River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Village of Hazel Crest
611 F.3d 367, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 13681, 2010 WL 2630602 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
A land use regulation does not violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act's (RLUIPA) equal-terms provision if it treats a religious assembly the same as secular assemblies that are similar from the standpoint of accepted, objective zoning criteria, such as the distinction between commercial and noncommercial uses.
Facts:
- River of Life Kingdom Ministries, a small church, operated out of a cramped warehouse in Chicago Heights.
- The church sought to relocate to a building it purchased in the Village of Hazel Crest.
- The building was located in a run-down area that Hazel Crest's zoning ordinance designated as a commercial district.
- In an effort to revitalize the area, Hazel Crest amended its zoning ordinance to exclude all new noncommercial uses from the district.
- The ordinance's exclusion applied to churches as well as secular noncommercial assemblies, such as community centers, schools, and art galleries.
- The ordinance continued to permit secular commercial assemblies, including gymnasiums, health clubs, restaurants, and hotels, in the commercial district.
- The stated purpose for the all-commercial district was to generate tax revenue and provide shopping opportunities for residents and commuters from a nearby train station.
Procedural Posture:
- River of Life Kingdom Ministries sued the Village of Hazel Crest in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
- River of Life filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the zoning ordinance.
- The district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction.
- River of Life (appellant) appealed the denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
- A three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted a petition for rehearing en banc to resolve uncertainty regarding the proper standard for RLUIPA's equal-terms provision.
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Issue:
Does a municipal zoning ordinance that excludes churches from a commercial district, while also excluding comparable secular noncommercial assemblies but permitting secular commercial assemblies, violate RLUIPA's provision that prohibits treating a religious institution on 'less than equal terms' with a nonreligious institution?
Opinions:
Majority - Posner
No, the zoning ordinance does not violate RLUIPA's equal-terms provision. The court establishes a new test focused on 'accepted zoning criteria' rather than subjective 'regulatory purpose.' A violation occurs only if an ordinance treats a religious assembly differently from a secular assembly that is similar with respect to an objective zoning criterion. Here, the Village of Hazel Crest created a 'commercial district,' an accepted zoning criterion. It excluded the church, a noncommercial assembly, along with other secular noncommercial assemblies like libraries and community centers. Because the church is treated the same as similarly situated noncommercial secular assemblies, there is no unequal treatment. The proper comparison is not between a church and a commercial gymnasium, but between a noncommercial church and a noncommercial community center.
Dissenting - Sykes
Yes, the ordinance violates RLUIPA's equal-terms provision. The majority's 'accepted zoning criteria' test eviscerates the statute by being overly deferential to municipalities' economic justifications. The plain text of the statute requires a straightforward comparison: if a nonreligious assembly is permitted while a religious assembly is excluded, there is a violation. The Hazel Crest ordinance permits secular assemblies like gymnasiums, health clubs, and day-care centers while excluding churches. This constitutes facial discrimination. The majority's approach wrongly compares the church to other excluded assemblies rather than to the permitted ones, turning the statute's protection on its head and departing from this circuit's prior precedent.
Concurring - Cudahy
I concur in the judgment but see little practical difference between the majority's 'regulatory criteria' test and the Third Circuit's 'regulatory purpose' test. The search for a completely objective test in this area is likely futile, and both approaches are acceptable ways for the judiciary to apply a vaguely written statutory provision. The distinction between 'purpose' and 'criteria' may not be as significant as the majority suggests.
Concurring - Manion
I concur in the result because River of Life is not 'equal' to any of the permitted commercial uses in the district. However, I am wary of the court crafting a broad, universal standard based on such a straightforward case. I also disagree with the majority's dicta suggesting that providing religious exemptions might violate the Establishment Clause, as this complex constitutional question was not briefed and is unnecessary for resolving the case.
Concurring - Williams
I concur in the judgment but believe the Third Circuit's 'regulatory purpose' test is the superior approach. It is simpler and does not require federal judges to become experts in zoning by determining what constitutes 'accepted regulatory criteria.' The majority's new test does not solve the subjectivity problem it identifies, as zoning officials could just as easily use 'accepted criteria' as a pretext for discrimination as they could a 'regulatory purpose.'
Analysis:
This en banc decision establishes a new test in the Seventh Circuit for RLUIPA's equal-terms provision, creating a circuit split. The 'accepted zoning criteria' test is a middle ground between the Eleventh Circuit's literal approach and the Third Circuit's more deferential 'regulatory purpose' standard. This holding gives municipalities more latitude to exclude religious institutions from certain zones, provided the exclusion is based on neutral, objective zoning classifications (like commercial vs. noncommercial) that are applied equally to religious and secular institutions alike. The ruling will likely make it more difficult for religious assemblies to win equal-terms challenges against noncumulative zoning ordinances, especially in commercially zoned districts.
