No. The police's job is to protect the public in general, not to act as a personal bodyguard for one person. It would be impossible for them to protect every single person who gets a threat. There are special exceptions, like if the person is a police informant helping with a dangerous case, but this woman wasn't. Even though the police turned out to be wrong and something awful happened, their decision not to give her special protection wasn't legally negligent at the time.

Yes. This judge completely disagreed. He argued that the police knew for months how specific and serious the threats were, and they should have done something. He couldn't see a good reason why a police informant deserves protection more than a regular person who is clearly in danger. He believed a jury should have been allowed to decide if the police acted reasonably or not.

No. This judge agreed with the final decision to dismiss the case, but for a simpler reason. He believed that the law simply does not allow a person to sue the police for failing to do their general job of protecting the public.

No, the city didn't do anything wrong. We're saying this because the police couldn't have known for sure that the man would actually hurt Linda. Even though she asked for help many times, that's not enough to make the police responsible. The police can't protect everyone all the time from every threat. They have to have a really good reason to give someone special protection. In this case, even though the man did end up hurting Linda, which is terrible, that doesn't mean the police should have known it would happen. They had to balance a lot of things, like the fact that the man was a lawyer and hadn't actually done anything dangerous before the attack.

Yes, I think the city did do something wrong. For almost a year, Linda was being threatened and attacked, and she told the police about it many times. They should have done more to protect her. There was a case before called Schuster where the court said the police had to protect someone who gave them information about a criminal. I think this case is similar - Linda told the police about the man threatening her, so they should have protected her too. The police should look at each situation and decide if someone needs extra protection based on how much danger they're in. In this case, I think they should have seen that Linda was in real danger and helped her more.

I agree with the main decision that the city didn't do anything wrong, but for different reasons. Linda was mainly asking the police to arrest the man who was threatening her, not just for protection. But the police couldn't arrest him before he actually did something illegal. Also, there's a rule that says people can't usually sue the city for not doing a good job at general police work. So even if the police made a mistake, that doesn't mean Linda can sue them for it.

***** HERE ARE THE OPINIONS. THERE ARE 3 OF THEM ***** 
*THIS IS A Majority OPINION* 
 *ITS CONTENT IS:* 

<opinion type="majority">
<author id="b268-3">Steuer, J. P.</author>
It would serve no purpose to iterate the facts leading up to the tragic incident which resulted in the horrible injuries suffered by this plaintiff. Sufficient is set out in the dissenting opinion.
The question is whether plaintiff raised an issue calling for submission to a jury as to whether the defendant, through its Police Department, was negligent. The claimed negligence is the failure to provide personal police protection to plaintiff. It must be conceded that, absent special circumstances, there is no duty resting on a municipality or other governmental body to provide police protection to any particular person on his request (Murrain v. Wilson Line, 270 App. Div. 372, affd. 296 N. Y. 845). The noted case, heavily relied on by plaintiff and the dissenting opinion, of Schuster v. City of New York (5 N Y 2d 75), does not change this. It merely fixes one of the special circumstances in which a failure to .supply such protection may be actionable. Such circumstance is where the police know that the person seeking protection has informed on a dangerous criminal and has been threatened on account thereof. This was held to constitute a special circumstance not only because unusual danger could readily be seen to be imminent but also because a failure to provide protection under such circumstances would discourage citizens from giving information to the police and hence decrease the efficiency of law enforcement. No such element is here present.
Admittedly this is not the only set of circumstances in which the failure to supply protection would be a breach of duty owed by the municipality. And we do not wish to be understood as invoking any such limitation. Undoubtedly there would be liability if a .police officer witnessed an assault and failed to go to the protection of the person threatened; and also where the authorities have recognized a present, immediate and serious danger to the extent of supplying protection and thereafter abandon the person protected before the threat of imminent danger has abated (Isereau v. Stone, 207 Misc. 941).
Here the evidence shows that the police were told of the actions of a disappointed suitor who, it is true, made extravagant threats. In addition, they were told of certain incidents which might be construed as activating those threats, though actual proof of the perpetration of those acts by the one threatening was lacking. They were confronted with the fact that the person accused was a lawyer in good standing, and that when the plaintiff made a charge against him in court it was withdrawn on the hearing. It must be common knowledge that unfavored swains are not infrequently tempted to relieve their frustrations by <page-number citation-index="1" label="219">*219</page-number>predictions of dire results to the object of their attentions; and that the timorous make frequent applications for protection for this, as well as a variety of other reasons, real or imagined. It would not only be impracticable but impossible to protect against all these contingencies.
Here, events proved the police to be wrong. The suitor was either so depraved or demented that he carried out his threats in a manner that can only evoke revulsion to himself and the greatest pity for his victim. But this is not to say that there was negligence in failing to foresee these consequences. Otherwise, in every case of reported threat the police would have to determine the probability of injury at their peril. It is submitted that the facts brought out on this trial do not show the presence of such imminent danger that extraordinary police activity was so indicated that the failure to take it can be deemed unreasonable conduct. The balancing factors, plus the fact that complaints continued over a considerable period without active implementation by dangerous conduct, negate the contention that the failure to afford personal protection in excess of that accorded to members of the community generally was negligence. Something in addition by way of proof of an immediate danger would have to be shown.
Plaintiff also complains of prejudicial treatment by the Trial Judge. We agree that certain rulings, and particularly the manner in which they were made, did not add to the appearance of a fair trial. But as the complaint was dismissed, no prejudice could have resulted. As to exclusions of evidence, we have not been shown, by offer of proof or otherwise, that what was required to make out a case was excluded.
The dismissal of the complaint should be affirmed.
</opinion>

 **END OF THIS Majority OPINION ***THIS IS A Dissent OPINION* 
 *ITS CONTENT IS:* 

<opinion type="dissent">
<author id="b270-3">Capozzoli, J. (dissenting).</author>
It is practically impossible, in a brief summary of the evidence, to be able to give a complete recital of the many incidents which gave this plaintiff genuine cause to fear for her safety. Suffice it to say that, in reading this record, one cannot help but conclude that, for about 10 months, this plaintiff was abused, threatened, attacked and attempts were also made to frame her as a violator of the narcotics laws, all chargeable to one, Burton Pugach. This was due to her refusal to go out with him, despite his persistent demands. Although the police were fully informed as to what was taking place, she was left completely alone to protect herself, except for one occasion when the police did escort her home from the station house. Despite her repeated requests to the police for protection, none was given. As late as June 14, 1959, while her engagement party was in progress at her home, the final threatening telephone call was made to her by Pugach, who told her that it was her last chance. She immediately ’phoned the police station, which was familiar with her difficulty, for assistance, nothing was done. On the next morning lye was thrown into her face, as a result of which she lost the sight of one eye, the partial loss of sight in the. other and suffered severe facial scars.
The city agrees that “we must assume that the plaintiff’s testimony is true, and * * * she be credited with the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom ” but argues that her complaint was properly dismissed at the end of the entire case under the law. As against this contention the plaintiff contends that the case should have been- allowed to go to the jury and that the Judge committed error in refusing to have the jury pass upon it.
It is true that, independent of sovereign immunity, a municipality is not liable for failure to supply general police protection. (Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N Y 2d 134.) But, are we dealing with a situation where there was a failure to supply general police protection, or is it a situation where the circumstances brought home to the police, who were fully familiar with this case, were such as to impose upon the police the duty of complying with the request of the plaintiff?
Until the case of Schuster v. City of New York (5 N Y 2d 75) it was very doubtful as to whether a cause of action could be urged against a municipality for failure to supply police protection. In the latter case the issue presented was whether a municipality was ‘1 under any duty to exercise reasonable care for the protection of a person in Schuster’s .situation” (p. 80). The court did make it clear that its decision in Schuster (supra) did not mean that there was created an ‘ ‘ obligation enforcible in <page-number citation-index="1" label="221">*221</page-number>the courts to exercise the police powers of government for the protection of every member of the general public” (p. 81). Therefore, in order for this plaintiff to recover she must demonstrate that her case comes within the principle of law established in the Schuster case.
It is true that, in that case, Schuster had informed against a notorious criminal, who was at large and, in fact, caused his arrest. In the case at bar it should be noted that, because of the continuous threats made against this plaintiff, she informed against the one whom she believed to be responsible for these threats, viz: Pugach. In fact, she also informed the police that it must have been he who had narcotic drugs sent to her at her home.
In the case of Canosa v. City of Mt. Vernon (N. Y. L. J., Feb. 18, 1965, p. 17, col. 6) there was presented a somewhat similar situation as is involved in the case at bar. An action was commenced against the City of Mt. Vernon by the estate of the decedent wife for the failure of the police to furnish protection to her from her husband, although she had requested such protection and the police were fully informed of the existing circumstances. In denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint, Mr. Justice Dmuorr, in part, said: “ The court can see no significant difference between this case and Schuster v. City of New York (5 N Y 2d 75). * * * Of course there are some differences in the facts of the two cases. In the Schuster case the decedent, acting as a public-spirited citizen, gave the police information leading to the arrest of a criminal of national reputation * * * here, the decedent went to the police, not as a person interested in abstract law enforcement, but as a woman justifiably fearful of her own life. * * * This court cannot see Avhy an informer should be entitled to more police protection than a threatened victim, or why the failure to furnish such protection should not be as actionable in one case as in the other. ’ ’
I, too, find it difficult to distinguish the case at bar from the Schuster case. It seems to me that, while the facts are somewhat dissimilar the principle of law applicable to both is the same. (Also, see, Isereau v. Stone, 207 Misc. 941, revd. in part on other grounds 3 A D 2d 243.)
Of course, prior to the enactment of section 8 of the Court of Claims Act, this plaintiff would have been completely without a remedy in law. The latter provides as follows: “ The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby assumes liability and consents to have the same determined in <page-number citation-index="1" label="222">*222</page-number>accordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court against individuals or corporations
In construing this section the Court of Appeals in Bernardine v. City of New York (294 N. Y. 361, 365) said: “ On the waiver by the State of its own sovereign dispensation, that extension naturally was at an end and thus we were brought all the way round to a point where the civil divisions of the state are answerable equally with individuals and private corporations for wrongs of officers and employees,—even if no separate statute sanctions that enlarged liability in a given instance. ’ ’ Again, in the Schuster case (p. 83) the court said: ‘ ‘ This waiver of governmental immunity removed the bar that previously prevented actions based on negligence of the police and made possible recoveries in the cases which have been cited. In one sense all of those causes of action grew out of the waiver of governmental immunity. But they were not created by waiver of governmental immunity, but by the common law, which ‘ is the legal embodiment of practical sense. It is a comprehensive enumeration of principles sufficiently elastic to meet the social development of the people. Its guiding star has always been the rule of right and wrong, and in this country its principles demonstrate that there is in fact, as well as in theory, a remedy for all wrongs. The capacity of common law for growth and adaptátion to new conditions is one of its most admirable features. ’ (11 Am, Jur., Common Law, § 2, pp. 154-155.) While governmental immunity remained in effect, this type of court action remained in abeyance. It remained in abeyance not on account of absence of duty on the part of a municipality to the injured or deceased person, but for the reason that where the factual basis of the claim was involved in the performance of a governmental function (such as police duty), the State had not permitted itself or its political subdivisions or municipal corporations to be sued.” Later (p. 86) of the Schuster opinion, the court said: “ The instant action is based on negligence. It is grounded on negligence of the police in the failure to exercise reasonable care for the protection of Schuster after he had received threatening letters
In view of the above, it is my conclusion that the nature and extent of the duty of the police to protect an individual is dependent upon the circumstances of each particular situation and the danger reasonably to be anticipated. Therefore, since the city is liable as is an individual or corporation for wrongful acts of its officers and agents, it was a question of fact for the jury, whether, under the circumstances, the failure of the police to provide protection for the plaintiff was reasonably to be foreseen <page-number citation-index="1" label="223">*223</page-number>as exposing this plaintiff to danger. The failure of the trial court to allow this case to go to the jury was error and I, therefore, vote to reverse and remand for a new trial.
Tilzer, J., concurs with Stetjer, J. P.; McNally, J., concurs in result in opinion; Oapozzoli, J., dissents in opinion.
Judgment affirmed, without costs and without disbursements.
</opinion>

 **END OF THIS Dissent OPINION ***THIS IS A Concurrence Opinion OPINION* 
 *ITS CONTENT IS:* 

<opinion type="concurrence">
<author id="b269-7">McNally, J. (concurring).</author>
I concur in the result. The gist of plaintiff’s claim is that defendant was negligent in refusing to arrest the threatener, thereby failing to prevent the allegedly foreseeable assault of the plaintiff. Schuster v. City of New York (5 N Y 2d 75) is inapplicable since there the defendant was alleged to be negligent in withdrawing and failing to afford protection of the deceased after he had supplied information leading to the arrest of a dangerous fugitive from justice. On this record there was no legal basis for an arrest prior to the alleged assault. Moreover, plaintiff did not seek protection, except as an incident of the arrest and detention of the threatener.
I would also affirm under constraint of Steitz v. City of Beacon (295 N. Y. 51, 56) on the ground that there is no civil remedy to individuals for alleged neglect in the performance of the public duty of police protection.
</opinion>

 **END OF THIS Concurrence Opinion OPINION ******* END OF ALL OPINIONS FOR THIS CASE *****

No. Absent special circumstances, a municipality has no duty to provide police protection to any particular person on his request. The exception established in Schuster v. City of New York for police informants does not apply here, as that rule was designed to encourage citizen cooperation with law enforcement. While the police were told of threats from a suitor, the circumstances—including the fact the accuser was a lawyer and a prior court charge had been withdrawn—did not present such imminent danger that the failure to provide extraordinary protection was unreasonable. Although events proved the police assessment was tragically wrong, this hindsight does not establish negligence; otherwise, police would have to determine the probability of every reported threat at their peril.

Yes. The unique and severe circumstances brought to the police's attention imposed a duty to comply with the plaintiff's request for protection. While a municipality is not liable for failing to supply general police protection, the principle from Schuster v. City of New York should apply here; there is no significant difference between protecting an informant who has aided the police and protecting a threatened victim whose peril is fully known to the police. Given the city's waiver of sovereign immunity, it should be liable for its employees' negligence, and it should have been a question of fact for the jury to decide whether the police's failure to act was reasonable under the circumstances.

No. The claim should be dismissed, but for reasons different from the majority's. The precedent in Schuster is inapplicable because the police here were not withdrawing protection already afforded. Furthermore, there was no legal basis for an arrest prior to the assault. The controlling principle comes from Steitz v. City of Beacon, which holds that there is no civil remedy available to individuals for alleged neglect in the performance of the public duty of providing police protection.

No. The failure to provide police protection to the plaintiff does not constitute negligence in this case. I affirm the dismissal of the complaint because the evidence does not demonstrate that the police could have reasonably anticipated the actual occurrence of the assault to necessitate special police protection. Absent special circumstances, there is no duty resting on a municipality to provide police protection to any particular person on their request. The general threats and the plaintiff's repeated requests, without more concrete evidence of imminent danger, do not establish negligence on the part of the police. While we acknowledge that there are circumstances where failure to provide protection would be a breach of duty, such as when a police officer witnesses an assault or when authorities have recognized an immediate and serious danger, those circumstances are not present here. The police were confronted with threats from a lawyer in good standing, and when the plaintiff made a charge against him in court, it was withdrawn. It would be impractical and impossible for the police to protect against all contingencies of reported threats. Although events proved the police to be wrong, this does not necessarily indicate negligence in failing to foresee these consequences. The balancing factors, including the fact that complaints continued over a considerable period without active implementation of dangerous conduct, negate the contention that the failure to afford personal protection was negligence.

Yes. The failure to provide police protection to the plaintiff constitutes negligence. I dissent and would vote to reverse and remand for a new trial. For about 10 months, the plaintiff was abused, threatened, and attacked, all attributable to Burton Pugach. Despite being fully informed of the situation, the police left her completely alone to protect herself, except for one occasion. The circumstances brought home to the police were such as to impose upon them a duty to comply with the plaintiff's request for protection. While it's true that a municipality is not generally liable for failure to supply general police protection, this case goes beyond that. The principle established in Schuster v. City of New York should apply here. The plaintiff informed against Pugach, whom she believed to be responsible for the threats, similar to how Schuster informed against a criminal. There is no significant difference between this case and Schuster; a threatened victim should be entitled to as much police protection as an informer. The nature and extent of the police's duty to protect an individual depend on the circumstances of each particular situation and the danger reasonably anticipated. It was a question of fact for the jury whether, under these circumstances, the failure of the police to provide protection was reasonably foreseeable as exposing the plaintiff to danger.

I concur with the majority's decision to affirm the dismissal, but for different reasons. The core of the plaintiff's claim is that the defendant was negligent in refusing to arrest the threatener, thereby failing to prevent the allegedly foreseeable assault. However, Schuster v. City of New York is not applicable here, as in that case, the defendant was alleged to be negligent in withdrawing protection after the deceased had supplied information leading to the arrest of a dangerous fugitive. In this case, there was no legal basis for an arrest prior to the alleged assault. Moreover, the plaintiff did not seek protection except as an incident of the arrest and detention of the threatener. I would also affirm under the constraint of Steitz v. City of Beacon, which holds that there is no civil remedy for individuals for alleged neglect in the performance of the public duty of police protection.

Riss v. City of New York

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