Robert E. Curry v. Secretary of the Army
595 F.2d 873, 194 U.S. App. D.C. 66 (1979)
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Rule of Law:
The provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) that grant a convening authority multiple roles in a court-martial, including referring charges, selecting court members, and reviewing the outcome, do not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. These provisions are constitutionally permissible because of the unique needs of the military and the presence of sufficient statutory safeguards against improper command influence.
Facts:
- Curry was an enlisted man in the United States Army stationed in Germany.
- While driving intoxicated, Curry caused a car accident that resulted in two homicides.
- The convening authority, Curry's commanding officer, referred the homicide charges against him to a general court-martial for trial.
- This same convening authority also detailed the military judge who presided over the court-martial, selected the members of the court, and appointed the counsel.
- After the trial, the convening authority reviewed the court-martial record on both the facts and the law and approved the conviction.
Procedural Posture:
- Curry was convicted of two homicides by a general court-martial.
- The Army Court of Military Review, an intermediate appellate court, affirmed the conviction but reduced his sentence.
- The United States Court of Military Appeals, the military's highest court, declined to review the case.
- Curry filed suit against the Secretary of the Army in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, a federal trial court, collaterally attacking his conviction.
- The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Army, upholding the conviction's validity.
- Curry (appellant) then appealed the District Court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
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Issue:
Do the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice that grant a single convening authority the power to refer charges for a court-martial, select the court members, and review the conviction and sentence violate a service member's due process rights under the Fifth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Tamm
No, the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice do not violate a service member's due process rights. While the court-martial system would be inconsistent with due process in a civilian context, the military is a 'specialized society' with unique needs that justify a departure from civilian legal standards. Citing precedents like Middendorf v. Henry and Parker v. Levy, the court reasoned that Congress has broad power under Article I, section 8 to regulate the armed forces, and courts must grant particular deference to its legislative determinations. The court found that the convening authority's powers are justified by military necessities such as maintaining discipline, efficiently using limited resources, ensuring logistical feasibility in combat, and conducting speedy trials. Furthermore, Congress was aware of the potential for 'command influence' and implemented numerous safeguards, such as review by a staff judge advocate, multi-level appellate review (including by civilian judges on the Court of Military Appeals), and explicit prohibitions against improper influence under Article 37 of the UCMJ. The balance struck by Congress between individual rights and military necessity is constitutionally permissible.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the long-standing principle that military justice operates under a different, more deferential constitutional standard than civilian justice. It solidifies the 'military necessity' doctrine as a powerful justification for procedures that would otherwise fail a due process challenge. The ruling emphasizes judicial deference to Congress in structuring military law, making it exceptionally difficult for service members to succeed in facial challenges to the court-martial system's structure without demonstrating actual prejudice. This case sets a high bar for future due process claims against the UCMJ's fundamental procedures.
