Robinson v. State
707 S.W.2d 47, 1986 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1175 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
For a juvenile certified as an adult, the Texas Speedy Trial Act begins to run from the date of transfer to criminal court, not initial juvenile detention. Agreed continuances or resets signed by defense counsel are excludable periods under the Act, and a stipulation to use prior certification hearing testimony as the basis for an examining trial, even if not formally admitted into evidence, satisfies the examining trial requirement and due process if the defendant was adequately protected at the prior hearing.
Facts:
- On March 7, 1980, appellant Robinson, then sixteen years of age, was placed in a juvenile detention center after allegedly committing aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated rape.
- On June 17, 1980, the juvenile court waived its jurisdiction over Robinson's case.
- On June 17, 1980, Robinson was arrested for the alleged offenses.
Procedural Posture:
- On March 7, 1980, appellant Robinson was placed in a juvenile detention center for alleged aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated rape.
- On June 17, 1980, the juvenile court waived jurisdiction of Robinson's case and transferred jurisdiction to the 248th Judicial District Court to deal with him as an adult.
- On June 17, 1980, a felony complaint was filed against Robinson.
- On August 27, 1980, Robinson was indicted for aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping.
- On October 20, 1980, the State announced ready for trial.
- On October 21, 1980, a pre-trial hearing was held on Robinson’s “Motion to Set Aside the Indictment for Failure to Grant a Speedy Trial.”
- The trial court overruled Robinson's speedy trial motion.
- A jury subsequently convicted Robinson of aggravated robbery.
- The trial court assessed Robinson's punishment at twenty years’ confinement.
- Robinson appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, alleging five grounds of error, two related to the Texas Speedy Trial Act and three concerning the examining trial.
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Issue:
1. Does the Texas Speedy Trial Act begin to run for a juvenile from the date of initial juvenile detention or from the date they are certified as an adult and transferred to criminal court? 2. Can periods of delay resulting from "agreed reset forms" signed by a defendant's counsel be excluded from the Speedy Trial Act's computation? 3. Does a stipulation between parties to use transcribed testimony from a juvenile certification hearing as the examining trial, without formal admission into evidence, satisfy the examining trial requirement and due process for a certified adult?
Opinions:
Majority - W.C. Davis
1. No, the Texas Speedy Trial Act does not begin to run from the date of initial juvenile detention; it commences when a juvenile is certified as an adult and transferred to a criminal court. The Court reasoned that delinquency proceedings are civil in nature, and the provisions of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, including the Speedy Trial Act (Art. 32A.02, V.A.C.C.P.), do not apply until a defendant is certified as an adult and transferred to a criminal court. Therefore, the criminal action against Robinson commenced on June 17, 1980, when he was certified as an adult, arrested, and a felony complaint was filed. 2. Yes, periods of delay resulting from "agreed reset forms" signed by a defendant's counsel can be excluded from the Speedy Trial Act's computation. The Court held that the four "Appearance Of Counsel And Agreed Setting" forms, which stated that counsel agreed to the new setting dates, constituted a "postponement or continuance granted with the consent of the defendant or his counsel" under Art. 32A.02, Sec. 4(3), V.A.C.C.P. The total of 55 days accounted for by these agreed resets, when excluded, brought the State within the 120-day limit. 3. Yes, a stipulation between parties to use transcribed testimony from a juvenile certification hearing as the examining trial, without formal admission into evidence, satisfies the examining trial requirement and due process for a certified adult. The Court found that the record reflected appellant, his defense attorney, and the prosecutor stipulated before the judge that the certification transcript would suffice as the examining trial, and the judge subsequently made a determination of probable cause from it. The formal introduction of the transcript into evidence was deemed unnecessary given the agreement of all parties. Furthermore, since Robinson was represented by counsel at the certification hearing, extensively cross-examined witnesses, and called his own witnesses, his right to confrontation and other due process protections were fully exercised, making the subsequent use of that testimony for the examining trial by agreement "meaningful" and not a deprivation of due process.
Dissenting - Teague
1. No, the majority's conclusion that the Speedy Trial Act begins to run only upon transfer to adult court is incorrect and conflicts with prior precedent. Justice Teague dissented, arguing that the majority's holding that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply until certification contradicts Ex parte Green, which stated that once certified, a juvenile should be dealt with as an adult and not treated differently than someone initially detained as an adult. He questioned why Article 42.03, Section 2(a) (sentence credit for confinement) applies to juveniles before certification, but the Speedy Trial Act (Art. 32A.02) does not. 2. No, the "Harris County reset forms" are not legal continuances for Speedy Trial Act purposes. Justice Teague argued that there was nothing on the face of the reset forms or in the record to suggest they represented anything other than procedural formalities for docket control, rather than legally recognized continuances. He contended that if the word "continuance" in the Speedy Trial Act has the same meaning as in Chapter 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, then these reset forms, which are typically approved by court coordinators for docket management rather than a judge for a formal continuance, should not be used to exclude time under the Act.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the starting point for the Texas Speedy Trial Act for juveniles transferred to adult court, establishing that the clock begins upon criminal certification, not initial detention. It also broadens the interpretation of excludable time, validating agreed reset forms signed by counsel as equivalent to continuances. Furthermore, the ruling streamlines the examining trial process by allowing the use of stipulated prior testimony, prioritizing the substance of due process protections (like confrontation and cross-examination) afforded in earlier proceedings over strict evidentiary formalities. The dissenting opinion, however, highlights a critical inconsistency in the application of the Code of Criminal Procedure to juveniles post-certification, particularly concerning the crediting of pre-certification detention time versus speedy trial calculations, suggesting a potential for disparate legal treatment.
