No. The new law from 1991 can't be used for a firing that happened in 1986. Courts assume that new laws are for the future only. It wouldn't be fair to apply a new rule to a past event, because people and companies act based on the rules that exist at the time. The 1991 law created new responsibilities for employers that didn't exist when these men were fired. Even though Congress passed the law to fix an old court ruling, they didn't write in the law that it should apply to old cases. Without a clear command from Congress, we have to stick to the 'future only' rule.

Yes. The new law should apply to this case. When the company fired these men, pretty much everyone thought the law already protected against racist firings. A Supreme Court decision briefly and wrongly changed that, and Congress passed the 1991 Act to set things right again. The company can't claim 'unfair surprise' because they should have known their actions were wrong under the law as it was understood at the time. Not applying the new law just lets a bad court decision continue to cause harm.

No, the new rules from 1991 shouldn't be used for this case. We believe this because: 1) Usually, new laws that create new responsibilities don't apply to old situations. 2) Congress didn't clearly say they wanted this law to apply to old cases. 3) Even though Congress might have wanted to 'fix' what the Supreme Court did, that doesn't automatically mean they wanted the fix to work backwards in time. 4) It wouldn't be fair to suddenly change the rules for things that already happened. So, we're saying that the new law only works for things that happen after it was made.

Yes, I think the new rules from 1991 should be used for this case. When Rivers and Davison were fired in 1986, everyone thought the law protected against this kind of firing. Using the new law wouldn't surprise their employer or be unfair. I think we should look at what Congress wanted to do and what people expected when things happened. In this case, the employer knew they could get in trouble for racial discrimination when they fired Rivers and Davison. So I think we should let the case continue using the new law.

No. Section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not apply retroactively to conduct that occurred before the statute's enactment. The Court applies a strong presumption against statutory retroactivity, especially for laws that create new legal liabilities or standards of conduct, as § 101 does by expanding the scope of § 1981 to cover contract termination. The argument that § 101 was 'restorative' legislation intended to overrule this Court's decision in *Patterson v. McLean Credit Union* is insufficient to overcome this presumption. Unlike the vetoed 1990 Civil Rights bill which contained explicit retroactivity provisions, the enacted 1991 Act lacks any clear textual evidence of congressional intent for it to apply to past events. A judicial construction of a statute, such as *Patterson*, is an authoritative statement of what the statute has always meant, not a change in the law; therefore, applying the 1991 Act to pre-enactment conduct would constitute a truly retroactive change.

Yes. Section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should apply to cases pending on appeal at the time of its enactment. The proper analysis is to apply new laws to pending cases unless doing so would result in 'manifest injustice' by disturbing vested rights or settled expectations. In this case, there is no unfair surprise to the employer, because at the time of the firings, the prevailing view in the federal courts was that § 1981 did cover discriminatory terminations. The Court's decision in *Patterson* was a brief interruption of that settled understanding, and the 1991 Act was intended to restore it. Refusing to apply the restorative statute retroactively gives the congressionally repudiated *Patterson* decision an extended and unwarranted effect.

No. Section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not apply retroactively to conduct that occurred before its enactment. We reach this conclusion for several reasons. First, the presumption against statutory retroactivity applies with particular force to new substantive liabilities, as is the case here. Section 101 expanded the category of conduct subject to § 1981 liability, thus creating new legal obligations. Second, neither the text of the Act nor its legislative history provides clear evidence of congressional intent for retroactive application. While Congress may have intended to 'restore' pre-Patterson understanding of § 1981, this does not necessarily imply an intent for retroactive application. Third, even if § 101 is viewed as a 'restorative' statute, we do not presume retroactive intent for such statutes. The judicial decision being responded to (Patterson) was not 'wrong' but rather an authoritative interpretation of what the statute meant before the amendment. Finally, fairness concerns do not override the presumption against retroactivity in this case. Therefore, § 101 does not apply to preenactment conduct, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Yes, Section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should apply retroactively to cases pending on appeal at the time of its enactment, at least where doing so would not disturb vested rights or settled expectations. This is such a case because when the alleged discriminatory discharge occurred in 1986, the prevailing understanding was that § 1981 applied to discriminatory contract termination. Applying § 101 here would not alter the parties' expectations or disturb vested rights. The Court's new approach to retroactivity stalls the application of remedial legislation. The proper inquiry should focus on respecting congressional intent and the parties' settled expectations. In this case, the employer was on notice of potential liability under the pre-Patterson interpretation of § 1981. Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings.

Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc.

Case Podcast

Rule of Law:

The Legal Principle

Facts:

Procedural Posture:

How It Got Here

Issue:

Legal Question at Stake

Opinions:

Majority, Concurrences & Dissents

Analysis:

Why This Case Matters

Gunnerbot