Yes, the school's plan was illegal. You can't have a strict quota that blocks people of one race from competing for open spots. However, it's okay for schools to consider race as one of many 'plus factors'—like being from a small town or having a special talent—to make the student body more diverse. A diverse campus helps everyone learn better.

No, the school's plan should have been allowed. After centuries of discrimination in America, it's fair to use programs that consider race to help fix the problem and give minorities a better chance. The 16-spot program was a reasonable way to do that and should be legal.

Yes, the program was illegal, but for a simpler reason. We don't even need to discuss the Constitution. A federal law, the Civil Rights Act, clearly says you can't exclude anyone from a program that gets federal money because of their race. The school did that to Bakke, so its program is illegal, period.

Yes, the school broke the law. The Constitution says you can't save a specific number of spots for certain races. But colleges can consider race as one factor in admissions, along with grades, test scores, and other qualities. They just have to have a really good reason, like wanting a diverse student body, and they have to look at each applicant as an individual. The school's program wasn't flexible enough because it only looked at race, not at applicants' unique backgrounds and experiences.

I say the school can use race as one of several factors when picking students because it helps fix old unfairness. This decision is needed because past discrimination still affects opportunities, so it’s okay to have a rule that helps balance things out.

I agree that schools should use race to help fix old mistakes, because some groups have been hurt by unfair treatment for a long time. But I worry that if you just set aside a fixed number of spots, it might accidentally make those students feel labeled. It would be better to look at each student as a person.

I agree that using race can help bring a mix of students together and fix past wrongs. But I also think that if the school uses a strict rule, it might make some kids feel put into a box, which isn’t fair.

I think it’s okay for schools to check a student’s race as one way to help fix past unfairness, because that old bias still hurts some groups. But I also believe every student should be looked at individually rather than just putting a number on who gets a break.

I agree that looking at race when picking students can help fix old unfair problems, since history hasn’t been completely right. However, I worry that sticking to a strict number might hurt the idea of judging each student on their own strengths.

I agree with the decision because the law says schools can consider race sometimes, which helps fix old wrongs. This means money from the government isn’t wasted on unfair rules, and everyone gets a fair chance.

I think the decision is right because having students from different backgrounds makes a school a better place. It’s important to consider race sometimes to help fix old problems, while still looking at all the good qualities a student has.

We shouldn't even be talking about whether race can ever be considered in college admissions. That's not what this case is about. The only question is whether the school's program broke a specific law called Title VI. That law says you can't exclude anyone from a program that gets federal money because of their race. The school's program clearly excluded Bakke because he was white, so it violated Title VI. We have to let Bakke into the medical school.

I disagree with the decision because I think the case should only fix Bakke’s situation—not change the whole system. It’s like if someone was treated unfairly, you should fix that one mistake instead of making a rule that might end up unfair to others.

In that case, an unsuccessful white applicant to the University of California at Davis Medical School challenged the school's admissions program, which consisted of a regular admissions system for non-minority applicants and a special admissions system strictly for minorities.

—concluding that an applicant for admission had standing to challenge a university's affirmative action admissions program even though the applicant "had been unable to prove that he would have been admitted in the absence of the program

—stating that "[w] hen a classification denies an individual opportunities or benefits... because of his race... it must be regarded as suspect," and that "[p] referring members of any one group for no reason other than race... is discrimination for its own sake

A statute which restricts fundamental rights is subject to a strict scrutiny standard of review and can only be justified if it furthers a compelling government purpose, and even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available.

"The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color... Racial and ethnic distinctions are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination."

—believed that, for educational institutions, academic diversity is a compelling government interest.[5]

—joint opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part

"[T] he attainment of a diverse student body.... clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education,"

—invalidating special admissions program but allowing race to be taken into consideration in future admissions decisions

—we recognized that the national "majority" "is composed of various minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of prior discrimination at the hands of the State and private individuals."

Yes, the UC Davis special admissions program's use of a racial quota violates the Equal Protection Clause. While the goal of achieving a diverse student body is a compelling state interest, a program that sets aside a fixed number of seats for minority applicants is not a narrowly tailored means of achieving that goal. All racial and ethnic classifications are inherently suspect and must be subjected to the most exacting judicial scrutiny. The university failed to show that its purpose of remedying the effects of 'societal discrimination' was a compelling interest sufficient to justify a rigid, two-track admissions system. However, a university's interest in the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student body is a compelling interest under the First Amendment's protection of academic freedom. To be constitutionally permissible, an admissions program may consider race or ethnic background as a 'plus' factor in a particular applicant's file, but it cannot insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats.

No, the UC Davis special admissions program is constitutional. Government may take race into account to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice. Racial classifications designed for benign remedial purposes should be subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, requiring that they serve important governmental objectives and be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. Remedying the effects of past societal discrimination is an important governmental objective. The UC Davis program, which sets aside a reasonable number of seats for minorities who have been historically underrepresented in the medical profession, is a constitutionally permissible and substantially related means of achieving this objective.

Yes, the program is unlawful, but the decision should rest on statutory grounds, not constitutional ones. The plain language of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits the exclusion of any person from a federally funded program on the basis of race. The UC Davis special admissions program excluded Allan Bakke from consideration for 16 seats in the medical school solely because of his race. Therefore, the program is illegal under Title VI, and it is unnecessary and inappropriate to decide the constitutional question of whether race can ever be a factor in an admissions decision.

Yes. The University's use of racial quotas as part of its admissions process violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is subject to strict scrutiny because it is not precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. However, race can be considered as a 'plus factor' in a holistic evaluation of a student's application. The attainment of a diverse student body is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education, but the assignment of a fixed number of places to a minority group is not a necessary means toward that end. The University's special admissions program, focused solely on ethnic diversity, hinders rather than furthers attainment of genuine diversity. Race or ethnic background may be deemed a 'plus' in a particular applicant's file, yet it does not insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats.

The question whether race can ever be used as a factor in an admissions decision is not an issue in this case, and discussion of that issue is inappropriate. The only issue is whether the University's special admissions program violates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In unmistakable terms, the Act prohibits the exclusion of individuals from federally funded programs because of their race. As succinctly phrased during the Senate debate, under Title VI it is not 'permissible to say 

I rule that the University’s special admissions program, while flawed in its rigid imposition of numerical limits, may be revised to allow race to be considered as one factor among many. I support the holding because the program’s remedial purpose is vital to addressing long entrenched racial discrimination, and this approach is justified under both constitutional analysis and statutory interpretation – because historical injustice demands that race be taken into account to remedy the imbalance.

I join in part with the majority. I agree that remedial action in admissions is essential because history has left lasting racial disadvantages. However, I dissent concerning the rigid application of quotas; a system that mechanically allocates seats risks stigmatizing its beneficiaries because it fails to consider individual circumstances. A more flexible, individualized evaluation is preferable to ensure fairness without unintended labeling.

I concur with the majority’s decision to allow race as a factor in admissions because it is necessary to promote diversity and remedy historical discrimination. At the same time, I dissent from parts of the majority opinion that overlook the risk of stigma attached to categorical quotas, because even well‐intentioned policies can inadvertently harm individuals if they are not applied with sufficient discretion.

I agree with the Court’s reversal of the blanket exclusion because universities must consider race to overcome chronic historical imbalances. However, I dissent regarding the use of inflexible quotas instead of individualized assessments because treating applicants solely as members of a category risks denying them the benefit of a case-by-case review, which is essential for true equality.

I support the judgment that race-conscious admissions can be constitutional because they address the serious residual effects of historical discrimination. Yet I dissent from any approach that employs a rigid quota system without room for flexibility because such inflexibility may undermine evaluations based on individual merit, thereby potentially creating further bias.

I concur in this judgment because the statutory provisions of Title VI clearly support our decision to reverse the exclusion. I emphasize that remedial action is not only permissible but necessary to correct past racial discrimination – because the use of race as one factor in admissions helps ensure that federal funds are not used to perpetuate exclusionary practices.

I join the majority opinion because academic freedom and the benefits of diversity are essential to higher education. I stress that considering race helps create a richer educational environment because it allows us to counteract the adverse impacts of past discrimination while still evaluating each candidate on multiple merits.

I dissent from the Court’s judgment because the issue in this case should have been narrowly confined to Bakke’s individual exclusion, rather than broadly endorsing race-based admissions policies. I believe that allowing such a wide application of affirmative action risks blurring the lines between remedial measures and reverse discrimination, because the focus shifts from correcting a specific wrong to endorsing a sweeping policy.

Regents of University of California v. Bakke

Case Podcast

Rule of Law:

The Legal Principle

Facts:

Procedural Posture:

How It Got Here

Issue:

Legal Question at Stake

Opinions:

Majority, Concurrences & Dissents

Analysis:

Why This Case Matters

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