Robert C. McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc.
320 U.S. App. D.C. 40, 91 F.3d 1501 (1996)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
For a public figure to prove defamation, they must show by clear and convincing evidence that the publisher acted with actual malice, meaning the publisher either knew the material was false or entertained serious subjective doubts as to its truth.
Facts:
- Ari Ben-Menashe wrote a manuscript for a book, 'Profits of War,' which contained controversial allegations against former National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane.
- The manuscript alleged McFarlane was involved in the 'October Surprise' conspiracy to delay the release of American hostages in Iran and that he was an Israeli spy.
- In January 1992, Sheridan Square Press received the manuscript, and its co-chief, William H. Schaap, took responsibility for the project.
- Schaap was aware from the beginning that Ben-Menashe was a controversial figure whose credibility had been widely questioned in public reports.
- However, Ben-Menashe's claims had also been investigated by Congress and reported on by reputable journalists, some of whom told Schaap they found Ben-Menashe credible on certain matters.
- Schaap conducted over 100 hours of research, which included reviewing secondary sources and some of Ben-Menashe's passports (but not those covering 1980, the year of the key alleged events).
- Schaap acted as Ben-Menashe's attorney when Ben-Menashe repeated the allegations about McFarlane under oath before congressional committees.
- In September 1992, Sheridan Square Press published 'Profits of War' without independently corroborating the specific allegations against McFarlane and without contacting McFarlane for comment.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert C. McFarlane filed a defamation suit against author Ari Ben-Menashe and publisher Sheridan Square Press in federal district court.
- The district court initially denied Sheridan Square's motion for summary judgment.
- Upon Sheridan Square's motion for reconsideration, the district court reversed itself and granted summary judgment in favor of the publisher.
- McFarlane, as the appellant, appealed the grant of summary judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, with Sheridan Square Press as the appellee.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a publisher act with 'actual malice' when it publishes uncorroborated, defamatory allegations about a public figure from a source of questionable credibility, after conducting some investigation that did not disprove the allegations?
Opinions:
Majority - Ginsburg, Circuit Judge
No. A publisher does not act with actual malice merely by publishing uncorroborated allegations from a controversial source, as liability requires the plaintiff to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the publisher entertained serious subjective doubts as to the publication's truth. The actual malice standard is subjective and focuses on the defendant's state of mind, not on whether a reasonably prudent person would have published. While relying on a questionable source can be a factor, Sheridan Square's editor, Schaap, undertook a significant investigation. His efforts, which included consulting other journalists who relied on the author and personally witnessing the author repeat the allegations under oath before Congress, preclude a finding that he willfully blinded himself to the truth. The publisher's failure to corroborate the specific allegations, without more, does not constitute a reckless disregard for the truth, as there is no legal 'duty to corroborate' that would transform the subjective malice inquiry into an objective standard of care.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the formidable 'actual malice' standard established in New York Times v. Sullivan, making it exceptionally difficult for public figures to win defamation suits. The court clarifies that a publisher's failure to independently corroborate information from a notoriously unreliable source is not, by itself, sufficient to prove a reckless disregard for the truth. By focusing on the publisher's subjective state of mind and its good-faith, albeit imperfect, investigatory efforts, the ruling provides significant protection to the press, allowing publication of controversial allegations without fear of liability, so long as the publisher does not purposefully avoid evidence that would confirm falsity.
