Roark v. Commonwealth
2002 Ky. LEXIS 189, 90 S.W.3d 24, 2002 WL 31132873 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
Eyewitness testimony derived from a witness who has undergone hypnosis is admissible if, under a "totality of the circumstances" analysis, its reliability outweighs the potential for irreparable misidentification and prejudice.
Facts:
- On November 29, 1997, N.T. discovered a broken basement window and a ransacked bedroom in her home, with money, jewelry (including a cross and chain), and photographs of her unclothed chest stolen.
- On December 19, 1997, N.T. was attacked in her home by a male intruder who placed a knife to her throat and forced her to the floor.
- N.T. briefly observed the intruder before he attacked her again, ordered her to "Turn over, I want to see your operation," tied her hands, cut off her underwear, and digitally penetrated her.
- After the intruder left, N.T. found money and a cameo broach stolen from her bedroom.
- N.T. initially described her assailant to police with varying details regarding age, height, weight, and hair, and assisted in creating computer composites that showed a full head of hair and no facial hair.
- In March 1998, N.T., on her own initiative, was hypnotized by Jill Brunner, an acquaintance of her husband, and during this session, described her assailant for the first time as bald and having a full beard.
- On October 28, 1998, during an unrelated investigation, police searched Franklin Roark, Jr.'s residence and found the cross and chain stolen from N.T.'s bedroom on November 29, 1997, and the cameo broach stolen on December 19, 1997.
- On November 10, 1998, N.T. identified Franklin Roark, Jr. from a photo lineup and later identified his voice as her assailant's, then observed him in a suggestive "showup" at the jail.
Procedural Posture:
- A grand jury rendered separate indictments against Franklin Roark, Jr. for the November 29, 1997, and December 19, 1997, incidents.
- The trial judge in the Campbell Circuit Court consolidated these indictments for the purpose of trial.
- Franklin Roark, Jr. filed a pretrial motion in the Campbell Circuit Court to suppress N.T.'s photograph and voice identifications, which the trial judge overruled.
- A Campbell Circuit Court jury convicted Franklin Roark, Jr. of burglary in the second degree, robbery in the first degree, and sexual abuse in the first degree, and found him to be a persistent felony offender in the first degree.
- Franklin Roark, Jr. was sentenced to two concurrent enhanced sentences of life imprisonment by the Campbell Circuit Court.
- Franklin Roark, Jr. appealed his conviction and sentences to the Supreme Court of Kentucky as a matter of right.
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Issue:
Does the admission of hypnotically induced or refreshed eyewitness identification and testimony violate a criminal defendant's due process rights, particularly when the post-hypnotic memory differs from prior descriptions?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Cooper
No, the admission of hypnotically induced or refreshed eyewitness identification and testimony does not automatically violate a defendant's due process rights, as its admissibility is determined by a "totality of the circumstances" test, which found the identification sufficiently reliable in this case. The Court acknowledged the substantial scientific debate and concerns regarding hypnotically induced memory, including increased susceptibility to suggestion, confabulation (filling in missing details), and "memory hardening" (overconfidence in altered memories) which impairs cross-examination. Rejecting per se admissible, per se inadmissible, and "procedural safeguards" approaches as too rigid or insufficient, the Court adopted a "totality of the circumstances" test. This test, consistent with the reliability inquiry for general eyewitness identifications under Neil v. Biggers and the balancing approach of KRE 403, requires a case-by-case evaluation of reliability. Key factors include the purpose of hypnosis (therapeutic vs. investigative), employment of procedural safeguards, existence of independent corroborating evidence, consistency with pre-hypnotic recollection, likelihood of taint from outside influences, and whether probative value outweighs prejudicial effect. Applying this test, the Court found several circumstances militating against admission (investigative purpose, post-hypnotic changes, lack of procedural safeguards), but also strong factors in favor: Appellant was not a suspect when N.T. was hypnotized (reducing suggestive influence), and critically, N.T.'s subsequent identification was corroborated by the recovery of stolen property from Roark's residence. Given these mitigating factors, the trial judge's decision to admit the testimony was neither clearly erroneous nor an abuse of discretion, leaving the weight and credibility of the testimony for the jury to decide.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies Kentucky's evidentiary standards regarding hypnotically-influenced testimony, establishing a flexible "totality of the circumstances" test. This approach ensures that courts avoid rigid rules that might either admit unreliable evidence or exclude potentially valuable, corroborated testimony. By emphasizing independent corroboration and the absence of known suspects during hypnosis, the ruling provides a framework for evaluating reliability that balances scientific concerns about memory alteration with the practical realities of criminal investigations. It grants trial courts considerable discretion in admissibility determinations and underscores the jury's role in assessing the ultimate credibility of such evidence, likely influencing how similar evidence is handled in future cases across Kentucky.
