Robert M. Levine v. Richard Kling
1997 WL 464766, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21493, 123 F.3d 580 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
A plaintiff in a legal malpractice case arising from a criminal conviction cannot state a claim for damages unless they can establish their actual innocence, which generally requires having the conviction overturned through direct appeal or post-conviction relief.
Facts:
- Robert Levine was convicted of using interstate commerce to commit murder for hire.
- Richard Kling was appointed as Levine's appellate counsel to handle the appeal of his conviction.
- During the appeal, Levine alleged that Kling's representation constituted legal malpractice.
- Levine's criminal conviction was ultimately upheld on appeal.
- At the time of filing the malpractice suit, Levine's conviction remained valid and had not been overturned.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert Levine was convicted of murder for hire in a federal trial court.
- Levine appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the conviction.
- Levine then filed a civil damages suit for legal malpractice against his appellate counsel, Richard Kling, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
- The district court granted Kling's motion and dismissed Levine's suit for failure to state a claim under Illinois law.
- Levine (appellant) appealed the district court's dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a convicted criminal state a valid claim for legal malpractice against his defense counsel under Illinois law if he has not first had his conviction overturned and cannot prove his actual innocence?
Opinions:
Majority - Posner, Chief Judge
No. A convicted criminal cannot state a valid claim for legal malpractice without first establishing his actual innocence, as a guilty person has no legally protected interest in the liberty they have forfeited by committing a crime. To prove injury in a malpractice claim, a plaintiff would have to show that competent counsel would have secured an acquittal. However, an acquittal only signifies that the government failed to meet its heavy burden of proof; it does not equate to actual innocence. Tort law does not provide damages for the loss of liberty for a rightfully imprisoned individual, as this would create the paradoxical result of compensating a guilty person for their just punishment. The proper remedy for incompetent counsel in a criminal case is a new trial, not a civil damages award. Therefore, a valid criminal conviction collaterally estops a plaintiff from re-litigating their guilt in a subsequent civil malpractice action.
Analysis:
This decision establishes the "actual innocence" rule for criminal malpractice claims under the court's interpretation of Illinois law, aligning it with the majority of U.S. jurisdictions. It prevents convicted individuals from using tort law to collaterally attack their criminal convictions or potentially profit from their own illegal acts. The ruling solidifies the principle that remedies for a flawed criminal proceeding must be sought within the criminal justice system (e.g., new trial, post-conviction relief) before a civil remedy can be pursued. This creates a significant barrier for malpractice claims by criminal defendants, requiring them to first succeed in vacating their conviction before they can even file a suit for damages.
