Rice v. Marathon Petroleum Corp.
2024 IL 129628 (2024)
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Rule of Law:
The Illinois Environmental Protection Act's Leaking Underground Storage Tank (LUST) Program provisions do not create an express or implied private right of action for third parties to recover for personal injuries caused by leaking underground storage tanks.
Facts:
- Marathon Petroleum Corporation, Speedway, LLC, and Manoj Valiathara (collectively 'defendants') owned and operated a Speedway gas station with an underground storage tank system.
- In January 2017, the gas station's 10,000-gallon regular unleaded gasoline tank began alarming, and its water level significantly increased by October 15, 2017, indicating a release or displacement of gasoline.
- The displaced gasoline migrated through the soil and entered the common sanitary sewer system, which transported gasoline and vapors away from the gas station toward residential areas, including Margaret L. Rice's condominium.
- On October 19, 2017, an odor resembling nail polish remover and high 'lower explosive limit' readings were detected in basement apartments near Margaret L. Rice's building, approximately 1.5 miles from the gas station, and reported to the Illinois Emergency Management Agency.
- Around 9 a.m. on October 20, 2017, Margaret L. Rice was doing laundry in her residential laundry room when a spark from the clothes dryer ignited gasoline vapors, causing an explosion.
- The explosion threw Margaret L. Rice into a hallway wall, causing second-degree burns over at least 10% of her body and other injuries, requiring two weeks in an intensive care burn unit and seven more weeks in rehabilitation facilities.
- The Village of Willowbrook public works division traced the source of the odors and vapors to the gasoline released from the gas station before the explosion.
- Margaret L. Rice's residence was significantly damaged, preventing her return for over a year, and Margaret L. Rice died during the litigation, with her daughter, Laura E. Rice, appointed as a special representative.
Procedural Posture:
- Margaret L. Rice (later Laura E. Rice, as special representative) filed a complaint, later amended, in the Circuit Court of Cook County (trial court) against Marathon Petroleum Corporation, Speedway, LLC, and Manoj Valiathara.
- The amended complaint included counts I, II, and III, alleging strict liability for bodily injury under title XVI of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act (LUST Program), and counts IV, VI, and VIII alleging common-law negligence.
- Defendants filed a motion to dismiss counts I, II, and III under sections 2-619.1, 2-619(a)(3), and 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure, arguing plaintiff lacked standing and the claims were duplicative of an attorney general action.
- The trial court granted the motion to dismiss counts I, II, and III under section 2-615, concluding the Act did not provide a private right of action for the requested remedies, and made an express finding that there was no just reason for delaying appeal (Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a)).
- Plaintiff (Laura E. Rice) appealed the dismissal of counts I, II, and III to the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District.
- The appellate court initially dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction but, upon plaintiff's petition for rehearing, issued a modified order finding jurisdiction because the statutory and negligence counts sought different remedies, even though based on common facts.
- The appellate court, as the intermediate appellate court, affirmed the dismissal of counts I, II, and III, concluding that plaintiff did not have an express or implied private right of action under the LUST Program provisions of the Act.
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Issue:
Does the Leaking Underground Storage Tank (LUST) Program of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act (415 ILCS 5/57 et seq.) provide for an express or implied private right of action for third parties to recover for personal injuries resulting from a leaking underground storage tank?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice O’Brien
No, the Leaking Underground Storage Tank (LUST) Program of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act does not provide for an express or implied private right of action for third parties to recover for personal injuries resulting from a leaking underground storage tank. The court found no express private right of action, noting that if the legislature intended to create such a right, it would do so with clear and unmistakable language, as it has in other statutes. Plaintiff's attempt to piece together various statutory and regulatory provisions did not amount to an express grant of a private right of action. Regarding an implied right of action, the court applied the four-factor test from Fisher v. Lexington Health Care, Inc. and concluded that the LUST Program does not imply a private right of action for third parties suffering personal injuries. The court reasoned that the LUST Program was primarily intended to protect environmental resources, facilitate remediation of leaking underground storage tank sites, and administer the Underground Storage Tank Fund for owners and operators, not to protect third parties from personal injuries or provide a cause of action for those injuries. Thus, Laura Rice, while a member of the general public, was not a member of the class the legislature primarily intended to benefit. Crucially, the court determined that implying a private right of action was not necessary to provide an adequate remedy for violations of the statute. The LUST Program provisions of the Act do not impose strict liability on private parties for personal injury claims; section 22.2(f) explicitly limits strict liability to costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the State or local governmental entities, and section 57.12(a)(1) states that the Act does not affect or modify common-law liability for damages. Therefore, a common-law negligence action provides an adequate remedy, particularly since statutory violations can be used as prima facie evidence to prove duty and breach. Furthermore, robust governmental enforcement mechanisms, including civil penalties payable to the Environmental Protection Trust Fund and injunctive relief (which were utilized in this case), fulfill the Act's purpose of establishing a statewide environmental protection program. The court cited Abbasi v. Paraskevoulakos, which held that a common-law negligence action was an adequate remedy, making an implied private right of action unnecessary, and distinguished Rodgers v. St. Mary’s Hospital, where a statute provided no other remedy.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the scope of private litigation under Illinois environmental statutes, particularly the LUST Program of the Environmental Protection Act. It reinforces the Illinois Supreme Court's reluctance to imply private rights of action, emphasizing that such an extraordinary step is taken only when clearly needed and when a statute would otherwise be ineffective. The ruling makes it clear that while environmental statutes aim to protect the public and the environment, they do not automatically create new causes of action for personal injuries beyond existing common-law remedies. Plaintiffs seeking to recover for personal injuries caused by environmental contamination under these specific statutory provisions must generally rely on common-law negligence claims, where statutory violations might serve as evidence, rather than asserting a direct statutory cause of action or seeking statutory strict liability.
