Rockhill v. Pollard
259 Or. 54, 1971 Ore. LEXIS 355, 485 P.2d 28 (1971)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant's conduct may be deemed sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, particularly when there is a special relationship between the parties, such as that of a physician and a patient in an emergency medical situation.
Facts:
- Plaintiff, her 10-month-old daughter Marla, and her mother-in-law Christine Rockhill were injured in a car accident, which left Marla unconscious and appearing lifeless.
- They were taken to the office of the defendant, Dr. Pollard, for emergency medical care.
- Dr. Pollard was immediately rude, dismissed their concerns, and initially stated there was nothing wrong with them without conducting an examination.
- After being urged to examine the unconscious Marla, Dr. Pollard performed a very brief examination with a stethoscope and reflex hammer, which elicited no response.
- When Marla vomited, Dr. Pollard attributed it to overfeeding without any further examination.
- Dr. Pollard refused to examine the visibly injured and bleeding plaintiff and her mother-in-law, telling one of them to 'Get in there and clean yourself up.'
- When asked for advice on what to do for the child, Dr. Pollard shrugged his shoulders and offered no guidance.
- Dr. Pollard then ordered the family to leave his office and wait for a ride outside by a streetlight in the sub-freezing weather, despite the baby's clothes being wet with vomit.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff sued Dr. Pollard in a state trial court for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
- At the conclusion of the plaintiff's presentation of evidence at trial, the defendant moved for an involuntary nonsuit, arguing the plaintiff had failed to present sufficient evidence for the case to go to the jury.
- The trial court granted the defendant's motion and dismissed the case.
- The plaintiff appealed the trial court's grant of the nonsuit to the Supreme Court of Oregon.
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Issue:
Does a physician's callous refusal to treat or advise a distraught mother and her injured, unconscious child, culminating in ordering them to leave his office into the freezing cold, constitute extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to state a prima facie case for intentional infliction of emotional distress?
Opinions:
Majority - McAllister, J.
Yes. A jury could find the physician's conduct was outrageous in the extreme, establishing a prima facie case for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court determined that the test for liability in such cases is whether the conduct is 'outrageous in the extreme,' a determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis. A critical factor here is the special doctor-patient relationship; the defendant was a physician consulted in an emergency and was under a professional obligation to the plaintiff, who was a distraught mother with an unconscious baby totally dependent on him. A jury could infer that the defendant's conduct was not merely a mistaken diagnosis but a willful or reckless failure to perform his professional duty, with his rudeness serving as evidence of his intent or recklessness. This abandonment of a patient in a vulnerable state goes beyond mere insults and could be found by a jury to be utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
Analysis:
This case is significant for clarifying the application of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), or 'outrageous conduct,' within a professional relationship. It establishes that the existence of a special relationship, such as physician-patient, can elevate conduct that might otherwise be considered merely rude or callous to the level of 'outrageous.' The decision lowers the threshold for what constitutes outrageous conduct in such contexts, focusing on the professional's duties and the vulnerability of the person seeking aid. This precedent makes it clear that professional abandonment in a time of critical need, not just affirmative acts of cruelty, can be a basis for an IIED claim.
