Robinson v. Bodman
333 F. App'x 205 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Rehabilitation Act, an employer is not required to provide telecommuting as a reasonable accommodation if the employee cannot perform essential job functions remotely or if doing so would be an undue hardship for valid business reasons. An employer is also not required to accommodate an employee's commute to or from the workplace unless it provides similar accommodations to non-disabled employees.
Facts:
- Marilyn A. Robinson, an employee of the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), had a disability for which she received several workplace accommodations.
- BPA had previously allowed Robinson to telecommute, during which time she worked 477 hours but produced only a single half-page report, missed deadlines, and failed to complete her assignments.
- After her doctors cleared her to return to work full-time on November 7, 2005, Robinson requested to continue telecommuting.
- BPA denied Robinson's request to continue telecommuting, asserting that an essential part of her job was interacting with personnel and experts, which she could not do from home.
- Robinson did not inform the BPA of any specific ambulatory limitations that necessitated telecommuting; her request was primarily related to difficulties with her commute.
- BPA did not offer transportation assistance or similar commute-related accommodations to its non-disabled employees.
- BPA ultimately allowed Robinson to retire on disability on May 27, 2006.
Procedural Posture:
- Marilyn A. Robinson filed several lawsuits against her employer, the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), in the U.S. District Court, alleging violations including failure to accommodate under the Rehabilitation Act.
- The district court consolidated the cases.
- The parties entered into a partial settlement that resolved most claims, leaving only the Rehabilitation Act claim regarding the period from November 7, 2005, to May 27, 2006.
- In the district court, the BPA moved for summary judgment, and Robinson filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment.
- The district court granted the BPA's motion for summary judgment and denied Robinson's motion.
- Robinson (appellant) appealed the district court's final judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where the BPA (appellee) was the opposing party.
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Issue:
Does an employer's refusal to allow a disabled employee to telecommute as an accommodation violate the Rehabilitation Act when the employee has demonstrated an inability to perform essential job functions remotely and the employer has valid business reasons for the refusal?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam (Unpublished Memorandum)
No, the employer's refusal to allow telecommuting does not violate the Rehabilitation Act under these circumstances. The court reasoned that an employer is not required to provide an accommodation that imposes an undue hardship or is otherwise unreasonable. The BPA provided two valid, uncontroverted business reasons for denying Robinson's request: first, her past remote work performance was exceptionally poor, demonstrating she could not effectively perform her duties from home. Second, an essential function of her job was in-person interaction with colleagues and experts, which was not possible from home. The court also held that an employer's duty to accommodate applies to barriers within the workplace, not to an employee's commute, unless the employer provides such accommodations to non-disabled employees.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the scope of the 'reasonable accommodation' duty under the Rehabilitation Act, particularly concerning telework. It empowers employers to deny telecommuting requests by pointing to objective evidence, such as an employee's poor past performance in a remote setting or the inherently collaborative, in-person nature of a job's essential functions. The ruling reinforces the distinction between workplace barriers, which employers must address, and external barriers like commuting, which generally fall outside the scope of required accommodation. This provides a clear defense for employers when a requested accommodation is not only ineffective but also demonstrably detrimental to fulfilling core job responsibilities.
