Reynolds v. Hicks
951 P.2d 761 (1998)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A social host who furnishes alcohol to a minor in violation of statute does not owe a duty of care to third persons who are subsequently injured by the intoxicated minor.
Facts:
- On September 10, 1988, Jamie and Anna Hicks hosted a wedding reception with 300 guests.
- Steven Hicks, Jamie Hicks' underage nephew, attended the reception.
- Wine, champagne, and drinks from a hosted bar were served at the event.
- Steven Hicks consumed alcohol at the reception.
- At approximately midnight, Steven Hicks left the reception driving his sister's car.
- Around 1:00 A.M., Steven Hicks was involved in an automobile accident with Timothy Reynolds.
- Both Steven Hicks and Timothy Reynolds registered blood alcohol levels of 0.17 percent, and Timothy Reynolds suffered serious injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- Timothy Reynolds and his family filed a lawsuit against Steven Hicks and Dianne Hicks in King County Superior Court, the trial court of first instance.
- Plaintiffs later filed an amended complaint adding Jamie and Anna Hicks as defendants, alleging negligence for serving alcohol to a minor.
- Defendants Jamie and Anna Hicks filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing they owed no legal duty to third parties like the Reynolds family.
- The trial court granted the summary judgment motion on the issue of duty, dismissing the claims against Jamie and Anna Hicks.
- Plaintiffs (as appellants) appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals certified the case for direct review by the Supreme Court of Washington.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a social host who furnishes alcohol to a minor, in violation of RCW 66.44.270, owe a duty of care to third persons injured by the intoxicated minor?
Opinions:
Majority - Madsen, J.
No, a social host who furnishes alcohol to a minor does not owe a duty of care to third persons injured by the intoxicated minor. The statute prohibiting furnishing alcohol to minors, RCW 66.44.270, was enacted to protect the minor's own health and safety from their inability to drink responsibly, not to protect third parties. Citing Burkhart v. Harrod, the court emphasized the significant differences between social hosts and commercial vendors, noting that hosts are not as capable of monitoring alcohol consumption and that imposing such liability would have wide-sweeping and unpredictable social implications. The court also reasoned that the statute's exception, which allows a parent or guardian to furnish alcohol to their own minor child, indicates the legislature did not intend to protect third persons from intoxicated minors, as this would lead to the illogical result of holding a non-violator liable under the statute. This distinguishes the situation from commercial vendor liability established in Purchase v. Meyer.
Concurring - Durham, C.J.
No, the defendant social hosts should not be held liable for injuries to third parties. While agreeing with the majority's conclusion, this opinion is not persuaded by the reasoning regarding the parental exception in the statute. Instead, the concurrence finds that liability should be denied for the policy reasons expressed in the dissent of Hansen v. Friend, which argued that the judiciary is ill-equipped to impose social host liability.
Dissenting - Johnson, J.
Yes, a social host who furnishes alcohol to a minor should owe a duty of care to third persons injured by that minor. The majority's decision creates an illogical rule where a person can commit a criminal act (furnishing alcohol to a minor) yet avoid all civil liability for the foreseeable consequences of that act. There is no justifiable reason to apply a different standard to social hosts than to commercial vendors when both are committing a crime and the harm to the victim is the same regardless of the alcohol's source. The majority confuses the existence of a legal duty with the ultimate determination of liability, which should be a question of fact for a jury based on foreseeability and proximate cause. The broad public safety purpose of the state's liquor laws supports finding that injured third parties are within the class of persons the statute is meant to protect.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies a significant distinction in Washington tort law between social hosts and commercial vendors regarding liability for furnishing alcohol. By refusing to extend a duty of care from social hosts to third parties injured by an intoxicated minor, the court established a bright-line rule insulating private individuals from such lawsuits. This creates a dichotomy where a commercial vendor can be liable to a third party for the same act that a social host cannot. The ruling reinforces the idea that the judiciary is reluctant to impose broad, difficult-to-manage duties on private citizens in social settings, thereby placing the burden on the legislature to explicitly create such liability if it sees fit.
