Robert Marks, Sr. v. State of Tennessee
562 F. App'x 341 (2014)
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Rule of Law:
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires courts to provide reasonable accommodations for disabled litigants, but this duty does not override a trial judge's inherent authority to control the court's calendar and direct that motions for continuances be submitted directly to the court, especially when substantial accommodations are otherwise provided.
Facts:
- Robert Clive Marks, a former lawyer, was found liable for legal malpractice and subsequently defended himself pro se in an enforcement action against certain assets.
- The Administrative Office of the State Courts had a policy to implement the ADA, outlining a procedure for disabled persons to request modifications to courtrooms or procedures.
- During the enforcement litigation, Marks submitted administrative requests for modifications, including postponing the case due to medical issues and truncating hearings to accommodate his limited stamina.
- The local ADA coordinator forwarded all of Marks's requests for modification to the trial court judge.
- The trial judge substantially accommodated all of Marks's requests, but after the first request, informed Marks that he should move for continuances directly before the court, rather than submitting administrative requests for postponement.
- Marks administratively challenged the trial judge's directive that requests for continuances be addressed to the court.
- During the litigation and administrative challenge, Marks suffered a medical complication that led to the amputation of his leg.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert Clive Marks, Sr. was found liable for legal malpractice.
- Marks defended himself pro se in an enforcement action in state court to protect certain assets from creditors.
- The state trial court judge in the enforcement action substantially accommodated Marks's requests for modification but advised him to move for continuances directly before the court.
- Marks administratively challenged the trial judge's directive through the Administrative Office of the State Courts.
- Marks subsequently sued the State of Tennessee and the Administrative Office of the State Courts in federal district court, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
- The federal district court initially dismissed Marks's case under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
- Marks appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the district court's decision, holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply.
- On remand, the federal district court again dismissed Marks's complaint, concluding that Marks lacked standing for his failure-to-post-notice claim, his claims were partially time-barred, judicial immunity applied, and he failed to state a claim for disability discrimination because reasonable accommodations had been made.
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Issue:
Does a state's ADA policy, which requires a disabled litigant to submit requests for continuances directly to the presiding judge rather than indefinitely granting them through an administrative ADA coordinator, constitute discrimination under the ADA when the litigant's requests for accommodation are otherwise substantially met?
Opinions:
Majority - Rogers
No, the state's ADA policy, as implemented by the local coordinator and trial judge, did not violate Marks's rights under the ADA because the court substantially accommodated his disability, and the policy's requirement for continuances to be addressed to the judge is a reasonable exercise of judicial authority. The court first held that Marks lacked constitutional standing to raise the claim that the Administrative Office failed to post ADA notices. Marks was already fully aware of the courts’ ADA policy, evidenced by his repeated requests, and therefore could not demonstrate injury from lack of notice. An "abstract stigmatic injury" is not the concrete and particularized harm required for standing, as per Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and Allen v. Wright. Regarding the handling of administrative requests, the court found that Marks failed to state a plausible cause of action for discrimination. The local ADA coordinator acted reasonably by forwarding Marks's requests to the trial judge, as her role under the policy was to advise the judge in judicial functions, not to unilaterally grant continuances. The trial judge substantially accommodated Marks's disability by granting multiple continuances and limiting the merits hearings to three hours, which enabled Marks to effectively litigate his case through a successful appeal. The court emphasized that the policy respects the longstanding principle that a judge maintains full control over their calendar and docket, citing Elliot v. Life of the South Ins. Co., Hessmer v. Hessmer, and Smith v. Daniel. This inherent power means motions for continuance are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the presiding judge. The court concluded that Marks's alleged injuries stemmed from his choice to contest the established procedure for continuances rather than accepting the court's determination.
Analysis:
This case provides important guidance on the scope of reasonable accommodation under the ADA in judicial settings, particularly regarding a litigant's requests for continuances. It clarifies that while courts must accommodate disabled individuals, this obligation does not supersede a judge's inherent authority to manage their docket and require formal motions for continuances. The ruling also reinforces standing requirements for ADA claims, emphasizing that a plaintiff must demonstrate concrete injury rather than merely abstract or stigmatic harm, even for alleged failures to post required notices. Future cases may reference this decision to delineate the balance between ADA compliance and judicial discretion over court procedures.
