Roe v. Catholic Diocese of Memphis, Inc.
950 S.W.2d 27, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 861 (1996)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
For a defendant's negligence to be the proximate cause of an injury, the harm must be of a general type that a person of ordinary prudence could have reasonably foreseen; a harm that is so shocking, unprecedented, and outside the realm of normal experience is unforeseeable as a matter of law.
Facts:
- John Roe, a four-year-old boy, was enrolled in the preschool day care program at St. Paul’s Catholic School.
- On May 21, 1993, a substitute teacher, Ms. Lashlee, gave John Roe permission to go to the restroom, which was located down the hall out of her sight and hearing.
- Shortly after, Ms. Lashlee allowed a four-year-old classmate, Jimmy Doe, to leave the room to get a drink of water at a fountain near the restroom, instructing him not to enter the restroom.
- While both children were out of the classroom, Jimmy Doe entered the restroom and sexually assaulted and molested John Roe.
- The teacher was momentarily absent from the classroom doorway where she was observing the hallway to attend to a crying child.
- St. Paul’s had never received any prior complaints or reports concerning sexual assault or misconduct among its preschoolers, or specifically regarding either John Roe or Jimmy Doe.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert and Jean Roe, individually and as next friend for their son John Roe, filed a complaint against St. Paul’s Catholic School in the trial court, alleging negligence.
- St. Paul's filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that the assault was unforeseeable as a matter of law.
- The trial court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of St. Paul's.
- The Roes (appellants) appealed the trial court's order to the Tennessee Court of Appeals.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Is a sexual assault between two unsupervised four-year-old boys in a preschool restroom a legally foreseeable harm for the purpose of establishing proximate cause in a negligence claim against the school?
Opinions:
Majority - Crawford, Presiding Judge
No. A sexual assault between two four-year-old boys is not a legally foreseeable harm for the purpose of establishing proximate cause. For proximate cause to exist, the harm must be of a type that a reasonable person could foresee. While the law does not require foreseeing the exact manner of the injury, it does require foreseeing the 'general manner' in which the injury occurred. The court found that a sexual assault between children of this age is so shocking, appalling, and unprecedented that it falls outside the bounds of reasonable foreseeability. The plaintiffs argued that since a general scuffle between boys is foreseeable, this harm should also be. The court rejected this, reasoning that the nature and severity of injuries resulting from a sexual assault are fundamentally different in character from those resulting from a typical scuffle, making the general manner of harm entirely distinct and unforeseeable.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the scope of the foreseeability element within proximate cause, particularly in cases involving children and third-party criminal acts. It establishes that foreseeability is not limitless; there is a point where an act is so bizarre and shocking that a court can rule it unforeseeable as a matter of law, precluding a jury determination. The case distinguishes between the foreseeability of general misbehavior (like a scuffle) and the unforeseeability of a profoundly different and more severe type of harm (like sexual assault). This precedent makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in negligence cases where the injury, while occurring under arguably negligent supervision, is of a highly unusual and shocking nature that the defendant had no reason to anticipate.
