Remy v. MacDonald
440 Mass. 675 (2004)
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Rule of Law:
A child born alive cannot maintain a cause of action in tort against her mother for personal injuries incurred before birth due to the mother’s ordinary negligence, because a pregnant woman does not owe a legal duty of care to her unborn child.
Facts:
- On January 7, 1999, Christine MacDonald was thirty-two weeks pregnant with the plaintiff.
- While Christine MacDonald was operating a motor vehicle at an intersection in Worcester, her vehicle was struck by a motor vehicle owned by Dennis Ellis and operated by Anna Ellis.
- Four days after the accident, the plaintiff was born prematurely by emergency caesarian section.
- The plaintiff was hospitalized for twenty-three days and experienced multiple breathing difficulties associated with her premature birth.
- In the first few years of her life, the plaintiff suffered from respiratory distress and asthma.
- The plaintiff alleges that Christine MacDonald’s negligent driving caused the accident that led to the plaintiff’s premature birth and subsequent related injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff filed a complaint in Superior Court, alleging negligence against her mother, Christine MacDonald, for prenatal injuries, and also asserted two claims of negligence against Dennis and Anna Ellis.
- Christine MacDonald, the defendant mother, filed a motion for summary judgment in the Superior Court, arguing that she could not be held liable.
- A judge in the Superior Court allowed Christine MacDonald's motion for summary judgment, concluding that she owed no duty of care to the unborn plaintiff.
- Final judgment was entered under Mass. R. Civ. R 54 (b), dismissing the plaintiff’s claim of negligence against Christine MacDonald, as well as a cross-claim filed by the Ellises against MacDonald for contribution.
- The plaintiff appealed the Superior Court's judgment.
- The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts transferred the case to itself on its own motion.
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Issue:
Does a pregnant woman owe a legal duty of care to her unborn child such that a child born alive can maintain a cause of action in tort against her mother for personal injuries incurred before birth due to the mother's negligence?
Opinions:
Majority - Greaney, J.
No, a pregnant woman does not owe a legal duty of care to her unborn child, and therefore a child born alive cannot maintain a cause of action in tort against her mother for prenatal injuries caused by the mother's ordinary negligence. The court determined that whether a duty exists is a question of common law, guided by existing social values, customs, and appropriate social policy. While a general duty to exercise reasonable care exists, the court identified the unique symbiotic relationship between a mother and her unborn child as a situation where imposing such a duty would be inadvisable and unworkable. Recognizing such a duty would lead to an almost unlimited number of litigation circumstances, posing challenges for courts to define its scope and the standard of conduct expected of a pregnant woman, and lacking consensus in social values or policy to justify it. The court cited decisions from Illinois and Texas (Stallman v. Youngquist; Chenault v. Huie) which similarly declined to recognize such a duty, reasoning that treating a fetus as a separate legal person with hostile rights against its mother would be a 'legal fiction' with profound social implications. While Massachusetts law allows recovery for prenatal injuries inflicted by third parties and for injuries to a born child caused by a parent’s negligence, the court found 'inherent and important differences between a fetus, in útero, and a child already born.' The court rejected the argument to limit such a duty solely to automobile accidents, as it would be inconsistent with Massachusetts law and inevitably extend to a 'myriad of situations' making pregnant women liable for all manner of allegedly negligent conduct. The court affirmed the principle that tortious harm caused by 'one who tortiously causes harm to an unborn child' is subject to liability if the child is born alive, but emphasized this does not extend to the mother. Ultimately, the court concluded that a 'bright line' should be drawn to limit the zone of potential tort liability of one who is still biologically joined to an injured plaintiff.
Analysis:
This case establishes a significant precedent in Massachusetts tort law by definitively denying a legal duty of care owed by a pregnant woman to her unborn child for prenatal negligence. The ruling protects pregnant individuals from potential civil liability arising from ordinary activities that might inadvertently affect fetal development, prioritizing a woman's autonomy and avoiding the creation of an unmanageable scope of legal responsibility. The court's emphasis on distinguishing the mother-fetus relationship from that of a third-party tortfeasor or a parent-born child highlights the judiciary's role in shaping legal duties based on social policy and practical implications. This decision effectively forecloses a category of claims, ensuring that while children can recover for prenatal injuries caused by third parties, their mothers are not subject to the same liability for everyday negligent conduct during pregnancy.
