Roberts v. Saylor
230 Kan. 289, 637 P.2d 1175, 1981 Kan. LEXIS 291 (1981)
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Rule of Law:
For conduct to be actionable as the tort of outrage (intentional infliction of emotional distress), it must be so extreme and outrageous as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Additionally, the resulting emotional distress must be so severe that no reasonable person should be expected to endure it.
Facts:
- Loretta Roberts had a surgery performed by Dr. McClure which left silk sutures inside her.
- Dr. Saylor performed a subsequent surgery on Roberts, during which he removed the sutures left by Dr. McClure.
- When Roberts decided to sue Dr. McClure for malpractice, she asked Dr. Saylor for his testimony.
- Dr. Saylor refused to cooperate, stating he despised people like her for causing doctors trouble and calling her and her family 'a bunch of thieves without a gun.'
- Following this, Roberts filed a suit against Dr. Saylor, which was later settled and dismissed.
- Three years later, Roberts was at a hospital on a gurney in a pre-operation room, medicated and awaiting hernia surgery to be performed by a different doctor.
- Dr. Saylor, who was at the hospital for his own medical appointment, saw Roberts in the pre-op room.
- According to Roberts's testimony, Dr. Saylor entered the room and, with a hostile face, stated in a loud voice, 'I don’t like you, I don’t like you... I wanted to tell you that before you went in there.'
Procedural Posture:
- Loretta Roberts filed a lawsuit against Dr. L. M. Saylor in the Kansas district court (trial court) for the tort of outrage.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Dr. Saylor.
- Roberts, as the appellant, appealed the decision to the Kansas Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for trial.
- Dr. Saylor, as the petitioner, filed a Petition for Review with the Kansas Supreme Court, which the court granted.
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Issue:
Does a doctor's conduct of approaching a former patient in a pre-operative room and angrily stating he dislikes her constitute extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress?
Opinions:
Majority - Fromme, J.
No. The doctor's conduct, while insulting and inconsiderate, did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous behavior required to be legally actionable for the tort of outrage. Liability for this tort requires meeting two threshold requirements: (1) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous, and (2) the emotional distress must be severe. The court found that Dr. Saylor’s conduct did not meet the first threshold. Given the prior antagonistic relationship, his expression of dislike was not entirely unexpected. The conduct amounted to mere insults and indignities, which are not considered 'atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.' Furthermore, the court found the second threshold was also not met. Roberts described her distress as being upset, nervous, and scared, but she required no further medical or psychiatric care and functioned normally after her surgery. This level of distress is not so severe that a reasonable person should not be expected to endure it, and the law does not intervene when feelings are merely hurt.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the high bar required to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, often called the tort of outrage. It establishes a critical gatekeeping function for trial courts, requiring them to determine as a matter of law whether the alleged conduct and resulting distress meet the thresholds of 'extreme and outrageous' and 'severe' before the case can proceed to a jury. The decision emphasizes that the tort is reserved for only the most egregious conduct and is not intended to police mere insults, rude behavior, or bad manners, even in sensitive situations. This precedent makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to survive summary judgment on IIED claims based on verbal harassment alone without demonstrating truly shocking behavior and debilitating emotional harm.
