Reid v. Covert
354 U.S. 1 (1957)
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Rule of Law:
Civilian dependents of members of the armed forces overseas may not be tried by court-martial for capital offenses in peacetime because they are entitled to the constitutional protections of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, including indictment by grand jury and trial by jury.
Facts:
- Clarice Covert was a civilian residing with her husband, a U.S. Air Force sergeant, at an airbase in England.
- While living on the base, Mrs. Covert killed her husband.
- Dorothy Smith was a civilian living with her husband, a U.S. Army officer, at a military post in Japan.
- While at the post, Mrs. Smith killed her husband.
- Both women were civilian dependents of military personnel and were not themselves members of the armed services.
- The alleged offenses occurred during a time of peace, not in an area of active hostilities or in occupied enemy territory.
Procedural Posture:
- In the first case, Clarice Covert was convicted of murder by a U.S. Air Force court-martial in England. After her conviction was reversed by the Court of Military Appeals for trial errors, her counsel filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
- The District Court granted the writ, holding that the court-martial of a civilian was unconstitutional. The Government appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.
- In the second case, Dorothy Smith was convicted of murder by a U.S. Army court-martial in Japan and her conviction was affirmed through the military appeals system. Her father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for West Virginia.
- The District Court denied the writ. While the case was on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- The Supreme Court consolidated the cases and initially held, in a 1956 decision, that the court-martial jurisdiction was constitutional.
- Subsequently, the Court granted a petition for rehearing to reconsider its initial decision.
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Issue:
Does Article 2(11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which subjects civilian dependents accompanying the armed forces overseas to court-martial jurisdiction, violate Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution when applied to a capital offense committed during peacetime?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Black
Yes, the application of Article 2(11) of the UCMJ to civilian dependents in capital cases violates the Constitution. The protections of the Bill of Rights extend to American citizens wherever they are, including when they are abroad. The power of the United States government is derived from and limited by the Constitution, and no international agreement or treaty can authorize the government to act in a manner that violates these fundamental constitutional prohibitions. Article I's power to make rules for the 'land and naval Forces' does not extend to civilians who are not members of the armed services, and the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot be used to expand military jurisdiction in a way that deprives civilians of their right to a jury trial and other constitutional safeguards. The history of the Constitution demonstrates a profound fear of unchecked military power and a commitment to keeping the military subordinate to civilian authority.
Concurring - Justice Frankfurter
Yes, court-martial jurisdiction over civilian dependents in capital cases during peacetime is unconstitutional. This decision should be narrowly confined to the specific facts at hand: a capital case involving a civilian dependent in a time of peace. While Congress's power to regulate the armed forces must be interpreted flexibly, it cannot override the fundamental procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights when a person's life is at stake. The proximity of these dependents to the military is not so critical to military discipline as to justify the loss of these core protections in a capital case. Historical precedents like In re Ross and the Insular Cases are inapplicable as they arose from unique historical circumstances involving consular courts in 'non-Christian' countries or the governance of unincorporated territories, respectively.
Concurring - Justice Harlan
Yes, in capital cases, Article 2(11) is unconstitutional as applied to civilian dependents in peacetime. The constitutionality of the statute must be tested as an exercise of Congress's Article I power to regulate the armed forces, not on abstract notions of reasonableness. While there is a rational connection between regulating dependents and maintaining military effectiveness overseas, this power collides with constitutional protections. The proper analysis is a balancing test, weighing practical necessities against specific constitutional guarantees. For capital offenses, where the law is most sensitive to procedural fairness, the constitutional guarantees of a civilian trial must prevail over the government's asserted practical needs.
Dissenting - Justice Clark
No, the statute is a constitutional exercise of Congress's power to regulate the land and naval forces. Civilian dependents overseas are an integral part of the military community, and their conduct has a direct impact on the morale, discipline, and readiness of the armed forces. Trial by court-martial is the only practicable alternative, as trial in the U.S. would be unworkable and trial in foreign courts would be inadequate and undesirable. The majority's decision creates a dangerous jurisdictional vacuum, undermining the authority of military commanders and leaving dependents to the varying standards of foreign justice. Historical practice and precedent, including cases involving 'camp followers,' support Congress's authority to subject these persons to military law.
Analysis:
Reid v. Covert is a landmark decision that significantly curtailed the scope of military jurisdiction over civilians. It firmly established that fundamental constitutional protections, particularly the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to grand and petit juries, travel with American citizens even when they are abroad. The ruling reinforced the principle of military subordination to civilian law and limited congressional power under Article I, ensuring it could not be used to override the specific protections of Article III and the Bill of Rights for civilians. While the holding was narrow (applying to capital cases in peacetime), it set a powerful precedent that would later be extended to non-capital offenses, profoundly shaping the legal relationship between the military and the civilians associated with it overseas.
