Robb v. John C. Hickey, Inc.
19 N.J. Misc. 455, 1941 N.J. Misc. LEXIS 68, 20 A.2d 707 (1941)
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Rule of Law:
A court cannot mould or reform a jury verdict that is substantively defective, ambiguous, and internally contradictory regarding the ultimate issue of liability. When a jury's true intent cannot be clearly determined from such a verdict, the proper remedy is to set it aside and grant a new trial.
Facts:
- An incident occurred involving Clyde J. Robb's decedent and the defendants, John C. Hickey, Inc. and Roger W. King.
- During this incident, the defendants allegedly acted with negligence.
- The plaintiff's decedent was also alleged to have acted with contributory negligence during the same incident.
- The incident resulted in a legal dispute over liability for the harm caused to the decedent.
Procedural Posture:
- Clyde J. Robb sued John C. Hickey, Inc. and Roger W. King in the New Jersey Circuit Court (a trial court).
- The case was tried before a jury on the issues of negligence and contributory negligence.
- The jury was instructed that contributory negligence by the plaintiff's decedent was a complete bar to recovery.
- The jury returned a verdict finding both parties negligent but recommending a $2,000 award for the plaintiff.
- The plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict as ambiguous and inconsistent.
- The defendants moved to mould the verdict into a judgment in their favor, arguing the award was surplusage.
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Issue:
Is a jury verdict that finds both parties contributorily negligent but nevertheless awards damages to the plaintiff so substantively defective and ambiguous that it must be set aside for a new trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Leyden, C. C. J.
Yes. A jury verdict that is internally contradictory on the ultimate issue of liability is substantively defective and cannot be moulded, requiring a new trial. The court reasoned that the verdict was 'self contradictory, inconsistent and ambiguous' because it found negligence on the part of both parties, which under the prevailing doctrine of contributory negligence should legally result in a verdict for the defendants. However, the verdict simultaneously recommended a monetary award for the plaintiff, which is a finding in his favor. This recommendation is pertinent to the core issue of liability and cannot be dismissed as mere 'surplusage.' A court's power to mould a verdict is limited to correcting formal errors where the jury's intent is clear and convincing. Since the jury's real purpose here is a matter of 'conjecture and surmise,' the court cannot substitute its own judgment, and the only proper course of action is to grant a new trial.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the limits of a court's power to alter a jury verdict. It establishes a clear distinction between a verdict that is merely 'informal,' which a court can correct, and one that is 'substantively defective,' which a court must reject. The decision underscores the principle that courts cannot resolve fundamental ambiguities or contradictions that suggest a jury misunderstood or misapplied the governing law, such as the absolute bar of contributory negligence. This holding protects the integrity of the jury's role by preventing judicial speculation about a jury's confused intentions, ensuring that judgments are based on clear and legally sound findings.
