Richard P. French v. Estate of Martha Gutzan
2015 ME 152, 128 A.3d 657, 2015 Me. LEXIS 166 (2015)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
An easement reserved in a deed is construed as an easement appurtenant, which runs with the land, unless the instrument contains explicit language clearly expressing the intention for it to be an easement in gross, personal only to the individual to whom it was reserved.
Facts:
- Prior to 1880, Reuben Hutchings owned a single large parcel of land that included the properties now owned by Richard P. French and the Estate of Martha Gutzan.
- In 1880, Reuben Hutchings conveyed a large part of the property to his brother, Edward Hutchings.
- In the 1880 deed, Reuben Hutchings reserved to himself a lot (which French now owns) and "the right of way from said lot East of Meadow Brook to the County road in the way as now travelled."
- French's lot is undeveloped and has no other access to a road.
- In 1884, Reuben Hutchings transferred the reserved lot to Andrew Grindle "with all the privileges and appurtenances thereunto."
- Richard P. French later acquired this lot via a deed from the heirs of Andrew Grindle.
- The Estate of Martha Gutzan's property, derived from the land conveyed to Edward Hutchings, has a chain of title subjecting it to "the right reserved... to Reuben H. Hutchings to cross" the property.
- The Estate of Martha Gutzan denied French use of the access easement.
Procedural Posture:
- Richard P. French filed an action to quiet title against the Estate of Martha Gutzan in the Maine District Court (Ellsworth), the court of first instance.
- The District Court held a nonjury trial.
- The trial court entered a declaratory judgment for French, concluding that he owns an access easement over the Estate’s property.
- The Estate of Martha Gutzan, as appellant, appealed the District Court's judgment to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a reservation of a "right of way" in an 1880 deed create an easement appurtenant that runs with the land to benefit subsequent owners, rather than an easement in gross personal only to the original grantor, when the deed does not explicitly state the easement is personal?
Opinions:
Majority - Alexander, J.
Yes, the reservation of the right of way created an easement appurtenant that runs with the land. Maine law has a strong preference for construing easements as appurtenant rather than in gross unless a contrary intention is clearly expressed. An appurtenant easement benefits the dominant estate (French's land) and passes to subsequent owners, whereas an easement in gross is a personal right that would have terminated upon the death of the original grantee, Reuben Hutchings. The language in the 1880 deed lacked any explicit restriction limiting the right of way to Reuben Hutchings personally. The court reasoned it is highly unlikely that a grantor would retain a landlocked parcel and knowingly impair its value by limiting access to his lifetime only. Furthermore, the Estate had constructive notice of the easement because its own chain of title referenced the servitude.
Analysis:
This case strongly reinforces the judicial preference for easements appurtenant, establishing a high bar for creating an easement in gross. It clarifies that deed language must be explicitly restrictive to overcome the presumption that an easement is intended to benefit the land itself, not just an individual. The decision provides stability in property law by allowing subsequent purchasers to rely on access rights that are not explicitly limited in historical deeds. It also pragmatically separates the legal question of an easement's existence from the factual determination of its precise location, allowing courts to affirm the right of access without needing a full survey in every case.
Unlock the full brief for Richard P. French v. Estate of Martha Gutzan