State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm.
135 Wn.2d 618, 957 P.2d 691 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
A state law prohibiting false statements of material fact about a political candidate, made with actual malice, is facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it regulates protected political speech without being narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. The government cannot act as the final arbiter of truth in political debate, and such a law improperly chills speech, particularly when it penalizes non-defamatory statements.
Facts:
- In 2002, Marilou Rickert challenged incumbent Senator Tim Sheldon for a state senate seat in Washington's 35th Legislative District.
- During the campaign, Rickert sponsored and distributed a mailer that included a brochure comparing her policy positions to those of Senator Sheldon.
- The brochure stated that Rickert '[s]upports social services for the most vulnerable of the state’s citizens.'
- In contrast, the brochure claimed that Senator Sheldon 'voted to close a facility for the developmentally challenged in his district.'
- Based on the statement about the facility, Senator Sheldon filed a complaint with Washington's Public Disclosure Commission (PDC), alleging a violation of a state campaign law.
- The complaint was investigated and heard by the PDC months after the election, which Senator Sheldon won with approximately 79 percent of the vote.
Procedural Posture:
- The Public Disclosure Commission (PDC), an administrative agency, held a hearing on Senator Sheldon's complaint against Marilou Rickert.
- The PDC found that Rickert's brochure contained false statements of material fact made with actual malice, concluded she violated RCW 42.17.530(1)(a), and imposed a $1,000 penalty.
- Rickert appealed the PDC's final order to the superior court (trial court), which affirmed the agency's decision.
- Rickert appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court), which reversed the superior court, holding that the statute was unconstitutional.
- The Public Disclosure Commission sought review from the Supreme Court of Washington (the state's highest court).
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Issue:
Does a state statute, RCW 42.17.530(1)(a), that allows a government agency to penalize a person for sponsoring a political advertisement containing a false, non-defamatory statement of material fact about a political candidate with actual malice violate the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech?
Opinions:
Majority - J.M. Johnson, J.
Yes, the statute violates the First Amendment. It is an unconstitutional content-based restriction on core political speech that cannot survive strict scrutiny. The State's asserted interests in protecting candidates from criticism or preserving election integrity are not compelling enough to justify a government agency acting as an arbiter of truth. The statute is also not narrowly tailored, as it is both overbroad by punishing non-defamatory speech and underinclusive by exempting a candidate's false statements about themselves. The preferred First Amendment remedy for false political speech is 'more speech, not enforced silence,' allowing opponents and the public to correct the record.
Concurring - Alexander, C. J.
Yes, the statute violates the First Amendment, but for a narrower reason than the majority provides. The government may constitutionally penalize defamatory political speech, which is an unprotected category of speech. However, this statute is unconstitutionally overbroad because its reach extends beyond defamatory speech to prohibit non-defamatory statements as well, thereby improperly regulating protected speech.
Dissenting - Madsen, J.
No, the statute does not violate the First Amendment. Knowingly false statements made with 'actual malice' are not constitutionally protected speech under the standard established in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. Because the statute only targets this unprotected category of speech, strict scrutiny is inapplicable. The State has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of the election process from the corrosive effects of deliberate falsehoods. The majority is incorrect to suggest the 'actual malice' standard is confined to defamation lawsuits; it is a constitutional standard applicable to other contexts, and this statute properly incorporates it.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a strong precedent in Washington state against laws that attempt to regulate the factual content of political speech, even when that speech is false and made with malice. It prioritizes the 'marketplace of ideas' and the remedy of 'more speech' over government intervention, effectively rejecting the concept of a government 'truth-teller' in political campaigns. The ruling leaves candidates to either rebut falsehoods through their own speech or, if the statements cause reputational harm, to pursue private defamation suits. This holding places Washington among the jurisdictions with the most robust protections for political speech, potentially influencing how other states approach or interpret similar 'false campaign speech' laws.
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