Rodgers Et Ux v. Reimann Et Ux
1961 Ore. LEXIS 312, 361 P.2d 101, 227 Or. 62 (1961)
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Rule of Law:
A prior grantee may enforce a restrictive covenant imposed by a common grantor in a subsequent conveyance, even without a general building plan, only if the prior grantee proves that the covenant was intended to benefit their land and that the subsequent grantee had notice of this specific intent.
Facts:
- Dr. and Mrs. Lebold owned one lot, and their neighbors, Mr. and Mrs. Willett, owned the adjoining lot.
- Together, the Lebolds and the Willetts co-owned Lot 11, which was situated across the street from the Lebold and Willett lots.
- On January 31, 1957, the Lebolds sold their lot to the Rodgers (plaintiffs).
- On December 15, 1959, the Lebolds and the Willetts jointly sold Lot 11 to the Reimanns (defendants).
- The sales contract for Lot 11 included a covenant stipulating that no dwelling's floor level could be more than one foot higher than the adjacent street curb.
- The grantors (Lebolds and Willetts) intended this restriction to protect the view from their properties, including the lot previously sold to the Rodgers.
- The Reimanns commenced construction of a dwelling on Lot 11.
- The Rodgers believed the construction would violate the height restriction and impair the view from their property.
Procedural Posture:
- The Rodgers (plaintiffs) filed a suit in equity in an Oregon trial court seeking to enjoin the Reimanns (defendants) from constructing their home.
- The trial court dismissed the Rodgers' complaint.
- The Rodgers, as appellants, appealed the trial court's decree to the Supreme Court of Oregon, with the Reimanns as appellees.
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Issue:
Can a prior grantee enforce a restrictive covenant against a subsequent grantee from a common grantor if the prior grantee fails to prove the covenant was intended to benefit their specific property and that the subsequent grantee had notice of that intent?
Opinions:
Majority - O'Connell, J.
No. A prior grantee cannot enforce such a covenant without proving both the grantor's intent to benefit the prior grantee's land and the subsequent grantee's notice of that intent. To enforce the covenant, the Rodgers must show that the restriction was intended to benefit their lot and that the Reimanns purchased Lot 11 with notice of that intent. The court adopts the prevailing view that a prior grantee may enforce a subsequent covenant, even without a general development plan, under either a third-party beneficiary theory or an implied reciprocal servitude theory. However, the Rodgers failed to meet the evidentiary burden for either theory. There was insufficient evidence of an agreement or reliance to create an implied servitude. For a third-party beneficiary claim, the benefit to the Rodgers must have been 'one of the things bargained for' between the grantors and the Reimanns, and the Reimanns must have had notice of this. The evidence of the Reimanns' notice was equivocal at best. Mr. Reimann testified he believed the restriction was solely for the benefit of the Willetts' retained property, not the Rodgers' lot. Given the ambiguity and the legal preference against restricting land use, the Rodgers failed to carry their burden of proof.
Dissenting - Sloan, J.
This opinion was a dissent without a written explanation.
Analysis:
This case clarifies that while a prior grantee can enforce a restrictive covenant against a subsequent grantee even without a general building scheme, the evidentiary burden is significant. The decision adopts the modern, flexible approach (third-party beneficiary or implied servitude) but grounds it in the traditional requirement of notice. It establishes that the subsequent grantee must have notice not just of the restriction itself, but of its intended beneficiaries. This holding underscores the importance for purchasers seeking the benefit of future restrictions to secure an express, written agreement from the grantor, as relying on inferences from circumstances or uncommunicated intentions is a precarious legal strategy.
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