1. Yes. The court said that all those nasty things together—the graffiti, harassing calls, and obscene gestures—could be considered 'outrageous' enough for a jury to find it was illegal emotional distress. This wasn't just being a jerk; it was extreme.
2. No. The tenant loses this claim. The court decided that even if the landlord had lied, it doesn't matter because the police officer and the prosecutor both said they made their decision to charge the tenant based only on their own investigation (like the tenant's confession), not on what the landlord initially told them.

1. No, I disagree on this part. The judge thought the landlord's behavior was definitely rude and obnoxious, but not 'outrageous in the extreme.' He felt the tenants didn't provide enough details to show the behavior was truly beyond what society tolerates.
2. I agree the tenant loses, but for a different reason. This judge said you *can* sue someone for lying to the cops, because their lie messes up the whole process. But in this case, the tenant had no actual proof the landlord was lying; he just claimed it was true without evidence to back it up.

Yes, the lower court made a mistake dismissing the emotional distress claim because if what the plaintiffs say is true, the defendant's actions like painting graffiti, making harassing calls, and obscene gestures to customers could be considered extremely outrageous conduct. But the court was right to rule for the defendant on the wrongful prosecution claim because there's no proof he influenced the police investigation or the prosecutor's independent choice to charge Richer.

I agree with ruling for the defendant on the wrongful prosecution claim because the prosecutor decided to charge Richer all on his own based on the police report, without being swayed by anything the defendant said. But I disagree with reviving the emotional distress claim. The alleged behavior, while rude and obnoxious, isn't extreme and outrageous enough to be totally beyond what society will tolerate.

1. Yes. Allegations that the defendant sprayed graffiti on the plaintiffs' windows, harassed them by telephone, and harassed their customers and employees with obscene gestures describe offensive conduct that may be outrageous in the extreme and are sufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
2. No. A defendant is not liable for malicious prosecution when there is no evidence that the investigating officer or the prosecutor acted on the information the defendant provided. In this case, both the officer and the district attorney submitted uncontroverted affidavits stating that their decisions to investigate and prosecute were made independently and were based solely on the officer's own investigation, not on the defendant's initial report. The truth or falsity of a defendant's statements is only relevant if the prosecution was influenced by that information.

1. No. The alleged conduct, while crude, rude, and boorish, is not outrageous in the extreme. The plaintiffs' allegations about 'harassing' calls and graffiti lacked sufficient specificity about their content or frequency to rise to the level of an extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct required for an IIED claim.
2. No. While a person can be liable for providing knowingly false information that taints an officer's discretion, the plaintiff here failed to produce competent evidence creating a genuine issue of fact that the defendant's report was actually false. The plaintiff's affidavit stating the defendant disposed of his own signs was not based on personal knowledge and was insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.

Yes, the trial court erred in dismissing the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because the plaintiffs have alleged conduct by the defendant that, if true, may constitute behavior that is outrageous in the extreme, such as painting graffiti on the plaintiffs' store windows, harassing them by telephone, and harassing their customers by making obscene gestures. However, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim because there is no evidence that the defendant influenced the police investigation or the prosecutor's independent decision to charge Richer.

I concur with affirming summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim because the prosecutor's decision to charge Richer was solely his own, based on his review of the police report, without any influence from the defendant's statements. However, I respectfully dissent from reversing the dismissal of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The alleged conduct, while boorish and obnoxious, does not rise to the level of being outrageous in the extreme and beyond the farthest reaches of socially tolerable behavior.

Richer v. Poisson

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