Richardson v. United States
468 U.S. 317 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a retrial following a mistrial declared because of a genuinely deadlocked jury. A mistrial due to a hung jury is not an event that terminates the original jeopardy, regardless of the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the first trial.
Facts:
- Petitioner Richardson was indicted on two counts of distributing a controlled substance and one count of conspiracy.
- At trial, the government presented evidence against Richardson.
- The evidence presented involved at least one drug transaction.
- The jury acquitted Richardson on one of the substantive drug distribution counts.
- The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the conspiracy count and the second distribution count.
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioner Richardson was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
- During the trial, Richardson twice moved for a judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence; the district court denied the motions.
- The jury acquitted on one count but was deadlocked on the remaining two counts.
- The district court declared a mistrial as to the deadlocked counts and scheduled a retrial.
- Richardson then filed another motion for acquittal and a motion to bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds.
- The district court denied both motions.
- Richardson (appellant) appealed the denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding the order was not immediately appealable.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision.
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Issue:
Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment bar the government from retrying a defendant after the first trial ends in a mistrial due to a hung jury, where the defendant claims the evidence presented at the first trial was legally insufficient to support a conviction?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Rehnquist
No. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a retrial following a mistrial due to a hung jury, even when the defendant claims the evidence at the first trial was insufficient. The court reasoned that jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn in but does not terminate until an event like an acquittal or conviction occurs. Citing a line of cases going back to United States v. Perez (1824), the Court held that a jury's failure to agree on a verdict constitutes a 'manifest necessity' that permits a retrial. The Court distinguished Burks v. United States, which held that an appellate reversal for insufficient evidence bars retrial, by explaining that a judicial finding of insufficiency is equivalent to an acquittal, whereas a hung jury is not. Therefore, because the original jeopardy never terminated, the government is entitled to retry the case to give the prosecution 'one complete opportunity to convict.'
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
This opinion does not directly answer the merits issue but argues the appeal should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Justice Stevens contended that an order denying a motion for judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence is not a final, appealable order. Because the petitioner's double jeopardy claim was entirely dependent on this non-appealable sufficiency claim, he argued that the double jeopardy claim itself was not 'colorable' and could not be subject to an interlocutory appeal. Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the case, and the Supreme Court should not have reached the merits of the double jeopardy question.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Brennan
Yes. A retrial should be barred if the evidence at the first trial was constitutionally insufficient. While Justice Brennan agreed with the majority that the claim was immediately appealable, he dissented on the merits. He argued that the majority's concept of 'continuing jeopardy' was an artificial formalism. In his view, a mistrial objectively ends the first proceeding. The core principle of the Double Jeopardy Clause, established in Burks, is that the prosecution gets only one fair opportunity to prove its case. If the prosecution fails to present sufficient evidence, it should not get a second chance simply because the jury was unable to agree, as this would put a defendant who was entitled to an acquittal in a worse position than one who received an erroneous acquittal.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the 'continuing jeopardy' doctrine in the context of mistrials due to hung juries, drawing a bright line between this scenario and an appellate reversal for insufficient evidence. The ruling clarifies that a defendant cannot use a claim of evidentiary insufficiency to bar a retrial after a hung jury; the defendant must endure the second trial and may only raise the sufficiency claim on appeal if convicted. This precedent strongly favors the public's interest in obtaining a final verdict over the defendant's interest in avoiding the ordeal of a second trial, reinforcing that a hung jury is not an acquittal and does not terminate jeopardy.
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