Richard v. Hall
2004 WL 869596, 874 So. 2d 131 (2004)
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Rule of Law:
An employer is not vicariously liable for an employee's tort committed during a recreational activity unless the employee was motivated, at least in part, by serving the employer's business interests at the time of the incident. Furthermore, under Louisiana's Recreational Use Statutes, a non-commercial lessee is entitled to immunity from liability, even if the property is leased from a commercial recreational enterprise.
Facts:
- Screening Systems International, Inc. (SSI) paid $10,000 for a duck hunting lease at Loch Leven Plantation.
- The lease was intended as a perk for three of its upper-level executives, including Vice-President Michael Hall.
- SSI categorized the lease expense as a 'business promotion' for accounting purposes but had never used the lease to entertain clients or for any other business-related purpose.
- On January 2, 2000, SSI executive Michael Hall went to hunt at Loch Leven Plantation.
- Hall and another SSI executive accepted an invitation from a separate leaseholder, Todd Cavin, to join his hunting party in a better hunting blind.
- John Richard was present in the same blind as a guest of Todd Cavin.
- During the hunt, Michael Hall accidentally shot and fatally wounded John Richard.
Procedural Posture:
- Karen Richard, widow of the deceased, filed a wrongful death suit in district court against Michael Hall, Screening Systems International (SSI), and their respective insurance companies.
- SSI and its insurer, Empire Insurance Company, filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of vicarious liability.
- The district court granted the motion, dismissing the vicarious liability claim.
- SSI and Empire then filed a second motion for summary judgment on the direct negligence claim, arguing for immunity under Louisiana's Recreational Use Statutes (RUS).
- The district court granted the second motion, dismissing all remaining claims against SSI and Empire.
- The plaintiffs (appellants) appealed the summary judgments to the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal.
- A majority of the appellate court panel affirmed the district court's rulings.
- The plaintiffs (applicants) successfully petitioned the Supreme Court of Louisiana for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Is a company vicariously liable for the negligence of its executive during a hunting trip on a lease paid for by the company as an employee perk, and if not, is the company immune from direct liability under Louisiana's Recreational Use Immunity Statutes because it is a non-commercial lessee of a commercial recreational property?
Opinions:
Majority - Knoll, Justice
No, the company is not vicariously liable, and yes, it is immune from direct liability under the Recreational Use Statutes. For vicarious liability to attach for a recreational activity, the employee's conduct must be so closely connected to their employment duties as to be a risk fairly attributable to the employer's business; an employer's mere intent to use a recreational perk for future business purposes is insufficient. Additionally, a lessee who does not use a property for commercial recreational purposes is entitled to immunity under the Recreational Use Statutes, even if the lessor operates the property as a commercial enterprise. Reasoning (Vicarious Liability): The court distinguished this case from Ermert v. Hartford Ins. Co., where vicarious liability was found because the employee had repeatedly and consistently used a hunting camp for business purposes, thereby making the risks of hunting characteristic of the business. In this case, there was no evidence that SSI or Hall had ever used the duck lease for any business purpose. Hall's activity was purely for personal recreation and not actuated by a purpose to serve SSI's business interests. The fact that SSI treated the lease as a business expense for accounting purposes did not transform the recreational activity into conduct within the scope of employment. Reasoning (Recreational Use Immunity): First, the court determined that SSI qualified as a 'lessee' under the statutes. The oral agreement for hunting rights constituted a lease of an incorporeal thing (the right to hunt), as it involved a thing, a price, and consent. Second, the court resolved a conflict between Louisiana's two Recreational Use Statutes (RUS). La. R.S. 9:2791 appears to deny immunity if the premises are used commercially. However, the later-enacted La. R.S. 9:2795, which the court found to be controlling, denies immunity only to an 'owner' (including a lessee) who is itself operating a commercial recreational facility. Since SSI's use of the lease was purely recreational and not for commercial profit, it was not an 'owner of commercial recreational developments or facilities' and was therefore entitled to statutory immunity.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the boundary of vicarious liability for employee conduct during company-sponsored recreational activities, narrowing the precedent set by Ermert. It establishes that an employer's mere accounting treatment or unrealized future intent to use a perk for business is insufficient; a tangible, concurrent business purpose or established pattern of business use is required to bring the activity within the scope of employment. The ruling also provides an important interpretation of Louisiana's dual Recreational Use Statutes, holding that a lessee's immunity is determined by its own use of the property, not the commercial nature of the landlord's operation. This protects non-commercial tenants and reinforces the statutes' goal of encouraging recreational access to land.
