Robertson v. Commonwealth

Supreme Court of Kentucky
82 S.W.3d 832 (2002)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A defendant's unlawful act of fleeing from police can be the legal cause of a pursuing officer's death, even if the death results from the officer's own volitional act, provided the officer's response and resulting death were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's flight.

Facts:

Officer Brian Kane attempted to arrest Shawnta Robertson for possession of marijuana.
Robertson broke free from Kane's grasp and began to flee on foot.
Robertson ran onto the Clay Wade Bailey Bridge, which spans the Ohio River.
While on the bridge, Robertson vaulted over a 32-inch-high concrete barrier separating the roadway from the pedestrian walkway.
Officer Michael Partin, responding to a call for assistance, arrived at the bridge in his police cruiser.
Partin exited his vehicle and vaulted over the same concrete barrier in an attempt to pursue Robertson.
Unseen by Partin, there was a 41-inch-wide open space between the concrete barrier and the walkway railing.
Partin fell through this gap 94 feet into the river below and died as a result of the fall.

Procedural Posture:

Shawnta Robertson was tried by a jury in the Kenton Circuit Court, the court of first instance.
The jury convicted Robertson of manslaughter in the second degree.
Robertson, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky, the highest court in the state, granted discretionary review.

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Issue:

Does a defendant's act of unlawfully fleeing from police apprehension wantonly cause an officer's death when the officer, in pursuit, performs a volitional act that directly results in his death?

Opinions:

Majority - Cooper, Justice.

Yes. A defendant's unlawful flight can be the legal cause of an officer's death, even if resulting from the officer's own volitional act, if the officer's action was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's conduct. The court reasoned that under Kentucky's causation statute, KRS 501.060, a defendant's conduct is the legal cause of a result if the result was rendered 'substantially more probable' by that conduct. The officer's own action, or volitional act, does not sever the chain of causation if it was a direct and foreseeable response to the defendant's illegal act of fleeing. Citing cases involving high-speed chases, the court held that the reasonableness of the officer's response is relevant to determining its foreseeability from the defendant's perspective. The ultimate question of whether Robertson knew or should have known that his flight across the dangerous bridge made Partin's death substantially more probable was a question of fact properly submitted to the jury.

Dissenting - Keller, Justice

No, the conviction should not be affirmed because the jury was improperly instructed on the law of causation. The dissent argues that the causation statute, KRS 501.060, acts as a limitation on criminal liability, not as an alternative way to establish the required culpable mental state ('mens rea'). The jury instructions failed to adequately explain that the jury must find not only that the defendant acted wantonly, but also that the specific manner of death was a foreseeable result under the causation statute. The majority's proposed 'specimen' instructions are also flawed because they would permit a conviction without a finding of wantonness as defined in KRS 501.020. This error was prejudicial and requires a new trial with proper instructions that separate the inquiry into the defendant's mental state from the subsequent inquiry into legal causation and foreseeability.

Concurring - Graves, Justice

Yes. The concurring opinion agrees with the majority's conclusion but emphasizes that Robertson's specific act of vaulting over the barrier, knowing there was a dangerous gap and that he was being pursued, is what constitutes the wanton conduct. By taking this specific risk himself, Robertson had to assume a pursuing officer would attempt to follow and be subjected to the same substantial and unjustifiable risk. Robertson's conscious disregard of this specific, life-threatening danger—a nearly 4-foot gap over a 94-foot drop—was a gross deviation from the standard of conduct of a reasonable person and is sufficient to support the manslaughter conviction.

Analysis:

This decision clarifies the doctrine of legal causation in Kentucky criminal law, particularly in cases involving an intervening act by a third party. It establishes that a defendant fleeing police can be held liable for an officer's death if the officer's fatal actions were a foreseeable response to the flight. This expands the scope of liability for fleeing suspects, making them potentially responsible for tragic outcomes that are not directly inflicted by them but are induced by their unlawful conduct. The case underscores that foreseeability, from the defendant's point of view, is the critical link in establishing proximate cause when a victim's own volitional act is the immediate cause of death.

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