never establishing continuous physical presence for five years between the ages of 14 and 28.
- U.S. authorities warned Bellei multiple times, in writing and orally, about the residence requirement of § 301(b) and the risk of losing his citizenship if he failed to comply.
- On March 28, 1960, Bellei registered for U.S. Selective Service in Rome and passed a U.S. Army physical examination, but his induction was later deferred due to his NATO employment.
- After February 14, 1964, Selective Service advised Bellei by letter that he had no further military service obligation due to his loss of U.S. citizenship under § 301(b).
Procedural Posture:
- Aldo Mario Bellei instituted an action against the Secretary of State in the Southern District of New York, seeking an injunction against enforcement of § 301(b) and a declaratory judgment that it was unconstitutional.
- Due to improper venue, the case was transferred to the District of Columbia.
- A three-judge District Court was convened, and with stipulated facts, cross-motions for summary judgment were filed.
- The District Court ruled that § 301(b) was unconstitutional, citing Afroyim v. Rusk and Schneider v. Rusk, and granted Bellei's motion for summary judgment.
- The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and, after initial argument, restored the case to the calendar for reargument.
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Issue:
Does Section 301(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which requires foreign-born children of one citizen and one alien parent to reside continuously in the United States for five years between ages 14 and 28 to retain their citizenship, violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause when applied to revoke citizenship for noncompliance?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Blackmun
No, Section 301(b) does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because citizenship acquired by birth abroad to one citizen parent is purely statutory and thus subject to conditions imposed by Congress. The Court distinguished Bellei's situation from citizens covered by the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment (those "born or naturalized in the United States"). Mr. Bellei was not born in the U.S. nor naturalized in the U.S., meaning his citizenship claim derives entirely from congressional statute. Historically, Congress has always had the power to define who can transmit citizenship to children born abroad, and has often placed conditions on such citizenship, or even withheld it entirely. The congressional concern with dual nationality and ensuring a nexus to the United States for citizens is legitimate. The residence requirement is a reasonable means to address these concerns, and it functions as a condition subsequent, which is not constitutionally distinct from a condition precedent in this context. To hold otherwise would force Congress into an "unconditional conferment of United States citizenship at birth" or denying it outright, which the Constitution does not require.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Black
Yes, Section 301(b) unconstitutionally deprives Aldo Mario Bellei of his citizenship because, under Afroyim v. Rusk, Congress cannot strip an American citizen of citizenship without their voluntary assent. The majority's distinction that Bellei is not a "Fourteenth-Amendment-first-sentence citizen" is rejected as creating an unacceptable "hierarchy of citizenship." Justice Black argued that Afroyim was designed to protect "every citizen of this Nation." He asserted that Bellei, by acquiring citizenship under a congressional act establishing a "Rule of Naturalization," should be considered "naturalized in the United States" for constitutional purposes, consistent with the broad definition of naturalization in United States v. Wong Kim Ark. Therefore, he should receive the full protection of the Fourteenth Amendment against involuntary expatriation.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Brennan
Yes, Section 301(b) is unconstitutional because, as a citizen by birth, Bellei could only lose his citizenship if he voluntarily renounced or relinquished it, as established in Afroyim v. Rusk. Justice Brennan argued there is no rational basis to distinguish between citizens whose naturalization occurs within the U.S. and those, like Bellei, who are naturalized overseas by an Act of Congress. He contended that the phrase "naturalized in the United States" in the Fourteenth Amendment should be interpreted broadly to include anyone naturalized by an Act of Congress, regardless of their physical location at the time of naturalization. Therefore, Congress was powerless to strip Bellei of his citizenship through a condition subsequent.
Analysis:
This case significantly narrowed the scope of citizenship protection established in Afroyim v. Rusk by distinguishing between Fourteenth Amendment citizens (born or naturalized in the U.S.) and statutory citizens (born abroad to U.S. parents). It reaffirmed Congress's broad power to define and condition statutory citizenship, particularly regarding dual nationals and residence requirements. The ruling implies that Congress has greater latitude to impose conditions on individuals whose citizenship status is purely a creature of statute, potentially leading to a tiered system of citizenship rights based on the mode of acquisition. This distinction could influence future cases concerning the rights and obligations of various classes of citizens.
