Rhodda Thompson v. Altheimer & Gray
248 F.3d 621, 80 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 40,636, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 7157 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
When a prospective juror expresses a material and contestable prior belief that may cause bias, the trial judge has an affirmative duty to determine whether the juror can suspend that belief for the trial. If the judge fails to obtain an unequivocal assurance of impartiality, the refusal to strike the juror for cause constitutes reversible error.
Facts:
- Rhodda Thompson filed a lawsuit against her employer, Altheimer & Gray, alleging racial discrimination after she was denied certain benefits and positions.
- During jury selection for the trial, a prospective juror named Leiter stated that she was a business owner.
- Leiter told the court that her experience as an employer would 'definitely sway my judgment in this case.'
- When asked by the judge if she could apply the law as instructed, Leiter responded, 'I think my experience will cloud my judgment, but I can do my best.'
- Leiter also stated her belief that some people file lawsuits against their employers 'just because they don’t get something they want.'
- When asked for a final time if her judgment might be clouded, Leiter stated, 'I can’t say that it’s not going to cloud my judgment. I can try to be as fair as I can...'
Procedural Posture:
- Rhodda Thompson sued her employer, Altheimer & Gray, in the United States District Court (trial court) for racial discrimination.
- During voir dire, Thompson's counsel challenged prospective juror Leiter for cause.
- The trial judge denied the motion to strike Leiter for cause.
- Thompson exercised all three of her peremptory challenges on other prospective jurors, and Leiter was seated on the jury.
- The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, Altheimer & Gray.
- Thompson, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, with Altheimer & Gray as appellee.
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Issue:
Does a trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to strike a prospective juror for cause when the juror repeatedly states that her personal experiences as a business owner will 'cloud her judgment' and offers no unequivocal assurance that she can be impartial?
Opinions:
Majority - Posner, J.
Yes. A trial court abuses its discretion by refusing to strike a juror for cause who expresses significant doubt about her ability to be impartial and fails to give an unequivocal assurance that she can set her biases aside. Leiter's statements that her judgment would be 'clouded' and that she would only 'try' to be fair were not the 'unwavering affirmations of impartiality' required to ensure an unbiased tribunal. The judge had a duty to probe further to determine if she could suspend her beliefs; because he left the matter 'dangling' and received no clear assurance, the refusal to strike her was an error. The court distinguished a permissible 'prior belief' (e.g., that some lawsuits are frivolous) from disqualifying 'bias,' which is an inability to impartially apply the law. Since the record contained no assurances that Leiter could exercise an unclouded judgment, the verdict cannot stand, and a new trial is required.
Concurring - Wood, J.
Yes. While agreeing completely that the trial court erred in failing to strike Juror Leiter for cause, this opinion was written to address the majority's dicta questioning the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Martinez-Salazar. Judge Wood supports the Martinez-Salazar principle, which allows a party who loses a for-cause challenge to either use a peremptory challenge or let the juror sit and raise the issue on appeal. She argues this framework correctly respects the strategic decisions lawyers must make and that second-guessing the use of peremptory challenges on appeal would be unworkable. She concludes that the Supreme Court's approach is sound and that Thompson was entitled to a new trial based on the trial court's clear error.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the high standard required to ensure a litigant's right to an impartial jury. It clarifies that a trial judge's role during voir dire is not passive; the judge has an affirmative duty to elicit unequivocal assurances of impartiality from a potentially biased juror. The ruling establishes that a juror's mere promise to 'try' to be fair is insufficient when they have expressed a strong potential for bias. For future cases, this precedent empowers appellate courts to look closely at the voir dire record and overturn verdicts where a juror's impartiality was left ambiguous, putting pressure on trial judges to be more thorough in their questioning.
