Robinson v. United States
1986 D.C. App. LEXIS 507, 506 A.2d 572 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
Criminal assault in the District of Columbia encompasses both 'attempted-battery' (attempt to cause physical injury) and 'intent-to-frighten' (threatening conduct intended to create apprehension), with the latter being satisfied when a defendant points a dangerous weapon in a menacing manner, regardless of the victim's actual fear or the defendant's specific intent to injure.
Facts:
- Sergeant Ronald Monroe, a Metropolitan Police officer dressed in uniform covered by a jacket, was driving to work when he heard gunshots near Farragut Street.
- Sergeant Monroe made a U-turn to investigate and saw a large number of people running from the 900 block of Farragut Street, then saw Appellant standing about thirty to forty yards away holding a pistol.
- Sergeant Monroe exited his car, unzipped his jacket to reveal his uniform, identified himself as a police officer, and told Appellant to drop the gun.
- Appellant, then only 'two car lengths' away, turned toward Sergeant Monroe and pointed his pistol at him.
- Appellant crouched behind a car, continued to watch Sergeant Monroe's movements, and eventually laid his gun on the ground before starting to walk away rapidly.
- Sergeant Monroe yelled 'Police, stop,' but Appellant kept walking until Monroe moved quickly towards him and placed him under arrest.
- The seized pistol was later found to contain four live rounds of ammunition, and Appellant was wearing a shoulder holster.
Procedural Posture:
- Appellant was initially charged with assault on a police officer with a dangerous weapon in violation of D.C.Code § 22-505(b).
- Before the case went to the jury, the trial court ruled that the first count was improperly worded and charged only the offense of assault on a police officer under D.C.Code § 22-505(a).
- A jury found Appellant guilty of simple assault, a lesser included offense of assault on a police officer, and carrying a pistol without a license.
- Appellant appealed his assault conviction to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, contending that the evidence was insufficient to go to the jury.
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Issue:
Was there sufficient evidence to convict Appellant of simple assault, specifically under the 'intent-to-frighten' theory, when he pointed a pistol at Sergeant Monroe after being identified as a police officer?
Opinions:
Majority - Terry, Associate Judge
Yes, there was sufficient evidence to convict Appellant of simple assault because his act of pointing a gun at Sergeant Monroe constituted a menacing threat, satisfying the elements of an intent-to-frighten assault. The court affirmed the conviction by applying the 'intent-to-frighten' type of assault, which requires proof that the defendant intended to frighten or create apprehension, rather than necessarily to cause physical injury. This type of assault is established by threatening conduct, such as pointing a gun. Citing Anthony v. United States and Williamson v. United States, the court reiterated that the definition of criminal assault in the District of Columbia includes conduct that could induce 'a well-founded apprehension of peril,' expanding beyond merely attempted battery. The three elements for intent-to-frighten assault are: 1) an act (more than mere words) that is either an actual attempt to injure or a menacing threat; 2) apparent present ability to injure the victim; and 3) intent to perform the acts constituting the assault (e.g., intent to make a menacing threat). In this case, Appellant pointing the gun at Monroe was a 'menacing threat,' he had the 'apparent present ability to injure' given the gun contained live rounds, and the jury could infer intent to perform the act since no evidence suggested inadvertence. The victim's actual fear is not required; the crucial inquiry is whether the assailant acted in a manner that would portend an immediate threat to a person of reasonable sensibility.
Analysis:
This case clarifies and reinforces the scope of criminal assault in the District of Columbia, affirming that an 'intent-to-frighten' assault is a valid theory of conviction, distinct from 'attempted-battery' assault. This distinction is crucial as it allows for convictions where no actual physical injury was attempted or intended, but threatening conduct created apprehension. The ruling particularly impacts cases involving weapons, establishing that pointing a gun can be sufficient for assault regardless of the victim's actual fear or the assailant's specific intent to fire. It also provides guidance for future jury instructions by recommending a revision to include the intent-to-frighten type of assault.
