Roberto Morales Diaz v. State of Iowa
2017 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 63, 896 N.W.2d 723, 2017 WL 2491640 (2017)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Sixth Amendment, effective assistance of counsel requires a criminal defense attorney to advise a non-citizen client not only of the risk of deportation but also of the specific, severe, and clear immigration consequences of a guilty plea, including the foreclosure of any relief from removal.
Facts:
- Roberto Morales Diaz, an unauthorized alien, had resided in the United States since 2002 and was the primary caregiver for his young daughter, a U.S. citizen.
- On January 24, 2013, a police officer investigating a domestic disturbance report asked Morales Diaz for identification.
- Morales Diaz produced a Texas identification card which the officer determined was fraudulent.
- During questioning, Morales Diaz admitted he was residing in the U.S. without authorization and was subsequently arrested and charged with felony forgery.
- Morales Diaz's retained counsel advised him that because he had missed a previous immigration hearing, he was 'probably going to be deported no matter what happened.'
- Relying on this advice, Morales Diaz signed a written plea of guilty to the lesser offense of aggravated misdemeanor forgery.
- Based on this conviction, which federal law classifies as an 'aggravated felony,' federal authorities permanently removed Morales Diaz from the United States to Mexico.
Procedural Posture:
- Roberto Morales Diaz filed an application for postconviction relief in the Iowa District Court (court of first instance), asserting ineffective assistance of counsel.
- The district court granted the application, vacated his conviction, and permitted him to withdraw his guilty plea.
- The State, as appellant, appealed the district court's decision to the Iowa Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court).
- The court of appeals reversed the district court's judgment, finding counsel had no duty to provide specific immigration advice.
- Morales Diaz sought further review from the Supreme Court of Iowa (highest state court).
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Issue:
Does a criminal defense attorney provide ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment by failing to advise a non-citizen client that a guilty plea to an aggravated felony will result in certain, mandatory, and permanent removal from the United States and render them ineligible for relief from removal?
Opinions:
Majority - Cady, Chief Justice
Yes. A defense attorney provides constitutionally deficient representation by failing to advise a non-citizen client of the direct, severe, and certain immigration consequences of a guilty plea. Building upon Padilla v. Kentucky, the duty of counsel is not met by a generic warning that deportation is 'possible' or 'probable' when the law makes it a virtual certainty. Forgery is an 'aggravated felony' under federal immigration law, which triggers automatic and mandatory removal and forecloses eligibility for relief like 'cancellation of removal.' Competent counsel, guided by professional norms like the ABA Standards, has a duty to research and explain these specific consequences so the client can make a fully informed decision. Counsel's failure to explain that the plea would permanently separate Morales Diaz from his U.S. citizen daughter and eliminate any chance to fight removal was constitutionally deficient. The prejudice is clear because it would have been rational for Morales Diaz to reject the plea and proceed to trial to avoid the certain and devastating consequence of permanent removal.
Concurring - Mansfield, Justice
Yes, but for a narrower reason. Counsel provided ineffective assistance simply by advising his client that deportation was 'probable' when, under the law, it was a certainty. This incorrect advice alone satisfies the deficient performance prong of Strickland under Padilla v. Kentucky. The majority unnecessarily and improperly expands counsel's duty to require explaining 'the full meaning and consequences of deportation,' such as eligibility for cancellation of removal or bars to reentry. This broader issue was not argued by the parties and imposes a substantial new burden on criminal defense attorneys to become experts in the complex and separate field of immigration law, a duty not mandated by Padilla. The court should have resolved the case on the narrower ground of counsel's failure to advise of the certainty of deportation.
Analysis:
This decision significantly expands the duty of criminal defense counsel under Padilla v. Kentucky. It moves beyond a general requirement to warn non-citizen clients about the risk of deportation to a specific duty to investigate and advise on the full range of clear and severe immigration consequences, such as ineligibility for relief from removal or mandatory detention. The ruling solidifies the role of defense attorneys as 'crimmigration' lawyers, raising the standard of care and requiring a deeper understanding of immigration law. This will likely lead to an increase in post-conviction relief claims based on inadequate advice regarding the nuances of immigration consequences flowing from a criminal conviction.
