No, it's not legal. The Court decided that drug addiction is an illness, similar to being mentally ill or having a contagious disease. You can't put someone in jail just for being sick. While the state can require addicts to go to treatment programs (which might mean being confined), it can't make the illness itself a crime.

No, absolutely not. This justice said that addicts are sick people who need help, not punishment. Making addiction a crime is barbaric. Sending an addict to jail for 90 days isn't about curing them; it's about punishing them for their sickness, which is wrong.

No, this was unconstitutional. The problem was that the jury was told they could find Robinson guilty just for being an addict in California. This is like punishing someone for just *thinking* about committing a crime, which the government can't do.

Yes, it should be legal. These judges argued that the law was a smart way to help people who were just starting to use drugs but could still control themselves. They saw the 90-day jail sentence as a form of treatment to stop addiction early. They felt the Court shouldn't tell California how to handle its drug problem.

Yes, it should be legal. This judge believed Robinson wasn't convicted for 'being' an addict, but for the 'act' of regularly using drugs. Since using drugs is an action, the state should be able to punish it. He worried this decision would make it harder for states to fight drug use.

Yes, the law is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court said it's cruel and unusual punishment and violates the 14th Amendment for a state to put someone in prison as a criminal just for being addicted to drugs, if they haven't actually used or had drugs in that state or done anything wrong there. The Court said drug addiction is a sickness that people sometimes get without meaning to, and while a state can make rules about buying, selling, or having drugs, it can't make just being an addict a crime.

An addict is a sick person, not a criminal. In the past, people who were seen as 'sick', like the mentally ill or people with diseases, were often punished in cruel ways because people didn't understand. Addicts might need to be put away for treatment or to keep society safe, but they shouldn't be punished as criminals just for being addicts. That's punishing them for being sick. The law isn't trying to help them get better, it's just trying to punish them, which is wrong and goes against the Constitution.

Based on what doctors know now, a state isn't being totally unreasonable if it says drug addiction isn't just an illness. If addiction means using or having illegal drugs, the state can punish that as a crime. But here, the jury was told they could find Robinson guilty just for being addicted while in California, even without proof he used or had drugs there. Just wanting to commit a crime isn't enough to punish someone. So this law, as used in this case, was unconstitutional.

The Court misunderstood California's law and what happened at the trial. The law is part of a big plan to control drug addiction, including treatment programs for addicts who can't control themselves anymore. It only applies to addicts who still have self-control, like Robinson, who wasn't on drugs when he was arrested and wasn't having withdrawal symptoms. The jury was told the right definition of addiction. Even if the law is about punishment and not just treatment, it's still okay, because addicts can be dangerous to society just like people who have or use illegal drugs. States are allowed to punish that kind of danger.

This would be different if Robinson was convicted for being an addict who couldn't control himself anymore. But based on the facts, he was convicted for regularly using illegal drugs right before he was arrested, which broke California law. The law and the jury instructions, if read right, made regular drug use the crime, not just wanting drugs, and a state is allowed to punish regular drug use. The Court read the law and the facts wrong and ignored that addicts can be dangerous even in the early stages. The idea that a state can't ever punish drug use is unwise and not well thought out.

Yes, this law is unconstitutional. We say it is cruel and unusual punishment and violates the Fourteenth Amendment for a state to put someone in prison as a criminal just for being addicted to drugs, if they haven't actually used or had drugs in that state or done anything wrong there. Drug addiction is a sickness that people sometimes get without meaning to, and while a state can make rules about buying, selling, or having drugs, it cannot make just being an addict a crime.

Yes, I concur. An addict is a sick person, not a criminal. In the past, people who were seen as 'sick,' like the mentally ill or people with diseases, were often punished in cruel ways because people didn't understand. Addicts might need to be put away for treatment or to keep society safe, but they shouldn't be punished as criminals just for being addicts. That's punishing them for being sick. This law isn't trying to help them get better; it's just trying to punish them, which is wrong and goes against the Constitution.

Yes, I concur. Based on what doctors know now, a state isn't being totally unreasonable if it says drug addiction isn't just an illness. If addiction means using or having illegal drugs, punishing that can be a crime. But here, the jury was told they could find Robinson guilty just for being addicted while in California, even without proof he used or had drugs there. Just wanting to commit a crime isn't enough to punish someone. So this law, as used in this case, is unconstitutional.

No, I dissent. The majority misunderstood California's law and what happened at the trial. The law is part of a big plan to control drug addiction, including treatment programs for addicts who can't control themselves anymore. It only applies to addicts who still have self-control, like Robinson, who wasn't on drugs when he was arrested and wasn't having withdrawal symptoms. The jury was given the right definition of addiction. Even if the law is about punishment and not just treatment, it's still okay because addicts can be dangerous to society, just like people who have or use illegal drugs. A state is allowed to punish that kind of danger.

No, I dissent. This would be different if Robinson was convicted for being an addict who couldn't control himself anymore. But based on the facts, he was convicted for regularly using illegal drugs right before he was arrested, which broke California law. The law and the jury instructions, if read right, made regular drug use the crime, not just wanting drugs, and a state is allowed to punish regular drug use. The majority read the law and the facts wrong and ignored that addicts can be dangerous even in the early stages. The idea that a state can't ever punish drug use is unwise and not well thought out.

The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the "crime" of having a common cold.

—the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state law which made the "status" of drug addiction a crime.

Because the statute required no illegal act, but criminalized mere status as a drug addict, it violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

But, in the light of contemporary human knowledge, a law which made a criminal offense of such a disease would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in light of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

The Supreme Court has reminded us that "[a] single day in prison may be unconstitutional in some circumstances."

Id. "The case law is legion that people cannot be punished because of their status, the company they keep, or their presence in a public place." Id., citing

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids the imposition of "cruel and unusual punishments

In Robinson, the Supreme Court struck down, under the Eighth Amendment, a California law that made "it a criminal offense for a person to `be addicted to the use of narcotics.'"

Yes. A state law which imprisons a person for the status of being a narcotics addict inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court analogized narcotics addiction to other illnesses, such as mental illness or leprosy, for which a state would not be permitted to impose criminal punishment. While states have broad power to regulate narcotics and may impose compulsory treatment programs that involve confinement, they cannot make the 'status' of having an illness a crime in itself. The California statute, as interpreted by the state courts, punished the 'chronic condition' of addiction, regardless of whether the person had ever used narcotics within the state or engaged in any antisocial behavior there. Punishing a person for a disease is fundamentally different from punishing a criminal act and is therefore unconstitutional.

Yes. Treating a person who is a drug addict as a criminal constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Addiction is a disease, and individuals afflicted with it are sick people who should be treated, not branded as criminals. Punishing someone for being sick is a barbarous action inconsistent with the principles of the Eighth Amendment. The mandatory 90-day jail sentence required by the California statute demonstrates that its purpose is to penalize, not to cure. While society can confine addicts for treatment, making their illness a crime is unconstitutional.

Yes. The application of the California statute in this case was unconstitutional. The trial court's instructions permitted the jury to convict Robinson based on no more proof than that he was present in California while addicted to narcotics. This effectively authorized criminal punishment for a bare propensity or desire to commit a criminal act, rather than for the act itself. Such an imposition is arbitrary and exceeds the state's power to enact criminal law.

No. The California statute is a valid part of a comprehensive program aimed at preventing and curing narcotic addiction and does not inflict cruel and unusual punishment. The law targets incipient, volitional addicts who still possess self-control, and the required 90-day confinement should be viewed as a form of treatment, not merely punishment. The majority errs by dictating that hospitalization is the only constitutionally permissible form of treatment. Even if considered penal, the sanction is a reasonable deterrent against a condition that poses a serious threat of future criminal conduct.

No. Robinson's conviction was not for his sheer status but for the regular and repeated use of narcotics, which constitutes an act, not an illness. The trial court's definition of 'addiction' required the jury to find that Robinson had frequently used narcotics in the recent past. The State of California is entitled to criminalize the habitual use of narcotics, and this statute allows the state to prosecute such use even when the precise location of the act is unknown. The majority's novel application of 'cruel and unusual punishment' improperly infringes on the state's power to regulate narcotics and casts serious doubt on whether any use of narcotics can be criminally punished.

Yes. The Supreme Court held that a state law that imprisons a person as a criminal, even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the state or been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that narcotic addiction is an illness which may be contracted innocently or involuntarily, and that while a state may regulate the use, sale, purchase or possession of narcotics within its borders, and could establish a compulsory treatment program for addicts that might require periods of involuntary confinement, it cannot make the status of addiction a criminal offense for which the offender can be prosecuted at any time before he reforms. The Court found that the California statute, as construed by the state courts in this case, did just that, criminalizing the status of narcotic addiction whether or not the accused had ever used or possessed narcotics in California.

The addict is a sick person and should be treated as such, not branded as a criminal. Throughout history, 'sick' people such as the insane, lepers, and those afflicted with venereal disease have been subjected to inhumane punishments due to lack of understanding. While addicts may be confined for treatment or to protect society, they should not be punished as criminals simply for being addicts, as this amounts to punishing them for being sick. The statute's purpose is not to cure but to penalize, as evidenced by the mandatory jail term. If the purpose was to cure, civil commitment would suffice. This prosecution thus has no relationship to curing an illness and violates the Eighth Amendment.

On the current state of medical knowledge, it is not completely irrational or unconstitutional for a state to conclude that narcotics addiction is not simply an illness or to subject addicts to criminal law. Insofar as addiction involves the use or possession of narcotics in violation of state law, it can be criminally punished. However, the trial court's instructions here permitted the jury to convict Robinson merely for being present in California while addicted, without any proof of use or possession in the state. Addiction alone is merely a compelling propensity to use narcotics, so the effect was to criminally punish a bare desire to commit a criminal act, which exceeds the state's power. On that basis, the statute as applied here was unconstitutional.

The Court has misread California law and the trial record. The statute is part of a comprehensive program to control narcotism, including civil commitment for addicts who have lost self-control. It applies only to incipient, volitional addicts who still have control, as shown in this case where Robinson was not under the influence of narcotics when arrested and had no withdrawal symptoms. The jury was properly instructed that addiction means customary use, not simply a bare compulsion. Even if the statute is considered penal rather than part of a treatment program, it is still valid because incipient addicts pose a serious threat to society, similar to the threat inherent in possession or use of narcotics, which the state may validly punish and deter. The fact that addiction may be involuntary after a certain point does not make the statute unconstitutional as applied to volitional addicts like Robinson.

If Robinson had been convicted for being an addict who had lost the power of self-control, this would be a different case. But on this record, he was convicted not for the status of being an addict, but for regular, habitual use of narcotics immediately prior to his arrest, violating the California law. The jury instructions and statute, properly construed, criminalized not the mere desire to take drugs, but the regular use of drugs, which the state may validly punish. The Court has misconstrued the statute and record and ignored the reality that incipient addicts pose a serious threat which the state may address. The suggestion that the state may not punish even the use of narcotics is extremely unwise and ill-considered.

Yes. We hold that a state law that imprisons a person as a criminal, even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the state or been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. We reason that narcotic addiction is an illness which may be contracted innocently or involuntarily, and that while a state may regulate the use, sale, purchase, or possession of narcotics within its borders, and could establish a compulsory treatment program for addicts that might require periods of involuntary confinement, it cannot make the status of addiction a criminal offense for which an offender can be prosecuted at any time before he reforms. We conclude that the California statute, as construed by the state courts in this case, criminalizes the status of narcotic addiction whether or not the accused had ever used or possessed narcotics in California.

Yes, I concur that the law violates the Eighth Amendment. The addict is a sick person and should be treated as such, not branded as a criminal. Throughout history, 'sick' people such as the insane, lepers, and those afflicted with venereal disease have been subjected to inhumane punishments due to lack of understanding. While addicts may be confined for treatment or to protect society, they should not be punished as criminals simply for being addicts, as this amounts to punishing them for being sick. This statute's purpose is not to cure but to penalize, as evidenced by the mandatory jail term. If the purpose was to cure, civil commitment would suffice. This prosecution thus has no relationship to curing an illness and violates the Eighth Amendment.

Yes, I concur that the statute as applied here is unconstitutional. On the current state of medical knowledge, it is not completely irrational or unconstitutional for a state to conclude that narcotics addiction is not simply an illness or to subject addicts to criminal law. Insofar as addiction involves the use or possession of narcotics in violation of state law, it can be criminally punished. However, the trial court's instructions here permitted the jury to convict Robinson merely for being present in California while addicted, without any proof of use or possession in the state. Addiction alone is merely a compelling propensity to use narcotics, so the effect was to criminally punish a bare desire to commit a criminal act, which exceeds the state's power. On that basis, the statute as applied here was unconstitutional.

I dissent. The majority has misread California law and the trial record. This statute is part of a comprehensive program to control narcotism, including civil commitment for addicts who have lost self-control. It applies only to incipient, volitional addicts who still have control, as shown in this case where Robinson was not under the influence of narcotics when arrested and had no withdrawal symptoms. The jury was properly instructed that addiction means customary use, not simply a bare compulsion. Even if the statute is considered penal rather than part of a treatment program, it is still valid because incipient addicts pose a serious threat to society, similar to the threat inherent in possession or use of narcotics, which the state may validly punish and deter. The fact that addiction may be involuntary after a certain point does not make the statute unconstitutional as applied to volitional addicts like Robinson.

I dissent. If Robinson had been convicted for being an addict who had lost the power of self-control, this would be a different case. But on this record, he was convicted not for the status of being an addict, but for regular, habitual use of narcotics immediately prior to his arrest, violating the California law. The jury instructions and statute, properly construed, criminalized not the mere desire to take drugs, but the regular use of drugs, which the state may validly punish. The majority has misconstrued the statute and record and ignored the reality that incipient addicts pose a serious threat which the state may address. The suggestion that the state may not punish even the use of narcotics is extremely unwise and ill-considered.

Robinson v. California

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