Rhea v. City of Gainesville
1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 473, 574 So. 2d 221, 1991 WL 7124 (1991)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A complaint states a valid cause of action for a violation of Florida's Sunshine Law by making a prima facie showing that a public body held a meeting at which official acts or formal action took place without providing reasonable notice to the public. Any step in the decision-making process, including discussion and preliminary motions, constitutes an "official act" requiring such notice.
Facts:
- The Alachua County legislative delegation was planning to appoint a committee to study the operation of Gainesville Regional Utilities.
- In response, on February 20, 1990, the mayor of Gainesville called a special meeting of the Gainesville City Commission for 3:00 p.m. that same day.
- The local news media were contacted regarding the meeting no later than 1:35 p.m. on the day of the meeting.
- At the 3:00 p.m. meeting, the Commission discussed the planned committee study.
- The Commission then passed a motion authorizing the mayor to write a letter to the legislative delegation conveying the Commission's official position on the issue.
- Darnell Rhea was a resident of Alachua County.
Procedural Posture:
- Darnell Rhea filed a complaint in a Florida trial court against the City of Gainesville, alleging a violation of the Sunshine Law.
- The City filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted with leave for Rhea to amend his complaint.
- Rhea filed an amended complaint, and the City again moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.
- The trial court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice, finding the actions at the meeting were not "formal actions" covered by the statute.
- Rhea, as appellant, appealed the trial court's dismissal to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, with the City of Gainesville serving as appellee.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a complaint state a sufficient cause of action for a violation of Florida's Sunshine Law by alleging that a city commission held a meeting to discuss and pass a motion on a public matter with only a few hours' notice to the public?
Opinions:
Majority - Shivers, C.J.
Yes. The complaint states a sufficient cause of action because it makes a prima facie showing that the Commission held a public meeting at which official acts or formal action took place, without providing reasonable notice to the public. Although Florida's Sunshine Law does not define a specific notice period, case law has established that "reasonable notice" is a mandatory prerequisite for a public meeting. The purpose of such notice is to apprise the public of pending matters and afford them a reasonable opportunity to appear and present their views. Furthermore, the statute's reference to "official acts" or "formal action" has been interpreted broadly by the courts to include not just final votes, but "any gathering of the members where the members deal with some matter on which foreseeable action will be taken." Citing Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, the court affirmed that "[e]very step in the decision-making process...constitutes an 'official act'" covered by the law. Therefore, Rhea's allegations were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the broad application of Florida's Sunshine Law, confirming that the law's public notice and access requirements apply to the entire decision-making process, not just final, binding votes. It clarifies that even preliminary discussions, debates, and procedural motions are considered "official acts" that must occur in the open. This precedent lowers the pleading threshold for citizens alleging Sunshine Law violations, as a prima facie showing of potentially unreasonable notice for a meeting where official business was discussed is sufficient to proceed. The ruling serves as a caution to governmental bodies against holding hastily called meetings that may effectively exclude public participation, regardless of whether the press is notified.
