Robinson v. District of Columbia
1990 D.C. App. LEXIS 104, 580 A.2d 1255, 1990 WL 172778 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
Under the doctrine of last clear chance, a defendant's ability to avoid injuring a contributorily negligent plaintiff is judged not only by what the defendant actually saw, but also by what the defendant reasonably should have seen through the exercise of due care.
Facts:
- On December 14, 1983, appellant parked her car and stood at a curb on Third Street, N.W., intending to cross the street.
- She observed a police van, operated by the District of Columbia, approaching from a parking ramp on the opposite side of the street.
- Appellant assumed the van driver would see her and proceeded to cross Third Street outside of a marked crosswalk, despite two being visible nearby.
- While looking to her right for traffic in the other lane, she reached the double yellow lines in the middle of the street.
- The police van then struck her; she did not see it just before the impact.
- Evidence suggested the van's driver did not stop before exiting the ramp, was traveling fast, and was looking down and to the right.
- A passenger in the van saw the appellant before the driver did and shouted a warning to the driver.
Procedural Posture:
- The appellant sued the District of Columbia in a trial court for damages resulting from a vehicle collision.
- At the close of the appellant's evidence, the District of Columbia moved for a directed verdict.
- The trial court granted the motion for a directed verdict, finding that the appellant was contributorily negligent as a matter of law and that the doctrine of last clear chance was inapplicable.
- The appellant appealed the trial court's entry of a directed verdict to the current appellate court.
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Issue:
Under the doctrine of last clear chance, is a defendant's ability to avoid injuring a plaintiff judged only by what the defendant actually saw, or by what the defendant reasonably should have seen?
Opinions:
Majority - Mack, Senior Judge
No, a defendant's ability to avoid injuring a plaintiff under the last clear chance doctrine is judged not only by what the defendant actually saw, but also by what they reasonably should have been aware of. The court affirmed that appellant's violation of a traffic regulation by crossing outside a crosswalk constituted contributory negligence per se, rejecting her arguments that a 'de facto' crosswalk existed due to common practice or that her actions were otherwise reasonable. However, the court found the trial court erred in its application of the last clear chance doctrine. The doctrine allows a contributorily negligent plaintiff to recover if the defendant had the final opportunity to prevent the harm. The court clarified that the fourth element of the doctrine—that the defendant could have avoided injury after becoming aware of the danger—must be read in conjunction with the third element, which includes what a defendant 'should have been aware' of. A contrary holding would improperly allow a defendant to avoid liability due to their own negligence in failing to see the plaintiff. Given evidence that the driver was inattentive and could have seen the appellant, a jury should be permitted to decide whether the driver had the last clear chance to avoid the collision.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the last clear chance doctrine within District of Columbia tort law by explicitly incorporating an objective standard into its final element. It prevents a defendant from using their own inattentiveness as a shield against liability, harmonizing the test's components to focus on what a reasonably prudent person should have perceived and done. By doing so, the ruling strengthens the doctrine as an equitable remedy for plaintiffs whose initial negligence is followed by a defendant's more proximate failure to exercise due care. This precedent makes it more difficult for defendants to win on summary judgment or directed verdict in cases where there is any evidence they should have been aware of the plaintiff's peril.
