Richardson v. Hennly
434 S.E.2d 772 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
A battery can be committed by intentionally causing an offensive physical contact with another person through an indirect application of force, such as by directing a material substance like pipe smoke at them, knowing it will cause harm.
Facts:
- Bonnie Richardson was a long-time receptionist at First Federal Savings & Loan Association.
- A coworker, J. R. Hennly, Jr., began working in an office near Richardson's desk and regularly smoked a pipe.
- Richardson had a severe allergic reaction to Hennly's pipe smoke, causing nausea, stomach pain, headaches, anxiety, and weight loss.
- Richardson informed her superiors of the problem, and Hennly was made aware of her adverse reactions.
- Despite the installation of air cleaners and Hennly's knowledge of her condition, the exposure continued.
- Richardson was hospitalized twice because of her severe reactions to the pipe smoke.
- Shortly after her second hospitalization, First Federal terminated Richardson's employment, citing excessive absenteeism.
Procedural Posture:
- Bonnie Richardson sued her coworker, J.R. Hennly, Jr., and her employer, First Federal, in a state trial court.
- The claims against Hennly included battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
- Both defendants moved for summary judgment.
- The trial court granted summary judgment to Hennly on the battery and IIED claims.
- The trial court denied First Federal's motion for summary judgment.
- Richardson (appellant) appealed the grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Hennly (appellee) to the Georgia Court of Appeals.
- First Federal (appellant) filed an interlocutory appeal of the denial of its summary judgment motion to the Georgia Court of Appeals, where Richardson is the appellee.
- The Court of Appeals consolidated the two cases for its opinion.
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Issue:
Does intentionally directing pipe smoke at a coworker, with knowledge that it will cause an adverse physical reaction, constitute a battery?
Opinions:
Majority - Smith, Judge.
Yes. Intentionally directing pipe smoke at a coworker with knowledge of their particular sensitivity can constitute a battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the coworker, Hennly. For the battery claim, the court reasoned that an unlawful touching need not be direct. It can be indirect, such as causing a 'material substance' to make contact with another's person. The court rejected Hennly's argument that pipe smoke is too immaterial, holding that because smoke is visible, detectable by the senses, and can be inhaled, it is capable of making physical contact. Since Richardson alleged Hennly intentionally directed the smoke at her knowing it would cause injury, a jury question existed as to whether a battery occurred. For the intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim, the court found that a jury could deem the conduct 'extreme and outrageous.' It considered factors such as the workplace setting creating a 'captive victim,' Hennly's awareness of Richardson's particular susceptibility to the smoke, and the severity of the harm she suffered, including hospitalization. These factors were sufficient to present the question of outrageousness to a jury.
Analysis:
This decision significantly broadens the legal definition of battery by recognizing that an offensive 'touching' can be accomplished with an intangible or gaseous substance like smoke. It moves beyond the traditional concept of battery requiring direct physical force or contact with a solid object. The case also provides a strong precedent for claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress in the workplace, particularly where a defendant knowingly exploits a coworker's specific medical vulnerability. This ruling is often cited in cases involving secondhand smoke and other environmental torts, establishing that intentional exposure to such substances can be actionable.
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