Harlow v. Fitzgerald
457 U.S. 800 (1982)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Government officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from liability for civil damages as long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
Facts:
- A. Ernest Fitzgerald was a civilian management analyst for the United States Air Force.
- Fitzgerald testified before a congressional subcommittee about significant cost overruns on the C-5A transport aircraft project, which caused embarrassment for the Department of Defense.
- In 1969, Fitzgerald's position was eliminated in what was described as a departmental reorganization and reduction-in-force, resulting in his termination.
- Fitzgerald alleged that his termination was not for efficiency but was in retaliation for his congressional testimony.
- Bryce Harlow, a senior White House aide to President Richard M. Nixon, had conversations with the Air Force Secretary regarding Fitzgerald's dismissal.
- Alexander Butterfield, another senior aide, circulated a White House memorandum noting that Fitzgerald planned to "blow the whistle" on certain purchasing practices.
- After Fitzgerald's dismissal became public, Butterfield advised against offering Fitzgerald another position within the administration, emphasizing the importance of "loyalty."
- Harlow and Butterfield denied any conspiracy and asserted that all their actions were taken in good faith within the scope of their official duties.
Procedural Posture:
- A. Ernest Fitzgerald filed a lawsuit for civil damages in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against Bryce Harlow, Alexander Butterfield, and other officials.
- Harlow and Butterfield filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting they were entitled to absolute immunity from suit for their official acts.
- The District Court denied the motion for summary judgment, ruling that the petitioners were not entitled to absolute immunity.
- Harlow and Butterfield, as petitioners, appealed the trial court's denial of their immunity claim to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal without an opinion.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the scope of immunity for senior presidential aides.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Are senior White House aides entitled to absolute immunity from civil damages liability for their official acts?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Powell
No. Senior presidential aides are generally entitled only to qualified immunity, not absolute immunity. The Court rejected a theory of derivative absolute immunity for presidential aides, adhering to the 'functional' approach which grants immunity based on the nature of the function performed, not the official's high station. To address the problems of the existing qualified immunity standard, which included a subjective 'good faith' component that often required a trial to resolve, the Court reformulated the standard. The new test is purely objective, shielding officials from liability unless their conduct violates 'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' This objective standard permits the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment, avoiding the costs and disruptions of discovery and trial associated with inquiring into an official's subjective state of mind.
Dissenting - Chief Justice Burger
Yes. Senior presidential aides should be entitled to derivative absolute immunity for their official acts. The majority's decision is irreconcilable with Gravel v. United States, which granted legislative aides derivative absolute immunity because they function as their Members' 'alter egos.' Senior presidential aides are similarly indispensable to the functioning of the Presidency and act as the President's alter egos. Denying them the same protection afforded to congressional aides will frustrate the effective operation of the Executive Branch, as the fear of personal liability and harassing lawsuits will inevitably chill their willingness to provide candid advice and execute presidential duties vigorously.
Concurring - Justice Brennan
Agrees with the new objective standard but writes separately to clarify that it should not allow an official who actually knows he is violating the law to escape liability, even if a reasonable person might not have known. The standard imposes liability when an official 'knew or should have known' of the violation. Justice Brennan also notes that while the new standard should facilitate summary judgment, some measure of discovery into what the defendant knew may still be necessary in certain cases, although such discovery could be deferred pending resolution of threshold legal questions.
Analysis:
Harlow v. Fitzgerald is a landmark case that fundamentally reshaped the doctrine of qualified immunity for government officials. By replacing the two-part subjective and objective test with a single, purely objective standard of 'clearly established law,' the Court aimed to protect officials from the burdens of litigation and allow for early dismissal of insubstantial lawsuits. This decision significantly strengthened the immunity defense, making it easier for officials to win on summary judgment before extensive discovery. While promoting more fearless governance, the ruling has been criticized for creating a high barrier for plaintiffs seeking to vindicate their constitutional rights, as courts have often interpreted the 'clearly established' standard strictly.
