Regina v. Cunningham
2 Q.B. 396 (1957)
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Rule of Law:
In a statutory crime, the term 'maliciously' requires that the defendant either intended to do the particular kind of harm that was in fact done, or was reckless as to whether such harm would occur by foreseeing the risk and taking it anyway.
Facts:
- Cunningham's prospective mother-in-law was the tenant of an unoccupied house, No. 7A Bakes Street.
- An elderly couple, Mr. and Mrs. Wade, lived in the adjoining house, No. 7B.
- The two houses shared a cellar wall made of loosely cemented rubble, which separated the two properties.
- On the evening of January 17, 1957, Cunningham went into the cellar of the unoccupied house, No. 7A.
- He wrenched a gas meter from the gas pipes to steal the money inside.
- Despite a stop tap being located nearby, Cunningham did not turn off the gas after breaking the meter.
- A significant volume of coal gas escaped from the broken pipes.
- The escaped gas seeped through the cellar wall into the Wade's house, partially asphyxiating Mrs. Wade as she slept and endangering her life.
Procedural Posture:
- Cunningham was indicted at Leeds Assizes (a trial court) on a charge of unlawfully and maliciously causing Sarah Wade to take a noxious thing (coal gas), endangering her life.
- The trial judge instructed the jury that for the purposes of the statute, 'malicious' means 'wicked.'
- The jury returned a verdict of guilty.
- Cunningham (appellant) appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the meaning of 'maliciously'.
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Issue:
Does the term 'maliciously' in a criminal statute simply mean 'wicked,' or does it require proof that the defendant either intended the specific harm or foresaw the possibility of that harm occurring and proceeded regardless?
Opinions:
Majority - Byrne J.
No, the term 'maliciously' in a criminal statute requires a more specific state of mind than general wickedness. For an act to be malicious, the defendant must have foreseen that the particular kind of harm might be done and yet have gone on to take the risk of it. The court adopted the definition proposed by Professor Kenny, stating that 'malice' requires either (1) an actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that was done, or (2) recklessness as to whether such harm should occur. The court found that the trial judge misdirected the jury by defining 'malicious' simply as 'wicked.' This instruction erroneously allowed the jury to convict Cunningham based on the wickedness of his theft, rather than on a finding that he foresaw the risk of causing physical harm by gas poisoning. The proper question for the jury was whether Cunningham, even if not intending to harm Mrs. Wade, foresaw that removing the meter might cause injury to someone but proceeded anyway. Since a properly instructed jury might not have convicted, the conviction must be quashed.
Analysis:
This case is a landmark in English criminal law for defining the mens rea of 'malice.' It firmly establishes that malice does not mean ill-will or general wickedness, but rather requires a subjective state of mind regarding the specific harm caused. The court's adoption of the 'foresight of consequence' standard, also known as subjective recklessness, became a foundational principle for numerous statutory offenses. This decision distinguished malice from negligence and strict liability, reinforcing the principle that criminal culpability for serious offenses should depend on the defendant's actual awareness of the risks they are creating.
