Reed v. Tacoma Railway & Power Co.
1921 Wash. LEXIS 886, 201 P. 783, 117 Wash. 547 (1921)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
An error in judgment is not necessarily negligence. The proper legal standard for determining negligence is an objective one: whether the individual acted as a reasonably prudent person would have acted under similar circumstances, not whether their judgment proved correct in hindsight.
Facts:
- Plaintiff Reed was a passenger in an automobile driven by his daughter around midnight.
- While driving through Wright Park, their vehicle approached an intersection with streetcar tracks.
- Reed's daughter did not see the oncoming streetcar until the automobile was very close to the track, creating a sudden emergency.
- In this emergency, the daughter decided that attempting to accelerate across the tracks was safer than trying to stop.
- She was unable to clear the tracks in time, and the streetcar collided with the rear of the automobile.
- As a result of the collision, Reed was injured and his automobile was damaged.
Procedural Posture:
- Reed initially sued Tacoma Railway & Power Co. in a trial court, which resulted in a judgment of nonsuit (dismissal).
- On a prior appeal, the state's highest court reversed the nonsuit and remanded the case for a new trial.
- At the second trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, Tacoma Railway & Power Co.
- Based on the jury verdict, the trial court entered a judgment dismissing the plaintiff's action.
- The plaintiff, Reed, appealed the judgment of dismissal to the Supreme Court of Washington.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a jury instruction stating that an 'error in judgment' by a driver automatically constitutes negligence, thereby preventing the plaintiff from recovering damages, misstate the law of negligence?
Opinions:
Majority - Bridges, J.
Yes, such an instruction misstates the law. An error of judgment is not necessarily negligence. The correct legal test is not whether a person's judgment proved to be flawed, but whether the person acted as a reasonably prudent person would have under the same circumstances. The trial court's instruction incorrectly equated a mere error in judgment with negligence, which is an improper standard. The law recognizes that a person can make a mistake without being legally negligent. The standard of care is an external, objective one based on a 'reasonably prudent person,' not a subjective one based on an individual's 'best judgment' or the ultimate success of their chosen course of action. Therefore, the instruction was erroneous and prejudicial.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the critical distinction between a simple mistake and actionable negligence, particularly in situations involving a sudden emergency. By rejecting a jury instruction that equated an 'error in judgment' with negligence, the court reinforced the objective 'reasonably prudent person' standard as the bedrock of negligence law. This decision ensures that a person's conduct is judged based on the reasonableness of their actions at the time of the event, not on the perfection of the outcome. It provides a crucial protection for defendants who must make split-second decisions under pressure, preventing juries from using hindsight to assign liability for what was merely an unfortunate, but reasonable, choice.
