No, the trial was fair and the conviction should stand. The victim's last words were allowed in court because of a rule called a 'dying declaration.' The law trusts that people tell the truth when they know they're about to die. The court believed Dee knew she was dying because her wounds were so severe. Even if allowing her statement was a mistake, it wouldn't change the outcome because there was so much other evidence against Homer. For example, he had a motive, he was at the scene right before she was found, he ran away and hid for months, and the weapon was never found in the apartment. These facts, even without her last words, strongly pointed to his guilt. Therefore, the trial was not fundamentally unfair.

No, Reese got a fair trial. It was okay to use Dee's dying statement in court because she knew she was dying and would have told the truth. Even if it was wrong to use her statement, there was enough other evidence to show Reese was guilty. The judge's instructions to the jury were fair when you look at them carefully. Reese's punishment was not too harsh according to the law. Overall, Reese was treated fairly and his trial was done right.

—woman stabbed in the abdomen would have been "a competent witness as to how she came by her stab wounds

The rule's permissive wording was intended to protect the defendant, and it would be wrongminded to invoke the rule to the defendant's detriment. m See notes 123-25 supra and accompanying text. 28, 2 C. WiuoH, supra note 149, § 467, at 660. m

Since this Court has reviewed the entire record and the briefs submitted to the Appellate Division, it is desirable in the interests of judicial economy to pass upon all claims presented upon the merits.

Like many of the cases addressing the issue of federal review of state criminal proceedings, Orr involved a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to a state criminal conviction.

Rivera's sentence is within the range prescribed by state law,[3] and its length therefore does not present a question of constitutional dimensions.

Considering the excludable testimony of Berg in light of the entire record, the Court finds that any error was harmless and that petitioner was not denied a fair trial.

However, even if petitioner's excessive sentence claim had been preserved for habeas review, his sentence fails to raise any constitutional issues, since it does not exceed the maximum sentence prescribed under the relevant criminal statute.

Some courts appear to have adopted a half-way approach, relaxing exhaustion requirements only when satisfied that the claim on the merits is unavailing.

It is clear from a long, consistent line of cases that a collateral, due process attack on a state conviction, alleging error in the admission or exclusion of evidence at trial, is foreclosed absent a specific showing of violation of a constitutional right

They have not submitted the briefs containing their respective contentions in urging reversal or affirmance of the judgment of conviction. Despite repeated admonitions

No, the alleged state court errors do not rise to the level of a constitutional due process violation. The admission of the victim's statement was proper under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule, and even if it were an error, it did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. The three elements for a dying declaration were met: (1) the declarant, Dee, was in extremis, dying within minutes of the statement; (2) her sense of impending death could be inferred from the severity of her wounds, which included a fatal stab to the abdomen that severed a major blood vessel; and (3) she would have been a competent witness if she had lived. Furthermore, federal habeas review of state court evidentiary rulings is narrow; mere errors of state law are not sufficient for relief. A petitioner must show the error 'offend[s] fundamental principles of justice and fair play.' Given the overwhelming circumstantial evidence of guilt—including Reese's motive, presence at the scene just before the discovery, subsequent flight, and the absence of the weapon—the admission of the statement did not deny him a fair trial. The judge's jury instructions were also not prejudicial; the comment that the prosecution must 'take the witnesses as they found them' was a statement of fact, and the reference to the 'murder weapon' was proper within the context of the full instruction.

Yes, the petitioner was not deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial. The dying declaration identifying the petitioner as the assailant was properly admitted under the recognized hearsay exception because the evidence showed the declarant was in extremis, under a sense of impending death, and would have been a competent witness if living. Even if the statement was admitted in error, the circumstantial evidence of guilt was substantial enough to render any such error harmless. The trial court's instructions regarding the prosecution's witnesses and reference to a "murder weapon" did not improperly influence the jury or deprive petitioner of a fair trial when viewed in context. The sentence imposed was within statutory limits and does not itself raise constitutional issues. In sum, the petitioner received due process and his trial comported with constitutional requirements.

No, the admission of the victim's dying declaration and the trial court's jury instructions did not deprive the petitioner of his constitutional right to a fair trial. The dying declaration identifying the petitioner as the assailant was properly admitted under the recognized hearsay exception because the evidence showed the declarant was in extremis, under a sense of impending death, and would have been a competent witness if living. Even if the statement was admitted in error, the circumstantial evidence of guilt was substantial enough to render any such error harmless. When viewed in context, the trial court's instructions regarding the prosecution's witnesses and reference to a "murder weapon" did not improperly influence the jury or deprive the petitioner of a fair trial. The sentence imposed was within statutory limits and does not itself raise constitutional issues. In sum, the petitioner received due process, and the trial comported with constitutional requirements.

Reese v. Bara

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