Roberto Torres v. Jai Dining Services
Ariz. Supreme Court, (2021) (Opinion Vacating 250 Ariz. 147 (App. 2020)) (2021)
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Rule of Law:
An overserved patron's decision to resume driving while intoxicated after reaching a temporary place of repose does not, as a matter of law, constitute an intervening and superseding cause that breaks the chain of causation, thereby relieving a liquor licensee of liability.
Facts:
- Cesar Aguilera Villanueva spent several hours drinking alcohol at Jaguars Club and became intoxicated.
- Around 2:30 a.m., after a dispute with a club employee, bouncers pushed Villanueva out the door, and he drove away from the club in his truck.
- Villanueva drove to his brother’s house, where he remained for over an hour to 'chill out for a little bit and sober up'.
- Around 4:00 a.m., a friend used Villanueva’s truck to drive Villanueva, his girlfriend, and her friend to Villanueva’s house, dropping off the truck there.
- Villanueva slept for a short time at his home.
- His girlfriend woke him, and he agreed to take her friend home.
- The friend drove Villanueva’s truck to her house while Villanueva slept in the backseat.
- After dropping off the friend, Villanueva resumed driving while still intoxicated.
- Just after 5:00 a.m., Villanueva struck a car that was stopped at a red light, killing Guadalupe Gastelum Suarez and Jesus O. Torres Guillen.
Procedural Posture:
- Guadalupe Gastelum Suarez’s and Jesus O. Torres Guillen’s families (Plaintiffs/Appellees Roberto Torres, et al.) sued Cesar Aguilera Villanueva and JAI Dining Services (Phoenix), Inc. (Defendant/Appellant JAI) in the Maricopa County Superior Court (trial court) for negligence and dram shop liability related to overserving alcohol to Villanueva.
- JAI moved for summary judgment, arguing Villanueva’s decision to drive again after reaching home was an intervening and superseding cause as a matter of law, which the trial court denied.
- At the close of Plaintiffs’ case during the ensuing jury trial, JAI reasserted its intervening and superseding cause argument in a motion for judgment as a matter of law, which the trial court denied.
- The jury returned a verdict in Plaintiffs’ favor on their common law negligence claims against Villanueva and JAI, and their dram shop liability claim against JAI, awarding $2 million in compensatory damages and apportioning 60% of fault to Villanueva and 40% to JAI.
- The trial court subsequently denied JAI’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.
- JAI appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One (intermediate appellate court), which reversed the judgment against JAI, holding that the trial court erred by not entering judgment in JAI’s favor as a matter of law, finding Villanueva's actions to be an intervening and superseding cause.
- Plaintiffs/Appellees Roberto Torres, et al., sought review from the Arizona Supreme Court, which granted review.
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Issue:
Does an overserved patron’s decision to drive while intoxicated after safely reaching home or a similar resting place constitute an intervening and superseding cause that breaks the chain of causation as a matter of law, thus relieving the defendant liquor licensee of liability?
Opinions:
Majority - Vice Chief Justice Timmer
No, an overserved patron's decision to drive while intoxicated after safely reaching home or a similar resting place does not constitute an intervening and superseding cause that breaks the chain of causation as a matter of law. The court reasoned that to recover on negligence and dram shop claims, plaintiffs must prove actual and proximate causation, with proximate cause requiring the defendant's acts to produce the harm 'in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause.' An intervening cause becomes a superseding cause, relieving the original negligent actor of liability, when it is 'unforeseeable by a reasonable person in the position of the original actor and when, looking backward, after the event, the intervening act appears extraordinary.' The court held that the foreseeable risk created by overserving alcohol — that a patron will drive while intoxicated and cause an accident — does not 'vanish solely because the patron initially returns home with the intent to sleep, eat, change clothes, or do myriad other things before deciding to leave home and resume driving.' Intoxicated individuals frequently make imprudent decisions, including driving while still impaired. The injury-producing conduct of driving while impaired 'is one of the very hazards which make[s] the tavern owner’s act negligent.' Distinguishing from cases where club personnel actively separated a patron from their vehicle, the court found that a jury could reasonably conclude Villanueva's subsequent intoxicated driving was foreseeable and not extraordinary, thus keeping it within the scope of JAI's original negligent conduct. The court noted that liability would end when the patron sobers up, but not necessarily after a temporary stop. Therefore, the issue was properly submitted to the jury.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the parameters of proximate causation and superseding cause in Arizona dram shop liability, rejecting a narrow interpretation that would create a safe harbor for liquor licensees once a patron reaches a temporary place of repose. By emphasizing that the foreseeable risk of intoxicated driving continues as long as the patron is impaired, the court broadens the potential scope of liability for establishments that overserve alcohol. This ruling likely means fewer dram shop cases will be dismissed at the summary judgment stage based on a patron's interim actions, allowing more such cases to proceed to a jury for determination of foreseeability and extraordinariness. It reinforces the duty of liquor licensees to consider the full implications of their overserving practices on public safety.
