Robins v. Harris
2002 Ind. LEXIS 478, 2002 WL 1264140, 769 N.E.2d 586 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
In a civil battery claim brought by an inmate against a jailer for sexual contact, the inmate's alleged consent may potentially be raised as a valid defense.
Facts:
- Tammy Robins was an inmate at the Vigo County Jail.
- Michael Soules was a deputy sheriff employed at the jail.
- While Robins was incarcerated, Soules engaged in sexual conduct with her.
- Soules later admitted to the sexual conduct and pled guilty to criminal official misconduct.
Procedural Posture:
- Tammy Robins filed a personal injury lawsuit against Deputy Michael Soules, Sheriff Harris, and the Vigo County Commissioners in an Indiana trial court.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Sheriff Harris and the County Commissioners.
- Robins, as the appellant, appealed the summary judgment ruling to the Indiana Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the Commissioners but reversed for the Sheriff. The court also held that consent was not a valid defense to Robins's civil battery claim.
- Sheriff Harris, as the appellee from the original case and now petitioner, petitioned for transfer to the Supreme Court of Indiana.
- The Supreme Court of Indiana granted the petition for transfer.
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Issue:
In a civil battery lawsuit brought by a jail inmate against a jailer for sexual contact, is the inmate's alleged consent a valid defense?
Opinions:
Majority - Dickson, J.
Yes. The inmate's consent may potentially be raised as a defense in a civil battery claim. While the parties settled the case, the court granted transfer to address this specific issue. In dismissing the appeal post-settlement, the court summarily affirmed the Court of Appeals' opinion on all other matters but explicitly vacated the portion of that opinion which held that consent was unavailable as a defense. By carving out and nullifying this specific holding, the court leaves open the possibility for a consent defense to be argued in future civil cases of this nature.
Dissenting - Sullivan, J.
No. The inmate's consent should not be available as a defense in a civil battery claim against a jailer. The Legislature has already established a clear public policy in the criminal code (I.C. § 35-44-1-5(b)) that a service provider cannot claim consent as a defense for sexual misconduct with a detainee. This policy recognizes the inherent power imbalance that prevents a detainee from giving true consent. It is incongruous and contrary to public policy to bar this defense in the criminal context while allowing it in a civil claim arising from the same conduct.
Analysis:
This decision is significant for creating a potential divergence between Indiana's criminal and civil law regarding sexual contact between jailers and inmates. By vacating the appellate court's prohibition on the consent defense, the Supreme Court leaves the issue unresolved and allows defendants in civil suits to raise a defense that is statutorily barred in parallel criminal proceedings. This creates legal uncertainty and may weaken civil protections for incarcerated individuals by failing to definitively address the power dynamics that make true consent questionable in a custodial setting. Future litigants will have to argue the issue without a clear precedent from the state's highest court.
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