Regents of University of California v. Superior Court
183 Cal. App. 4th 755, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 481, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 637 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), a valid anatomical gift document transfers the exclusive right to control the disposition of a donor's remains to the donee upon the donor's death, and representations made by the donee to the donor's family outside the written agreement do not create additional legally enforceable duties for the donee.
Facts:
- In 1970, Ruth Waters enrolled in the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) 'Willed Body Program' with the intent to donate her body to medical science for teaching and research.
- Ruth Waters executed a donation agreement on October 3, 1970, stating her wish to donate her body to UCLA for 'teaching purposes, scientific research, or such purposes as the said University or its authorized representative shall in their sole discretion deem advisable.'
- Ruth Waters informed her children, Chiquita Waters, Tami Waters, and Victor Waters, of her intent to donate her body and some of them reviewed related documents.
- UCLA provided literature to donors, including documents entitled 'The Gift of Knowledge,' 'General Information,' and 'Frequently Asked Questions,' which stated that only medical staff, students, or students in health-related professions would have access to donated remains, and that remains were routinely cremated and scattered at El Toro Memorial Park.
- Chiquita Waters also viewed information about the UCLA Willed Body Program on the Internet, which indicated donated bodies were for the use of medical staff, students, and faculty.
- Ruth Waters died on July 14, 2001, and her body was transported to UCLA in accordance with her donation.
- After Ruth Waters's death, Tami Waters received a thank-you letter from UCLA stating that her mother's remains would be cremated and scattered at El Toro Memorial Park after study; she was later told her mother's body might be used for up to three years.
- In late 2003 or early 2004, Chiquita Waters and Victor Waters learned from media reports about alleged wrongdoing and misuse of donated remains at the UCLA Willed Body Program, including the improper sale of body parts for profit by program employees Henry Reid and Ernest Nelson.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs Chiquita Waters, Tami Waters, and Victor Waters, along with other plaintiffs, instituted an action against the Regents of the University of California (the Regents) and three corporate entities, consenting to and adopting a third amended master complaint for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
- The Regents filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative for summary adjudication of issues as to individual causes of action, against the Waters plaintiffs, raising issues of standing/duty, governmental immunity, and sufficiency of damages.
- The trial court denied the Regents' motion for summary judgment.
- Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 166.1 and 437c, subdivision (m)(l), the parties stipulated and the trial court ordered that the Regents' petition for writ of mandate be certified to the Court of Appeal to resolve issues regarding duties owed to family members under the UAGA and negligence claims based on alleged misrepresentations.
- The Regents filed a petition for peremptory writ of mandate with the California Court of Appeal.
- The Court of Appeal determined the issues were novel and important and ordered the parties to appear to show cause why the requested relief should or should not be granted.
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Issue:
Does a university operating a willed body program owe a duty of care to a donor's family members, such that representations made to the family regarding the use and disposition of donated remains, not specified in the original donation agreement, create legally enforceable obligations and form a basis for a negligence claim?
Opinions:
Majority - Kitching, J.
No, a university operating a willed body program does not owe a duty of care to a donor's family members based on representations made outside the written donation agreement. The court affirmed the grant of summary adjudication for the Regents on the negligence claim. The court relied heavily on Conroy v. Regents of University of California (2009), which held that the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) and the document of gift define the donee's duties, and representations made by the university to the donor's family do not amend the document of gift. Upon the donor's death, the statutory right to control disposition of the body passes exclusively to the donee (UCLA), making the donee the statutory right holder with superior rights to others, including family members. The UAGA, specifically former sections 7150.5(h) and 7154(a), and Health & Safety Code section 7100.1(a), establishes that an anatomical gift, if not revoked by the donor before death, becomes irrevocable and cannot be altered by family members. Ruth Waters's donation agreement, like the one in Conroy, gave UCLA 'sole discretion' for use. Therefore, any oral, Internet, or other representations made to the Waters plaintiffs that were not in the original donation agreement did not create an enforceable duty, as enforcing such duties would violate section 7100.1(a) by effectively altering the decedent's written disposition. The court reiterated Conroy's rejection of a duty to maintain records or to dispose of remains in a way that would not 'shock the sensibilities' of family members, as the donee's right to control disposition is exclusive and the Legislature has exempted medical programs from certain funeral laws.
Dissenting - Croskey, Acting P. J.
No, the majority's interpretation that Conroy dictates no duty of care arises from representations made outside the donation agreement is incorrect, and such representations can create a duty. The dissenting opinion argued that Conroy did not definitively hold that only representations within the donation agreement could create a duty of care. Instead, Conroy disposed of various claims on other grounds, such as lack of causation, failure to allege the theory, or inconsistency with the donation agreement's broad grant of discretion. The dissent asserted that Conroy never stated that outside representations could not create a duty of care as a matter of law. Furthermore, Health and Safety Code section 7100.1(a), which prohibits altering a decedent's written directions, does not preclude tort liability for unfulfilled promises causing emotional distress, as an award of damages would not amend the donation agreement. The dissent also highlighted that reliance, while crucial for fraud, is not an essential element for a negligence claim. Applying Rowland v. Christian factors, the dissent found it foreseeable that plaintiffs would suffer severe emotional distress if representations were unfulfilled, the moral blame was substantial, and a duty would discourage future misconduct without unduly burdening donees or research.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the strict interpretation of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) and anatomical donation agreements, emphasizing the donor's autonomy and the donee's broad discretion. It significantly limits the ability of a donor's family members to bring negligence claims based on oral or informal representations made outside the formal donation document. The ruling prioritizes the express terms of the written gift and the legislative intent behind the UAGA, which grants donees superior rights over family members regarding disposition. This makes it challenging for families to seek recourse for perceived mishandling unless specific conditions or limitations are explicitly stated in the original donation agreement or a state law mandates such a duty.
