Robert Kessler v. Patrizia Riccardi
363 F. App'x 350 (2010)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Under Tennessee law, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, an adverse action does not require actual funding or direct financial harm, but rather any action that 'well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.' Judgment as a matter of law on such claims is inappropriate when reasonable minds could differ on questions of fact regarding pretext or adverse action.
Facts:
- Dr. Patrizia Riccardi began a medical-research fellowship at Vanderbilt University in September 2003, working under the direct supervision of Dr. Robert Kessler, a radiology and psychiatry professor.
- In July 2004, Riccardi accepted a part-time faculty position, agreeing to fund a percentage of her salary through grants, either her own or by contributing to Kessler's grants.
- Riccardi alleged that Kessler sexually harassed her from November 2003, culminating in an attempted rape in June 2005 during a professional conference in Toronto.
- Kessler denied the harassment allegations, claiming he and Riccardi had a consensual, on-again-off-again affair from January 2004 until June 2005.
- In June 2005, following the Toronto incident, Riccardi reported Kessler's alleged sexual harassment and attempted rape to Vanderbilt University.
- University authorities investigated Riccardi's claims but found insufficient evidence to substantiate them, subsequently limiting Kessler's direct interaction with Riccardi.
- Riccardi alleged Kessler unlawfully retaliated against her by inadequately supporting her grant-writing efforts and by refusing to include her on some of his own grant proposals after she reported him.
- Kessler countersued Riccardi for defamation, alleging her reports against him were false and damaged his reputation and mental health.
Procedural Posture:
- Dr. Riccardi filed a sexual harassment complaint naming Vanderbilt, Dr. Kessler, and Dr. Martin Sandler as defendants.
- Dr. Riccardi raised state-law claims for retaliation, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Dr. Kessler individually in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee.
- Dr. Kessler countersued Dr. Riccardi in the same court for defamation, assault, and battery.
- Dr. Riccardi settled her claims against Vanderbilt and Sandler before trial.
- The district court granted partial summary judgment to Dr. Kessler on five of Dr. Riccardi's retaliation allegations, finding legitimate non-retaliatory reasons.
- The district court found a question of fact sufficient to warrant a trial on two of Dr. Riccardi's retaliation allegations.
- The case proceeded to trial on Dr. Riccardi’s two remaining retaliation allegations, Dr. Kessler’s defamation claim, and both parties' personal-injury claims.
- At the close of evidence, the district court granted Dr. Kessler’s pre-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law on Dr. Riccardi’s two remaining retaliation allegations.
- The jury found in Dr. Kessler’s favor on all claims, awarding him damages for battery, assault, and defamation.
- Dr. Riccardi filed a post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law on Dr. Kessler’s defamation claim or, in the alternative, requested a new trial or remittitur.
- The district court granted Dr. Riccardi's motion regarding $500,000 in actual monetary damages for defamation but denied it as to other compensatory damages and punitive damages, conditioned on Dr. Kessler accepting a remittitur reducing compensatory damages from $1,500,000 to $250,000 and punitive damages from $950,000 to $250,000.
- Dr. Kessler accepted the remittitur, and the district court entered a final judgment.
- Dr. Riccardi, now proceeding pro se, appealed the district court's decisions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Did the district court err by granting judgment as a matter of law to Kessler on Riccardi's retaliation claims, where genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether Kessler's actions constituted adverse actions and whether his stated reasons were pretextual?
Opinions:
Majority - Sutton, Circuit Judge
Yes, the district court erred by granting judgment as a matter of law on Riccardi’s two remaining retaliation claims because genuine issues of material fact regarding 'adverse action' and 'pretext' should have been decided by a jury. The court affirmed the district court's other rulings. For the 'Methamphetamine Grant' claim, the court found that Riccardi’s testimony that working on even an unfunded grant proposal would advance her career was sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably find an adverse action, as it 'well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination' (citing Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White). The district court also overlooked lingering questions of fact regarding Kessler’s stated non-retaliatory reasons (lack of expertise, small budget) for excluding Riccardi, as Kessler himself had previously included her on all his grants despite her expertise level and admitted she probably expected to be included. For the 'Risperidone Contract' claim, the court similarly found that being left off the proposal could be an adverse action because having one’s name on projects is a career benefit. Pretext was inferable because Riccardi had historically been included on Kessler's PET-related projects, the Risperidone project was related to their past work, and another colleague's name was included on the proposal, suggesting Kessler could have included Riccardi. The court affirmed the partial summary judgment on five other retaliation claims, finding Riccardi failed to raise a genuine issue of pretext. It also affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings, including allowing testimony about Riccardi's prior sexual relationships (probative to the nature of their relationship and Kessler's consensual defense, not prohibited by Rule 412 or 404(b)), denying evidence of Kessler shifting assets (attenuated relevance), and allowing Kessler's prior consistent statements about the affair (to rebut charges of recent fabrication). Finally, the court affirmed the denial of Riccardi's post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law on Kessler’s defamation claim, finding legally sufficient evidence of 'actual injury' based on Kessler’s testimony of severe mental anguish, impaired reputation, and sleep problems, and evidence of wide dissemination of Riccardi’s allegations.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the standard for 'adverse action' in retaliation claims under Tennessee law, emphasizing that career-building opportunities, even if not immediately remunerative or ultimately unsuccessful, can constitute adverse actions if their denial would dissuade a reasonable worker from engaging in protected activity. It also reinforces the principle that when genuine issues of material fact exist concerning a defendant's stated non-retaliatory reasons being pretextual, judgment as a matter of law is inappropriate, and the determination must be left to the jury. This ruling ensures that victims of alleged retaliation have a full opportunity to present their cases, preventing premature dismissal of claims where circumstantial evidence of harm and motive is present, especially when considering the totality of a professional relationship.
