Renton v. Watson

Majority - BARNES, Presiding Judge

No, a malicious prosecution claim requires the actual issuance of a valid warrant, accusation, or formal criminal process, and an order to appear at a warrant application hearing is not sufficient. The court clarified that OCGA § 51-7-40 and precedent (e.g., Wal-Mart Stores v. Blackford, Peterson v. Banker) demand that a valid warrant, accusation, or summons must actually issue for a malicious prosecution claim to be actionable. The magistrate's order for Renton to attend the warrant application hearing was not a "summons" in the context of charging a criminal offense and conferring jurisdiction, as it did not formally charge Renton with a crime. The case of McNeely v. Home Depot, relied upon by Renton, was distinguishable because an arrest warrant had been sworn out and an arrest had occurred in that case. Yes and No, statements made in warrant applications and in-court testimony responsive to judicial inquiry are absolutely privileged, but a defamation claim can still proceed based on unprivileged statements to third parties outside of those proceedings. The court affirmed that OCGA § 51-5-8 grants absolute privilege to charges, allegations, and averments in judicial pleadings pertinent and material to the relief sought, extending this privilege to official court documents and acts of legal process like warrant applications. Statements made by a witness in court that are responsive to a question posed by the court or counsel are also absolutely privileged. Therefore, Watson's statements in her warrant application and at the hearing were absolutely privileged. However, Renton's complaint also alleged that Watson made false statements about Renton "to third parties without privilege." Construed in Renton’s favor at the motion-to-dismiss stage, it is conceivable she could introduce evidence of such unprivileged defamatory communications. Consequently, the trial court erred in dismissing the defamation claim in its entirety. No, the act of applying for an arrest warrant with false allegations that is then voluntarily dismissed before issuance or arrest does not constitute sufficiently extreme and outrageous conduct to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court emphasized that liability for this tort requires conduct "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Watson's conduct, while possibly wrongful, did not meet this high bar, especially since the warrant was voluntarily dismissed and Renton was never arrested. Prior cases where emotional distress claims were upheld involved actual arrests. No, an award of attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14 (a) was not appropriate because Renton's claims, though ultimately unsuccessful in part, were based on arguable legal theories. The court noted that Renton's malicious prosecution claim, while rejected, was not baseless given her reliance on a superior court order in another case that had accepted a similar legal theory. OCGA § 9-15-14 (a) is intended to discourage frivolous claims, not novel legal theories with arguable support. Since the defamation claim was wrongly dismissed in part, fees related to that claim were unwarranted. For the emotional distress claim, some case law provided arguable, albeit distinguishable, support. Therefore, the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to Watson.